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This thesis consists of three papers examining determinants and implications of related party 
transactions (RPTs) in Vietnam, a transitional economy in South East Asia with features of 
concentrated state ownership and weak minority investor protection. Specifically, these papers 
describe RPTs and examine (i) the association between RPTs and state ownership, (ii) the association 
between the cost of corporate debt and RPTs, and the moderating role of state ownership on the 
association between the cost of debt and RPTs, and (iii) the association between corporate tax 
avoidance and RPTs, and the moderating role of state ownership on this potential association.  
The first paper describes the nature and extent of RPTs in Vietnamese listed firms and examines 
the association between RPTs and state ownership. The results from this paper demonstrate that 
related party transactions are prevalent in Vietnam. Findings show that the presence of state 
ownership is related to a lower extent of RPTs. However, among firms with state ownership, the 
extent of RPTs is positively associated with percentage of state ownership. 
The second paper reveals that the cost of debt is higher in firms having a higher level of RPTs, 
implying that RPTs are viewed as a potential risk to firms from the point of view of lenders. However, 
the presence of state ownership can reduce the effect of RPTs on the cost of debt.  
The third paper provides evidence that firms with RPTs demonstrate more tax avoidance than their 
counterparts without RPTs. Further, among firms with RPTs, firms with a higher extent of related net 
credit and related sales are found to exhibit even higher levels of tax avoidance. However, the 
association between tax avoidance and RPTs is moderated by the presence of state ownership. Finally, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis describes the nature and extent of related party transactions (RPTs, hereafter), and their 
potential association with state ownership, the cost of corporate debt and corporate tax avoidance in 
Vietnam, a transition economy with concentrated state ownership and weak minority investor 
protection (Robinett et al. 2013; World Bank 2016). The thesis answers the following questions. First, 
what is the nature and extent of RPTs by listed firms in Vietnam? Second, is the presence and 
percentage of state ownership associated with RPTs? Third, is there an association between the cost 
of corporate debt and RPTs, and does the presence of state ownership moderate the association 
between the cost of debt and RPTs? Finally, is there an association between corporate tax avoidance 
and RPTs and does the presence of state ownership moderate this association?  
A RPT is defined as a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related parties, 
regardless of whether or not a price is charged, where a related party is a person or entity related to 
the reporting entity (International Accounting Standard 24.9, International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) 2009). Such transactions are varied, often complicated business transactions between 
a firm and its related parties, including its managers, directors, shareholders, and associates (Habib et 
al. 2015).  
RPTs are initiated for legitimate business reasons, such as reducing transaction costs or ensuring 
the quality of products (Khanna and Palepu 2000). However, RPTs are often considered to breach the 
rules and violate arm’s-length market transactions (Habib et al. 2015). This violation is often related 
to financial fraud and expropriation of minority shareholders (Cheung et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2010). 
In addition, RPTs have been widely criticised for contributing to corporate failures in developed 
countries, such as Enron in the U.S., Health International Holdings (HIH) in Australia (both 
liquidations were in 2001) and some finance firms in New Zealand (Wu 2013). Therefore, firms are 
required to disclose information on transactions, balances, and relationships with related parties to 
2 
 
enable users of financial reports to evaluate the entity’s operations, including opportunities and 
challenges faced by the entity associated with RPTs (International Accounting Standard 24.8, 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 2009).  
This thesis is motivated by several important factors. First, there is a concern that weak disclosure 
requirements and ineffective governance mechanisms in Vietnam allow directors and controlling 
shareholders to use RPTs for personal benefit at the expense of the firm. RPTs are assessed to be 
prevalent among state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter) in Vietnam (Robinett et al. 2013). The 
involvement of RPTs is linked to some high-profile scandals1 in Vietnam since 2010. However, little 
research on RPTs has been conducted using Vietnamese data. There is no study assessing the nature 
and the extent of RPTs in Vietnam, its determinants and implications as being beneficial or 
detrimental to stakeholders.  
Second, the implications of RPTs have been assessed from different perspectives, such as those of 
auditors and shareholders (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Hwang et al. 2013; Habib et al. 2015; 
Balsam et al. 2017; Habib et al. 2019). However, there is limited evidence on whether lenders price 
the risks and benefits of the existence and extent of RPTs in the cost of debt, even though debt 
financing is a dominant channel to organise capital for firms in many economies. Given competing 
theories about the nature of RPTs (Gordon et al. 2004b; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004b), it is important 
to understand how these transactions relate to the cost of debt.  
Third, RPTs are found to be associated with tunnelling activities in firms and tunnelling activities 
are found to be associated with tax avoidance (Chan et al. 2016). However, whether there is an 
association between RPTs and tax avoidance is not clear. In addition, there is a lack of empirical 
research on RPTs and tax avoidance in Vietnam. 
Finally, state ownership has grown more prevalent in the world economy (Pargendler 2011). 
However, there is limited research examining the role of state ownership as a corporate governance 
 
1 Vinashin, ACB and Ocean Bank. 
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mechanism in determining RPTs and in moderating the association between RPTs and the cost of 
debt and the association between RPTs and tax avoidance.  
Vietnam offers an interesting context to answer the above research questions. First, being a small 
emerging economy in South East Asia, Vietnam features as a concentrated ownership economy with 
a prevalence of state ownership. The concentration of ownership enables RPTs, making RPTs 
substantial in Vietnam.  State ownership is dominant in Vietnam, although the government has 
conducted a reform in SOEs as part of the economic reforms introduced in 1986 (Nguyen and Richard 
2011; Nguyen 2019). Second, debt financing (mainly bank lending) is a major source of capital for 
firms as firms in Vietnam rely on loans rather than equity capital for their sources of finance (Nguyen 
et al. 2014; Sarath and Pham 2015; Phan 2018; Vuong 2019). Finally, Vietnamese firms have strong 
incentives to take part in tax avoidance activities, given the complexity and abundance of tax 
incentives resulting from continuous reforms in corporate income tax, along with the lack of 
efficiency in the tax administration process.  
To examine RPTs, their determinants and implications, this thesis is separated into three studies. 
The main variable of interest is RPTs. This is the dependent variable in the first paper which examines 
the determinant of RPTs in firms. In the second and third studies, RPTs are the main independent 
variable of interest to explore its implications regarding the cost of debt and tax avoidance. In this 
thesis, I use a variety of proxies to measure the presence and extent of RPTs engaged in by firms. 
Besides the dummy variable indicating if a firm has RPTs, I follow Jian and Wong (2010), Habib et 
al. (2017) and Habib et al. (2019) to use related sales ratios and related net credit ratios as the main 
measures of the extent of RPTs. These two measures are calculated as a proportion of net sales (related 
sales) or a proportion of total assets (related net credit) to remove the difference due to the scale of a 
firm. Applying the model by Jian and Wong (2010), I separate normal and abnormal values of these 
two above proxies of RPTs to gain a better understanding of the determinants of normal and abnormal 
levels of RPTs and the economic consequences of normal and abnormal levels of RPTs.  
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The first paper, Chapter 2 of this thesis, describes the nature and extent of RPTs in Vietnamese 
listed firms and examines the association between RPTs and state ownership. I classify transactions 
and balances with related parties by their natures and by their counterparts using information 
disclosed in notes to financial statements of firms in a sample of Vietnamese listed firms from 2010 
to 2016. There are 16 types of transactions and six types of balances representing categories of RPTs. 
To examine the association between RPTs and state ownership, regression of state ownership 
(measured as a dummy variable and percentage of shares owned by the state) on RPTs was applied. 
A propensity score matching characteristics of firms and an alternative measure of RPTs were 
employed as robustness tests.   
In this chapter, I find that RPTs are prevalent in Vietnamese listed firms with nearly 80 percent of 
firms disclosing at least one transaction or balance with related parties. The most frequently reported 
transactions in the sample are sales of goods and services and purchases of goods/services. These two 
types of transaction account respectively for about 53 and 44 percent of total RPTs disclosed in the 
sample. Loans, borrowings, sales, or purchases of assets with related parties are not frequent 
transactions disclosed in the sample. The most frequent balances with related parties in the sample 
are account receivables and payables, with about 53 and 45 percent, respectively. The most common 
party that a firm has transactions with is associates, accounting for about 24 percent of total firm-year 
RPTs observations. However, entities under common control are the party with which firms have the 
highest transaction in terms of average value.   
I find that the presence of state ownership is related to a lower extent of RPTs measured by related 
net credit. In other words, firms with state ownership have fewer RPTs relating to net credit than their 
non-state ownership counterparts. Specifically, the levels of normal net credit and abnormal net credit 
to related parties in firms with state ownership are about three percent lower than in firms without 
state ownership.  
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However, among firms with state ownership, the percentage of shares owned by state shareholders 
is found to be positively associated with the extent of RPTs. For example, one standard deviation 
increase in state ownership percentage inflates related sales by 26 percent of total sales relative to the 
mean value of related sales over net sales ratio. The positive association between state ownership 
percentage and the extent of abnormal RPTs is extremely high. One standard deviation increase in 
state ownership percentage is associated with a 792 percent increase in abnormal related sales ratio 
to its mean value.  
The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, examines the association between RPTs and the cost of 
corporate debt, and the moderating role of state ownership on this association. In line with previous 
research on the cost of debt (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Bliss and Gul 2012; Shailer and Wang 2015; 
Liu et al. 2016; Fonseka et al. 2019), I use the effective interest rate to measure the cost of debt. 
Regressions of RPTs on the cost of debt are run with both the presence of RPTs (dummy variable) 
and the extent of RPTs measured by related sales and related net credit. Regarding the extent of RPTs, 
I separate normal and abnormal values of RPTs to see if RPTs abuse is associated with the cost of 
debt. Interaction variables of state ownership presence and different measures of RPTs are added in 
the regression to estimate the moderating role of state ownership in the association between RPTs 
and the cost of debt. I also use the propensity score matching approach to ensure that the findings 
from the baseline regression are robust. 
I find that the cost of debt is positively correlated with the extent of RPTs determined by related 
sales and related net credit. This evidence indicates lenders assess RPTs as a possible risk to firms. 
The lenders thus charge a higher rate for firms with a higher extent of RPTs. This finding supports 
the agency theory view of RPTs. I also find that state ownership moderates the association between 
RPTs and the cost of debt. The association between the cost of debt and RPTs is less pronounced for 
firms with state ownership, indicating that the presence of state ownership reduces possible risks from 
RPTs in lenders’ assessment. 
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In the final paper, in Chapter 4, the association between RPTs and corporate tax avoidance, and 
the moderating role of state ownership on this association are examined. Tax avoidance is defined as 
any transaction or event (passive or aggressive) that leads to a reduction in corporate taxes that a firm 
is required to pay (Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). To capture tax avoidance, two 
proxy measures drawn from prior literature (e.g., Taylor and Richardson 2014; Khan et al. 2017) are 
employed. These measures are the accounting effective tax rate (ETR hereafter), and the cash ETR. 
These measures calculate the average tax rate per dollar of pre-tax accounting income and reflect the 
ability of a firm to lower its income tax expense (cash taxes paid) compared to its pre-tax accounting 
income (Richardson et al. 2016). Higher ETR indicates lower tax avoidance activities by firms. 
Regressions of different measures of RPTs on ETRs are employed to test whether firms with RPTs 
engage in more tax avoidance activities than firms without RPTs. The potential moderating role of 
state ownership in the association between RPTs and tax avoidance is also explored. Propensity score 
matching was used as a robustness test to reduce any heterogeneity in the characteristics of firms. 
In this paper, it is found that firms with RPTs demonstrate more tax avoidance than their 
counterparts with non-RPT. Specifically, firms with RPTs have approximately one percent 
accounting ETR lower than firms without RPTs, suggesting that these firms participate in more tax 
avoidance activities. Furthermore, among firms with RPTs, firms with a higher extent of related net 
credit and related sales are found to exhibit even higher levels of tax avoidance. Overall, findings 
from this paper are consistent with the agency theory view of RPTs. The presence of state 
shareholders is found to moderate the association between RPTs and tax avoidance by reducing 
corporate tax avoidance in the form of increasing ETRs. Thus, the presence of state shareholders in 
firms with RPTs is seen to reduce aggressive tax avoidance activities engaged in by those firms.  
This thesis makes several contributions. First, this is the first thesis to comprehensively describe 
RPTs and the characteristics of firms associated with RPTs in Vietnam, an emerging market where 
state ownership is pervasive. There are significant studies examining RPTs and their implications in 
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China, a big transitional economy with dominant state ownership, where RPTs are found to be 
prevalent (Berkman et al. 2009; Cheung et al. 2009a; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Peng 
et al. 2011; Habib et al. 2015). While there are some parallels between Vietnamese and Chinese 
economies (Nguyen and Richard 2011), the substantial gap in economic scale between Vietnam and 
China makes an analysis of RPTs in Vietnam of interest to various stakeholders, such as international 
academics, policymakers and investors.  
Second, by exploring the association between RPTs and the cost of debt, and between RPTs and 
tax avoidance, this thesis helps to gain a better understanding of the implications of RPTs for lenders 
and tax authorities. Prior literature on RPTs typically considers the impacts of RPTs on equity 
shareholders or auditors (Gordon et al. 2007; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; 
Habib et al. 2015; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017; Habib et al. 2019). However, previous research has 
not considered the implications of RPTs from the perspectives of lenders or tax authorities. This thesis 
provides evidence about the negative implications of RPTs from both lenders and tax authorities’ 
perspectives. RPTs are found to be associated with a higher cost of debt and a higher level of tax 
avoidance activities. The evidence from this thesis supports the agency theory view of the nature of 
RPTs, raising awareness of the potential abuse of RPTs in firms.  
Third, this thesis adds to the literature on the determinants of the cost of debt and corporate tax 
avoidance. RPTs are found to be an important factor determining the cost of debt and tax avoidance 
activities by firms. The existence and the extent of RPTs increase the cost of debt and the level of tax 
avoidance activities measured according to the effective tax rates.  
Finally, the thesis contributes to the literature on state ownership, as a corporate governance 
mechanism. State ownership is found to restrain RPTs engaged in by firms in Vietnam. However, 
among firms with state ownership, there is a positive association between the percentage of shares 
owned by the state and the extent of RPTs. There is limited research on the association between state 
ownership and the extent of RPTs disclosed by firms, given the growing prevalence of state 
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ownership in the world economy (Pargendler 2011), especially following the global financial crisis 
in 2008 (Borisova et al. 2012; Peng et al. 2016). State ownership also moderates the association 
between RPTs and the cost of debt and between RPTs and tax avoidance.  
In summary, RPTs can be part of the normal course of business but have been under scrutiny due 
to their potential abuse. The findings of this thesis provide policymakers and investors with insights 
into RPTs in the context of Vietnam and their implications for different stakeholders. Given the 
prevalence of state ownership in Vietnam, the thesis also provides evidence of the role of state 
ownership and its implication for corporate governance.  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes RPTs and explores the 
association between RPTs and state ownership in Vietnamese listed firms. Chapter 3 examines the 
association between RPTs and the cost of debt, with consideration of the moderating role of state 
ownership in this association in Vietnamese listed firms. Chapter 4 investigates the association 
between RPTs and tax avoidance and the moderating role of state ownership in this association. 












Chapter 2: Related party transactions and state ownership: 
Evidence from Vietnam 
2.1. Introduction  
In this paper, I describe RPTs2 and explore the potential association between state ownership and 
RPTs in Vietnam. I examine RPTs disclosed by 650 firms in two stock exchanges in Vietnam for the 
period from 2010 to 2016 by identifying whether a firm discloses the existence and value of its RPTs. 
In addition, for those that disclose RPTs, the identity of the parties and the nature of the transaction 
or balances are examined. Finally, I analyse whether the presence and level of state ownership are 
associated with RPTs in Vietnamese listed firms.  
This paper is motivated by the concern that weak disclosure requirements and ineffective 
governance mechanisms in Vietnam allow directors and controlling shareholders to use RPTs for 
personal benefit at the expense of the firm. The involvement of RPTs is linked to several high-profile 
scandals in Vietnam since 2010. The Vinashin scandal in 2010 is considered the most serious 
economic scandal in Vietnam. Vinashin was the largest shipbuilder and one of the largest state 
economic groups3 in Vietnam (Mishra 2011). It was the fifth largest shipbuilder in the world at its 
peak in 2008 and employed 50,000 people in the region4. RPTs were seen to be involved in concealing 
Vinashin’s financial problems, resulting from the inefficient operations of its 200 subsidiaries, 
including firms operating in unrelated businesses, such as securities, real estate, and tourism. In 2010, 
the group almost went bankrupt with debts of about US$4.4 billion.5 Its executives were given severe 
 
2 I can only access RPTs disclosed in the reported financial statements of firms. Therefore, I could not access information 
about RPTs if firms refuse to disclose.  
3 State economic groups (SEGs) were established by the Vietnamese government in the hope that Vietnam would achieve 
competitiveness with foreign firms after it joined the World Trade Organisation. There were 12 SEGs created during the 
2005-2010 period. 
4 Available at: http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Vinashin-%E2%80%93-An-English-solution-for-
an-Asian-problem.aspx. 




prison sentences for their role in the near-collapse of the group. Its former chairman was given the 
maximum sentence of 20 years in jail for falsifying the group’s financial reports to disguise the 
group’s financial situation.6 
Another scandal involved RPTs conducted by the top officials of the Asia Commercial Bank 
(ACB), which is one of the largest joint-stock commercial banks in Vietnam. ACB’s founder, Nguyen 
Duc Kien, established six firms to borrow loans from ACB to invest in stocks of different firms, and 
later used these stocks as collateral assets to borrow more money from ACB.7 He was subsequently 
sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a series of complicated financial scams worth US$1.1 
billion that has become one of the highest-profile banking scandals in Vietnam.8  
Vietnam is an example of a transition economy with concentrated state ownership and weak 
minority investor protection (Robinett et al. 2013; World Bank 2016). However, little research on 
RPTs has been conducted using data from Vietnam. Specifically, there is no study which explores 
RPTs in Vietnam, and its implication as being beneficial or detrimental to stakeholders. The 
association between state ownership and RPTs in the context of a country with high state ownership 
and a number of RPTs scandals is a research issue requiring empirical evidence to understand their 
potential relationship.  
The nature of RPTs and the impact of RPTs on the financial performance of firms have been 
investigated in existing research in developed and developing markets, such as the U.S., France, Italy, 
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and especially in China. The focus of these 
studies has been the role of controlling shareholders regarding engagement in RPTs because there has 
been concern about the expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders through the use of RPTs in ownership-concentrated economies, such as Taiwan, Hong 
 
6 Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203568004576043180815719282. 
7 Available at: https://vnexpress.net/co-quan-dieu-tra-giai-ma-cac-nguon-tien-cua-bau-kien-2431353.html;    
https://vnexpress.net/bau-kien-gian-lan-kinh-doanh-lat-leo-qua-6-cong-ty-2926704.html. 




Kong or China (Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a; Aharony et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2011; Yeh 
et al. 2012). Some studies use Chinese data and explore tunnelling and propping9 activities between 
listed firms and their state controlling shareholders (Cheung et al. 2009a; Jian and Wong 2010; Peng 
et al. 2011). However, there has been no study exploring the association between state ownership and 
the extent of RPTs, although state ownership remains pervasive in transitional economies, including 
China and Vietnam. Therefore, a study on RPTs concerning state ownership in Vietnam increases our 
understanding of RPTs and the role of state ownership in motivating firms to use these transactions 
in the context of an emerging transitional economy with dominant state ownership. 
Vietnam offers an excellent setting for a study regarding the potential association between state 
ownership and RPTs for two reasons. First, state ownership is dominant in Vietnam, although the 
equitisation process has made substantial progress since the economic reform launched in 1986 
(Robinett et al. 2013). Second, the use of RPTs is widespread in Vietnam due to highly concentrated 
firm ownership, week corporate governance, and little protection to minority shareholders (Robinett 
et al. 2013).   
I hand-collect RPTs for a sample of 650 firms listed on stock exchanges in Vietnam from 2010 to 
2016. RPTs are frequent in the sample with nearly 80 percent of firms disclosing at least one 
transaction or a balance with related parties. Vietnam, like other countries, does not prohibit 
transactions with related parties. However, transactions with related parties that reach a threshold, 
(i.e., 20 percent of the total assets – for listed firms), must be approved by a majority vote at an annual 
general meeting.10 In addition, firms are required to disclose a list of their related parties and 
transactions with these parties.11 Detailed requirements about disclosing transactions with related 
 
9 Tunnelling is defined as activities to transfer wealth from firms to their controlling shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000). 
Propping is defined as the situation in which a listed affiliate’s earnings are managed by its controlling shareholder 
through the use of the controlling shareholders’ resources (Jian and Wong 2010). 
10 Article 162 Law on Enterprise (2014) states that transactions shall be approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders. 
Only non-related-interest shareholders have the right to vote. Conditions for passing resolutions at the General Meeting 
of Shareholders are stated in Article 144 of Law on Enterprise (2014) (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). 
11 According to article 159, Law on Enterprise (2014) (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). 
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parties are regulated by the Vietnamese Accounting Standard (VAS) No 26 – Related Party 
Disclosures (Ministry of Finance 2003). Firms are required to disclose transactions with related 
parties regarding the nature and the amount of transactions and the nature of the relationship with a 
related party in the notes to the financial statements. In my sample, sales of goods and services to 
related parties are the most frequently disclosed RPTs, accounting for around 53 percent, followed 
by purchases of goods and services at around 44 percent. Loans and borrowing transactions are not 
frequent transactions with related parties. These transactions account for about 8 and 11 percent, 
respectively. In terms of balances with related parties, accounts receivables and payables are the most 
reported balances by firms in the sample, with around 53 and 45 percent, respectively.  
I then examine the association between state ownership and RPTs. I test this association with two 
measures of state ownership: (1) the presence of state ownership; and (2) the percentage of shares 
owned by state shareholders. I use related sales as a proportion of net sales and related net credit 
(defined as all related receivables minus all related payables) as a proportion of total assets to measure 
RPTs. These two measures of RPTs have been used widely in the literature on RPTs (Jian and Wong 
2010; Habib et al. 2017; Habib et al. 2019). Abnormal related sales are typically used to proxy for 
propping activities, while abnormal related net credit is used to proxy for tunnelling activities (Habib 
et al. 2017).  
I use panel data of 3921 firm-year observations  over the 2010 to 2016 period. I find that the higher 
the percentage of shares owned by the state, the higher the extent of RPTs among firms with state 
shareholders. This result holds across four measures of RPTs. These results suggest that firms with a 
higher percentage of state ownership are more likely to make use of RPTs. Finally, I also find that 
the presence of state ownership is related to a lower level of net credit for related parties.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it describes RPTs and the 
characteristics of firms associated with RPTs in Vietnam, an emerging market where state ownership 
is pervasive. The Vietnam economy has many similarities to the Chinese economy in that they are 
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both communist regimes and have applied a gradual process to conduct economic reform (Nguyen 
and Richard 2011). However, Vietnam is different as it has historically been influenced by countries, 
such as France, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China (Nguyen and Richard 2011). This fact makes 
Vietnam a unique context for this study. Moreover, the notable difference in the economic scale 
between Vietnam and China also makes a study about RPTs in Vietnam of interest to different 
stakeholders, such as international academics, policymakers and investors. In fact, little is known of 
the exact nature of RPTs in Vietnam, so I provide detailed descriptive evidence on this. 
Second, the paper extends previous research by examining the association between state ownership 
and RPTs to determine the implication of state ownership on corporate governance. There is limited 
research on the association between state ownership and the extent of RPTs disclosed by firms, given 
the fact that state ownership has grown more prevalent in the world economy (Pargendler 2011), 
especially after the global financial crisis in 2008 (Borisova et al. 2012; Peng et al. 2016).  I find that 
the presence of state ownership is associated with fewer RPTs employed by firms. However, my 
analysis reveals that the extent of RPTs is associated with a higher percentage of shares owned by 
state shareholders. My findings provide comprehensive evidence about the association between state 
ownership and RPTs in an emerging market. Finally, I use both normal and abnormal values of two 
widely used measures for RPTs to enhance the robustness of my empirical results.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2.2, I present the institutional 
context of Vietnam, with an overview of the general context, the corporate governance environment, 
and regulations about RPT disclosure. Section 2.3 reviews the literature and develops a hypothesis. 
Section 2.4 describes the sample selection process followed by the research design. Section 2.5 
reports and analyses the empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.  
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2.2. State ownership and RPTs in Vietnam 
2.2.1. State ownership in Vietnam 
Vietnam is an ownership-concentrated economy (Nguyen et al. 2017), similar to many other emerging 
markets. However, the highly concentrated corporate ownership in Vietnam is characterised by 
prominent state shareholders (Robinett et al. 2013). Vietnam has been conducting economic reforms 
to transform from a centrally planned economy to a market economy since 1986. Vietnam differs 
from other transitional economies in Eastern Europe by adopting a gradual approach to economic 
reform towards a socialist market-oriented economy while maintaining the ruling role of the 
Communist Party and the dominance of the state sector (Nguyen and Richard 2011; Wacker 2017). 
Almost all firms in Vietnam were solely state-owned before the beginning of economic reforms in 
1986. The private sector existed informally until 1990 with the promulgation of Company Law, which 
recognised the right of the domestic private sector to operate in stipulated areas (Cao et al. 2016). As 
part of the economic transition there is an increased number of private firms, either newly founded or 
being converted from SOEs in the equitisation process. The equitisation process in Vietnam began as 
a trial early in the 1990s and was conducted on a large scale from 1998 to 2008 to transform SOEs 
into joint-stock firms (Wacker 2017). Overall, this process is not the same as privatisation as it is 
considered that an equitised enterprise is one that has less than 100 percent state ownership (Cao et 
al. 2016).  
Although SOEs have had a declining role in the economy since the early 2000s, there is still a 
large SOE presence in many important economic sectors, such as the oil and gas industry, coal and 
minerals, infrastructure, transportation, aviation, rail and electricity (Vu-Thanh 2017). The statistics 
in this study show that the state is the pervasive shareholder with more than 65 percent (2558 
observations) of firms reporting some level of state ownership. Among these firms, the state remains 
a controlling shareholder (i.e., holding at least 20 percent of shares in a firm) in about 51 percent 
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(2015 observations) of firms. SOEs also account for a large share of employment, bank credit and 
fixed assets in Vietnam (Robinett et al. 2013).    
Recent reforms in Vietnam seek to further rationalise the role of SOEs in the economy. The legal 
framework for equitisation, divestment, and reform of SOEs was improved with the creation of an 
independent State Capital Management Committee (SCIC). The SCIC was established in 2005 to 
manage and invest state capital in enterprises, regardless of their ownership structure (Mishra 2011). 
This committee oversees all large SOEs to improve accountability and efficiency while leaving 
management and regulation with line ministries and regulatory bodies (Robinett et al. 2013).  
Finally, state ownership in listed firms in Vietnam is present in the form of investments by state-
owned corporations or state-owned groups12, provincial people’s committees, and the SCIC (Robinett 
et al. 2013).  
 
2.2.2. RPTs regulations in Vietnam 
Regulations about RPTs in Vietnam are governed by the Law on Enterprise, Law on Securities, and 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS). The Law on Enterprise and Law on Securities dictate 
regulations about approval and supervision of RPTs in listed firms, while VAS 26 provides another 
channel to supervise RPTs by requiring firms to disclose information about RPTs and related parties. 
A related party transaction was first defined in VAS 26 – Related Party Disclosures,  issued in 200313 
as a transfer of resources, services, or obligation between related parties, regardless of whether or not 
a price is charged (VAS 26.5, Ministry of Finance 2003). VAS 26 defines a related party as a party 
that controls or has significant influence over another party and itself is controlled or significantly 
influenced by the other (VAS 26.5, Ministry of Finance 2003). From this description, related parties 
 
12 Since the 1st of July 2015, an SOE is defined in the Law on Enterprise (2014) as an enterprise where the state owns 
100 percent of its equity. This definition differs from the one in Law on Enterprise (2005) which defined an SOE as a 
firm where the state holds from 50 percent or more of its equity (Phan 2018).  
13 VAS 26 was issued with the content mainly based on the 1999 version of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 
– Related Party Disclosures (Robinett et al. 2013, 22). 
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include entities such as parent companies; subsidiaries; associates; shareholders who have voting 
power; close members of the family (parents, spouse and siblings) and key management personnel 
(directors and managers) (VAS 26.3, Ministry of Finance 2003). Meanwhile, definitions of a related 
party in the Law on Enterprise (1999, 2005, and 2014 versions, article 4.17) and the Law on Securities 
(2006 and 2010 versions, article 6.34) are slightly different from VAS 26 but still cover similar groups 
as those stated in VAS 26 (National Assembly of Vietnam 1999, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014). However, 
in the revised Law on Enterprise (2014), a wider definition of family members is prescribed, with 
brothers and sisters-in-law of key management personnel or controlling shareholders also being 
considered as related parties of an entity.14  
RPTs are not prohibited in Vietnam, which is consistent with other countries, however there are 
regulations to supervise these transactions. In Vietnam, transactions with shareholders who own ten 
percent or more of total common shares of a firm, key management personnel (i.e., board members 
and management officials), and their related entities and individuals need approval from the general 
meeting of shareholders15 or board of directors.16 Details of transactions are required to be given to 
shareholders in advance and only disinterested shareholders can approve the transactions (Robinett 
et al. 2013). However, transactions with a major shareholder do not require shareholder approval 
(Robinett et al. 2013). Under VAS 26, firms are required to disclose, in the notes to financial 
statements, information about transactions and balances with related parties regarding their nature 
and amount, and the identity of their related parties (VAS 26.22, Ministry of Finance 2003). In 
particular, VAS 26 focuses on disclosing information about the relationship with specific related 
parties, such as key management personnel (i.e., members of the board of directors and executive 
directors), controlling persons or controlling groups, and transactions and balances with these parties 
(VAS 26.18, VAS 26.20, Ministry of Finance 2003). Although regulations on RPTs have been 
 
14 Law on Enterprise (revised 2014), article 4.17 (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). 
15 Resolutions on these transactions are passed when there is an approval of at least 51 percent of all attending shareholders 
at the meeting (Law on Enterprise (revised 2014), article 144.2) (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). 
16 Law on Enterprise (revised 2014), article 162 (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). 
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stipulated in Vietnam since the early 2000s, enforcement of these regulations is weak. Indeed, 
shareholders do not always have the opportunity to approve material RPTs, even though the 
regulations allow for voting rights (Robinett et al. 2013). Finally, information about RPTs is 
frequently not completely disclosed by listed firms (Robinett et al. 2013).  
 
2.3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 2.3.1. RPTs 
There are two opposing theories in the literature explaining the motivation underlying RPTs. The 
efficient contracting theory argues that RPTs can be used to add value to the firm because these 
transactions can optimise the internal resource allocation and reduce transaction costs, especially in 
the context of imperfect markets, such as emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu 2000; Ryngaert and 
Thomas 2012; Habib et al. 2015; Fang et al. 2018).  
Alternatively, agency theory suggests that managers or controlling shareholders of the firm can 
opportunistically use RPTs to expropriate wealth from shareholders or minority shareholders to 
related parties (Gordon et al. 2004b). In particular, this involves both types of agency conflicts 
referred to as “principal-agent” and “principal-principal” conflicts. Some studies provide evidence of 
RPTs being abused to manipulate earnings (e.g., Thomas et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2011), and to tunnel 
or prop-up earnings between listed firms and their controlling shareholders (e.g., Cheung et al. 2006; 
Cheung et al. 2009a; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Peng et al. 2011; Yeh et al. 2012; 
Habib et al. 2017).  
Prior research has examined the implications of RPTs on several aspects of firms, such as 
performance, valuation, or audit fees using samples in both developed and developing markets 
including the U.S., France, and China.  Although findings from these studies are mixed, there is 
evidence supporting the agency theory explanation of incentives for engagement in RPTs. For 
example, findings from Cheung et al. (2009a), Aharony et al. (2010), Jian and Wong (2010) and Peng 
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et al. (2011) provide evidence about opportunistically using RPTs by controlling shareholders in 
Chinese listed firms to manage earnings upwards to meet earnings targets or to exploit wealth from 
minority shareholders through tunnelling. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) and Nekhili and Cherif 
(2011) report that investors and markets in the U.S and France react negatively to RPTs. Chen et al. 
(2009) provide evidence about the negative correlation between the extent of RPTs and the 
operational performance of firms, using Chinese data. Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) support this 
finding with evidence about the negative association between ex-post RPTs, defined as transactions 
initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, with operating profitability. RPTs can be seen 
as a potential risk for restatement in the U.S (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017) or for increases in audit 
fees in China (Habib et al. 2015). Bennouri et al. (2015) report a negative relationship between auditor 
reputation and the number of RPTs reported, suggesting that RPTs result in accounting uncertainty. 
Finally, Habib et al. (2019) provide evidence of a positive association between RPTs and stock price 
crash risk in China. They argue that RPTs are used opportunistically and consequently increase the 
risk of a stock price crash.  
However, prior research also finds that not all RPTs are the same. For example, Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2004b) provide evidence that not all RPTs have negative connotations. Related party 
investments appear to be associated with efficient contracting (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004a, 2004b; 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010). When a firm is in financial distress, RPTs (such as related loans) can 
be used by controlling shareholders to support earnings, although these earnings are temporary and 
do not really add value to a firm in the long term. However, this action usually receives favourable 
reactions from the market (Peng et al. 2011). Wong et al. (2015) find that related party sales increase 
firm value in China, even though this value enhancement disappears for firms with a large proportion 




2.3.2. RPTs and state ownership 
The literature on determinants of RPTs is limited (Balsam et al. 2017), with existing research mainly 
focusing on the association between RPTs and corporate governance mechanisms, including 
ownership structure and board characteristics (e.g., Gordon et al. 2004a; Yeh et al. 2012; Kang et al. 
2014). Ownership structure is an important corporate governance mechanism that can be significantly 
associated with the extent of RPTs in firms because RPTs are found to be prevalent in concentrated 
ownership contexts, such as in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia and Korea (e.g., Cheung et al. 
2006; Jian and Wong 2010; Yeh et al. 2012; Kang et al. 2014; Habib et al. 2017).  
There has been some debate in the literature about the effect of state ownership on corporate 
governance and the efficiency of firms. This debate results from two broad views of the state’s role 
in markets; these views are classified by La Porta et al. (2002) as development and political. The 
development view of the state implies that, when necessary, firms can receive support from the state’s 
interference through its legal powers (La Porta et al. 2002). Therefore, the presence of state ownership 
possibly improves corporate governance through extensive monitoring and directly implementing 
recommended policies (Borisova et al. 2012). By contrast, the political view of the state relates to the 
desire of politicians to use a firm’s investments to pursue political goals, such as increased 
employment and tax collection (La Porta et al. 2002). Consequently, state ownership might have 
negative implications on corporate governance and a firm’s efficiency because the state’s interests 
are not always aligned with shareholders’ wealth maximisation goals (Pargendler 2011; Borisova et 
al. 2012). 
Prior studies provide mixed evidence about the association between state ownership and RPTs due 
to conflicting arguments about the role of state ownership in corporate governance and two 
conflicting views about the nature of RPTs. For example, Lo et al. (2010b) find a positive association 
between tunnelling activities through related party sales and a higher percentage of government share 
ownership. Lo et al. (2010b) also shows that it is more likely that profits shift through related-party 
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sales for the benefit of the parent in China when there is a higher percentage of shares owned by the 
state controlling shareholder. Again, in China, when investigating the involvement of state ownership 
as one of the characteristics of firms that conduct tunnelling and propping using RPTs, Cheung et al. 
(2009a) also find a positive association between state ownership and tunnelling and propping 
activities using RPTs. Cheung et al. (2009a) find that firms with larger state ownership tend to conduct 
more tunnelling and propping using RPTs. Overall, this evidence supports the political view of state 
ownership where the controlling state shareholders use RPTs to exploit resources from listed firms to 
pursue their political goals.  
Conversely, state ownership in China is found to constrain tunnelling activity by issuing related 
guarantees (Berkman et al. 2009). Berkman et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms with state non-
corporate shareholders (i.e., state agencies and bureaus) as controlling block holders are less likely to 
issue related guarantees because they are likely to use their direct relationship with the government 
to obtain a bank loan if needed. This finding supports the development view of state ownership where 
state ownership plays a positive role in firms’ efficiency through refraining from undertaking 
detrimental activities (i.e., tunnelling activities) to related firms.  
In summary, although there is mixed evidence from prior studies concerning the potential 
association between state ownership and the extent of RPTs, state ownership (whether from the 
development or political view) is found to be associated with the extent of RPTs. Given the above 
discussion, the following non-directional hypothesis is developed:  
H1: There is an association between state ownership and the extent of RPTs in Vietnam. 
 
2.4. Research design 
2.4.1. Data collection and sample selection 
My sample consists of 650 firms listed on the two stock exchanges in Vietnam in 2016: Ho Chi Minh 
City Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange. Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange was the first 
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stock market in Vietnam, established in 2000. On average, firms listed on this stock exchange have a 
much larger size compared to firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange, which was formed in 2005 
(Robinett et al. 2013). A comparison of some features of firms listed on these two exchanges is 
presented in Table 2.3 – Panel A (presented in Section 2.5.1).  
The sample period for this paper is from 2010 to 2016, because before 2010 the number of listed 
firms in the two stock exchanges was limited and the disclosure practices by listed firms were very 
poor. I begin with 4,209 firm-year observations. I exclude 271 firm-year observations for financial 
firms as these firms are subject to different regulatory constraints. Due to unavailable information for 
the control variables, 17 firm-year observations are also deleted. My final sample consists of 3,921 
firm-year observations.  
Data concerning RPTs, including the amounts, types and parties involved, are collected manually 
from the notes of audited financial statements of listed firms (consolidated financial statements for 
firms that have subsidiaries) during the period under investigation. Similarly, corporate governance 
data are also hand-collected from the annual reports and corporate governance reports declared by 
listed firms (corporate governance reports are prepared and disclosed by public firms in Vietnam at 
six-month intervals as required by the Corporate Governance Code promulgated by Circular 121)17. 
This includes the percentage of state ownership, the percentage of the largest shareholders, dual 
leadership, board size, number of non-executive members on the board, and the names of audit firms. 
Financial statement data and market data are obtained from OSIRIS. The data are hand collected 
directly from the annual reports of Vietnamese listed firms when not available in OSIRIS.  
 
 
17 Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC (i.e., Circular 121) issued by the Ministry of Finance on July 26, 2012 with effect from 
September 17, 2012. Circular 121 promulgates corporate governance regulation applicable to public firms in Vietnam. 
This regulation replaced Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 13, 2007, promulgating 
corporate governance regulation applicable to listed firms in Vietnam (Robinett et al. 2013). 
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2.4.2. Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is related party transactions (RPT). Following research by Habib et al. (2017), 
I proxy RPT according to the following categories of RPTs: (1) RP sales (RP_SALE), measured as 
the amount of sales with related parties scaled by net sales, and (2) RP net credit (RP_CREDIT), 
measured by total receivables minus total payables, scaled by total assets. RP sales are widely used 
in the literature as a proxy for propping activities (Aharony et al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Habib 
et al. 2017). Meanwhile, RP net credit is used as a proxy for tunnelling activities (Chan et al. 2016; 
Habib et al. 2017).  
Specifically, I use both normal and abnormal amounts of the above categories to test the sensitivity 
of my results. RPTs might be used to fulfil the economic need of firms in a large business group or 
to exploit wealth from shareholders. Abnormal amounts of RPTs reveal exploiting activities by firms 
(Jian and Wong 2010; Yeh et al. 2012). To calculate the abnormal RPTs, I adopt the approach of Jian 
and Wong (2010) approach as in the Eqn. (1) as follows: 
RPTi.t = β0 + β1SIZEi.t + β2LEVi.t + β3GROWTHi.t + β4MBi.t +YEARt + INDUSTRYt+ εi.t         (1) 
where SIZE = the natural log of total assets, LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets, GROWTH 
= sales growth, MB (measured as the ratio of market value to the book value of equity) = the market-
to-book ratio, and YEARt and INDUSTRYt represent year and industry fixed effects, respectively. I 
run two sets of regressions, one each for RP sales and RP net credit, and the residuals from these 
regressions are the abnormal value for RP sales and RP net credit, respectively.  
 
2.4.3. Independent variables 
2.4.3.1. Test variable 
The variable of interest is state ownership. Following research by Borisova et al. (2015), state 
ownership is proxied by the presence of state ownership (SO_PRESENCE) and the percentage of 
shares owned by state shareholders (SO_PERCENT).  
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2.4.3.2. Control variables 
Drawing from prior literature on RPTs (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; Habib et al. 
2017; Bennouri et al. 2015), I include the following control variables in my regression models that 
are likely to determine the extent of RPTs: firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), the market-to-book ratio 
(MB), adjusted return on assets (ADJ_ROA), ownership concentration (BLOCK), foreign ownership 
(FOWN), board size (BOARD), the proportion of non-executive member on the board (NONEXE), 
dual leadership (DUAL), and Big 4 auditor (BIG4). 
SIZE, LEV and MB are explained as for Eqn. (1). MB proxies for growth opportunities. ADJ_ROA 
is measured as the firm’s return on assets (ROA) minus the industry median ROA to remove any 
industry effects. ROA is net income divided by total assets. I make no sign predictions for these 
variables because there are contrasting views about RPTs, leading to conflicting arguments about the 
association between each control variable with RPTs. Prior studies also provide inconsistent results 
about the association between these variables with different proxies of RPTs. For example, regarding 
the association between SIZE and RPTs, Cheung et al. (2009b) find that SIZE is negatively associated 
with all connected transactions (i.e., transactions with related parties), regardless of whether these 
transactions are beneficial or detrimental. Meanwhile, Kang et al. (2014) show that SIZE has a 
significantly positive association with RPTs. RP sales are also found to be positively associated with 
SIZE by Jian and Wong (2010) and Balsam et al. (2017) 
I also control further in my regression model for the quality of corporate governance using several 
variables, specifically BLOCK, FOWN, BIG4, DUAL, BOARD and NONEXE. 18   
The extent of RPT is closely linked to the firm’s ownership concentration, measured by the voting 
rights of the largest shareholders. Such ownership features show the potential of major shareholders 
to expropriate a firm’s wealth (Bennouri et al. 2015). As concentrated ownership is prevalent in 
Vietnamese listed firms, I include BLOCK, measured as the proportion of shares owned by the largest 
 
18 I could not directly measure the proportion of the independent directors on the board as many firms do not disclose this 
information in their annual reports.   
24 
 
shareholder, to control for the influence of dominant shareholders on the extent of RPTs disclosed. I 
do not predict the sign of BLOCK as large shareholders are associated with positive and negative 
implications as a corporate governance mechanism. Large shareholders can improve the effectiveness 
of corporate governance as an external monitoring mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gordon et 
al. 2004a; Lo et al. 2010a). Alternatively, larger shareholders may expropriate a firm’s resources from 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
FOWN is measured as the total percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. BIG4 is a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if the chairperson is also the CEO of a firm, and 0 otherwise. BOARD is the 
number of directors on the board. NONEXE is measured by non-executive members on the board 
divided by the total number of directors. If RPTs are viewed as conflicts of interest, good corporate 
governance mechanisms constrain the extent of opportunistic RPTs (Yeh et al. 2012). Foreign 
ownership, Big 4 auditor, a smaller board size, and a high proportion of non-executive directors are 
considered to be effective corporate governance mechanisms in preventing potential detrimental 
activities to firms (see Gordon et al. 2004a; Gordon et al. 2004b; Fan and Wong 2005; Bennouri et 
al. 2015; Shan 2019). I therefore expect negative coefficients on FOWN, BIG4, and NONEXE and a 
positive coefficient on BOARD. I predict a positive coefficient for DUAL as dual leadership in firms 
is normally considered as a proxy for poor corporate governance, making the board less effective in 
monitoring management (Jensen 1993; Gordon et al. 2004a). Alternatively, there is a positive or no 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and the extent of RPTs if RPTs are viewed 
under efficient contracting theory.  
Finally, I also control for year and industry effects in my regression model by including dummy 
variables for YEARt, which ranges from 2010 to 2016 and INDUSTRYt.19 
 
19 The industry classification used is based on the General Industry Classification Standard (GICS), which is used by the 




2.4.4. Model specification 
To test H1, I estimate the following regression model: 
RPTi.t = β0 +β1SOi.t + β2SIZEi.t + β3LEVi.t + β4MBi.t +β5ADJ_ROAi.t + β6BLOCKi.t + β7FOWNi.t + 
β8DUALi.t + β9BOARDi.t + β10NONEXEi.t + β11BIG4i.t + + YEARt + INDUSTRYt + ε               (2) 
where RPT = a proxy for related party transactions including normal and abnormal values (RP_SALE, 
ABN_RP_SALE, RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT); SO = a proxy for state ownership that is 
measured by SO_PRESENCE and SO_PERCENT; SIZE= the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV 
= total liabilities scaled by total assets; MB = the market value of equity scaled by the book value of 
equity; ADJ_ROA = a firm’s ROA minus the industry median ROA; BLOCK = percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder; FOWN = percentage of shares owned by foreign shareholders; 
DUAL = a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm has dual leadership, and 0 otherwise; BOARD = 
number of members on the board; NONEXE= proportion of non-executive members on the board; 
BIG4 = a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; 
YEAR = year dummy variables, coded as 1 if the year falls within a specific year category, and 0 
otherwise, and INDUSTRY = industry dummy variables, coded as 1 if a firm is represented in a 
particular GICS category, and 0 otherwise. 
All continuous variables are winsorised by the top and bottom of three percent to reduce the effect 
of outliers on my empirical results. Finally, the definitions for all variables used in this study are 




Table 2.1: Variable definitions 
Abbreviation Description  Measurement 
RP_SALE Related sales Related sales, divided by net sales 
ABN_RP_SALE Abnormal related sales Abnormal value of related sales ratio  
RP_CREDIT Related net credit Total receivables minus total payables, scales by total assets 
ABN_RP_CREDIT Abnormal related net credit Abnormal value of related net credit ratio 
SO_PRESENCE State ownership dummy variable 
Dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state shareholder and 0 
otherwise in the end-of-year t 
SO_PERCENT State ownership percentage Percentage of shares owned by state shareholders 
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets in the end-of-year t 
LEV Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets in the end-of-year t 
MB Market-to-book ratio Ratio between market value to the book value of a firm’s equity 
ADJ_ROA Adjusted Return on asset 
Net income scaled by total assets in the end-of-year t minus the 
industry median ROA  
BLOCK Ownership concentration Percentage of share held by the largest single shareholder 
FOWN Foreign Ownership Percentage of share held by foreign shareholders 
DUAL leadership duality Dummy variable, coded as 1 if the chief executive officer is also the 
chair of the board and 0 otherwise 
BOARD Board size Number of directors in a firm 
NONEXE 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board 
Number of non-executive members on the board, divided by total 
members of the board 
BIG4 Auditor size 
Dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit 
firm and 0 otherwise in the end-of-year t 
 
2.5. Results and discussion 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 summarises the sample distribution based on firm-year observations. This table reports the 
sample distribution for firms disclosing at least one RPT or balance with related parties by industries 
defined by the ten GICS industries and by the stock exchange in which a firm’s stock is traded. For 
the whole sample period, nearly 80 percent of firms disclose information about at least one transaction 
or balance with related parties (3,132 observations, 79.878 percent). The number of firms disclosing 
RPTs and balances with related parties is 2,868 observations for RPTs and 2,867 observations for RP 
balances. Overall, the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange has a higher number of firms disclosing 
information about RPTs compared to the Hanoi Stock Exchange. Firms in the utilities (power 
generation and distribution, and water supply) and communication services industries have the 
highest proportion of information disclosed about RPTs. This result could be explained by the strong 
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connection between these listed firms and their controlling shareholders who are state-owned groups 
and currently dominate in these industries in Vietnam. 
 
Table 2.2: Sample distribution 
Industry Total % Exchange 
Observations with at least one RPT or RP 
balance disclosed 
      HOSE20 HNX21 Total % HOSE HNX 
Communication Services 105 2.678 7 98 89 84.762 7 82 
Consumer Discretionary 342 8.722 213 129 260 76.023 163 97 
Consumer Staples 383 9.768 224 159 309 80.679 190 119 
Energy 219 5.585 60 159 178 81.279 56 122 
Health Care 118 3.009 62 56 89 75.424 53 36 
Industrials 1,432 36.521 527 905 1,134 79.190 428 706 
Information Technology 124 3.162 37 87 98 79.032 33 65 
Materials 745 19.000 335 410 583 78.255 264 319 
Real Estate 307 7.830 233 74 257 83.713 202 55 
Utilities 146 3.724 118 28 135 92.466 114 21 
Total 3,921 100 1,816 2,105 3,132 79.878 1,510 1,622 
 
Table 2.3 describes the financial characteristics of firms in terms of exchange and of the existence 
of RPTs. From Panel A of Table 2.3, I find that firms listed on Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange 
are much larger than firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange in terms of total assets, net sales, net 
income, and market capitalisation. On average, firms on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange also 
have higher profitability ratios, such as ROA. Firms on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange also 
have higher sales growth, higher market-to-book ratios, a larger board size, and a higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board. In addition, there are more firms on the Ho Chi Minh City 
Stock Exchange that are audited by Big 4 auditing firms. However, firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh 
City Stock Exchange are found to have lower leverage and lower percentages of shares owned by 
state shareholders than firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the financial characteristics of firms with and without RPTs. On 
average, RPT firms are significantly larger in terms of market capitalisation, assets, liabilities, net 
 
20 Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. 
21 Hanoi Stock Exchange. 
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sales, and net income (p<0.05 or better). However, the profitability ratio (measured as ROA) of RPT 
firms is significantly lower than that of non-RPT firms (p<0.10). RPT firms also have a significantly 
higher percentage of state ownership and foreign ownership, and a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board (p<0.01). Further, the proportion of RPT firms with dual leadership is also 
significantly lower than non-RPT firms (p<0.01). However, there are no significant differences in 
terms of leverage, the market-to-book ratio, and board size between firms with and without RPTs.  
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Table 2.3: Firms' characteristics by the Exchanges and by the existence of RPTs 
Panel  A: Characteristics of firms by Exchanges 
Variable HOSE (N=1816) HNX (N=2105) Mean difference 
 (t-statistics)   N mean sd Q1 median Q3 N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
Market capitalisation 
(billion VND) 1816   2,354.618    10,927.239  
  
178.265       408.599    1,055.525  2105 
  
228.502       715.836  
    
32.561  
    
74.400    162.000  -8.905*** 
Total assets (billion 
VND) 1816   3,026.900      8,538.451  
  
466.590    1,035.868    2,311.842  2105 
  




233.677    556.750  -11.734*** 
Total liabilities 
(billion VND) 1816   1,701.421      5,760.152  
  
179.101       512.380    1,307.700  2105 
  
510.114    1,753.504  
    
39.457  
  
112.585    372.796  -9.017*** 
Net Sales (billion 
VND) 1816   2,240.316      5,640.063  
  
314.607       727.447    1,886.308  2105 
  
717.150    1,826.028  
    
91.127  
  
237.856    609.525  -11.700*** 
Net income (billion 
VND) 1816      194.405          798.439  
    
15.623  
        
45.689       111.951  2105 
    
25.252       110.111  
       
2.220  
       
8.845  
     
22.366  -9.615*** 
ROA 1816 0.082 0.106 0.022 0.063 0.123 2105 0.064 0.086 0.016 0.050 0.103 -5.733*** 
Leverage 1816 0.478 0.212 0.304 0.502 0.640 2105 0.521 0.226 0.347 0.547 0.709 6.080*** 
Market - to - book 1816 1.143 0.926 0.570 0.909 1.450 2105 0.928 0.893 0.444 0.698 1.077 -7.403*** 
State ownership (%) 1092 0.384 0.210 0.193 0.442 0.518 1466 0.405 0.185 0.289 0.452 0.512 2.705*** 
Foreign ownership 1766 0.133 0.160 0.012 0.065 0.196 1900 0.058 0.106 0.003 0.016 0.067 -16.725*** 
Board size 1816 5.726 1.244 5 5 7 2105 5.246 0.860 5 5 5 -14.194*** 
Non-executive 
directors (%) 1816 0.600 0.204 0.429 0.600 0.800 2105 0.561 0.202 0.400 0.600 0.714 -6.038*** 
Dual leadership 1816 0.330 0.470 0 0 1 2105 0.336 0.473 0 0 1 0.430 
Big 4 auditor 1816 0.312 0.463 0 0 1 2105 0.133 0.339 0 0 0 -13.932*** 






Panel B: Descriptive statistics partitioned by the existence of RPTs or balances      
Variable Firms with RPT or RP balance disclosed (N=3132) Firms with no RPT or RP balance disclosed (N=789) Mean difference 
 (t-statistics)   N mean sd Q1 median Q3 N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
Market capitalisation 
(billion VND) 3132   1,357.885      8,280.443  
    
61.224  
      
170.274  
     
544.155  789 
     
638.892    3,022.603  
    
46.800    121.001    306.000  -2.439** 
Total assets (billion 
VND) 3132   1,992.461      6,707.503  
  
212.435  
      
526.658  
  
1,511.216  789 
  
1,058.342    3,085.615  
  
155.251    328.016    821.484  -3.857*** 
Total liabilities (billion 
VND) 3132   1,168.342      4,542.699  
    
73.979  
      
259.093  
     
892.782  789 
     
639.193    2,041.869  
    
50.708    156.301    491.272  -3.237*** 
Net Sales (billion VND) 3132   1,516.151      4,344.006  
  
166.120  
      
438.943  
  
1,228.661  789 
  
1,051.241    3,144.916  
  
112.845    307.487    798.668  -2.874*** 
Net income (billion 
VND) 3132 111.832 596.677 4.547 19.519 62.757 789 70.899 346.688 3.960 14.587 42.427 -1.893* 
ROA 3132 0.071 0.098 0.018 0.053 0.109 789 0.078 0.089 0.022 0.062 0.121 1.876* 
Leverage 3132 0.502 0.220 0.330 0.528 0.675 789 0.497 0.221 0.318 0.522 0.666 -0.509 
Market - to - book 3132 1.021 0.920 0.478 0.776 1.235 789 1.052 0.895 0.518 0.827 1.322 0.666 
State ownership 2071 0.414 0.193 0.279 0.490 0.519 487 0.320 0.192 0.151 0.300 0.500 -9.762*** 
Foreign ownership 2938 0.097 0.143 0.005 0.032 0.129 728 0.083 0.125 0.005 0.033 0.103 -2.399*** 
Board size 3132 5.474 1.085 5 5 5 789 5.445 1.069 5 5 5 -0.608 
Non-executive directors 
(%) 3132 0.585 0.203 0.400 0.600 0.800 789 0.556 0.207 0.400 0.600 0.700 -3.714*** 
Dual leadership 3132 0.302 0.459 0 0 1 789 0.458 0.499 0 0 1 8.251*** 
Big 4 auditor 3132 0.240 0.427 0 0 0 789 0.118 0.323 0 0 0 -7.610*** 




Table 2.4 provides data about state ownership in my sample. In Panel A, I compare the firm-level 
characteristics of firms with and without state ownership. Table 2.4 Panel A shows that about 65 
percent (2,558 observations) of firms have state shareholders.22 The main reason for this is that most 
listed firms were converted from state-owned enterprises as a result of the equitisation process 
(Robinett et al. 2013). In my sample, about 67 percent of listed firms are SOE-converted (2,650 
observations), and nearly 85 percent of these firms report some state ownership (2,242 observations). 
Moreover, some firms are newly founded with investment from state-owned enterprises (316 
observations).23 On average, firms with state ownership are smaller in terms of assets and liabilities 
than firms without state ownership. However, firms with state ownership seem to have significantly 
better financial performance than firms without state ownership, with performance measured by ROA 
(p<0.01). Firms with state owners also have significantly higher leverage and market-to-book ratios 
compared to firms without state ownership (p<0.01). Regarding corporate governance characteristics, 
firms with state ownership have a significantly lower percentage of shares owned by foreign 
investors, smaller board sizes, and a lower proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
(p<0.01). Further, the proportion of firms with state ownership having a dual leadership is also 
significantly lower than firms without state ownership (p<0.01). I find no significant differences in 
market capitalisation, net sales, net income, and the proportion of firms audited by Big 4 audit firms 
between firms with and without state ownership.   
In Panel B, I break down firm-level characteristics into state ownership categories of 5, 20, and 50 
percent.24 Among firms in this group, nearly 45 percent of firms (1,145 observations over 2,558 of 
firms with state ownership) have ultimate state controlling shareholders (i.e., SO percent is equal or 
more than 50 percent). On average, firms with state shareholders as ultimate controlling shareholders 
are the largest in terms of market capitalisation, total assets, total liabilities, net sales, and net income. 
 
22 The ownership data may not include all indirect ownership through state-controlled firms.  
23 Untabulated data. 
24 These different levels of state ownership show whether the state is a major, controlling or ultimate controlling 
shareholder of a firm. 
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However, these firms’ profitability (measured by ROA) is lower than the profitability of firms in the 
group with controlling state shareholders. Interestingly, firms with ultimate state controlling 
shareholders are the group having the lowest proportion of dual leadership. This group also has the 
highest proportion of firms employing Big 4 audit firms.  
Panel C breaks-down the percentage of state ownership by year. On average, the percentage of 
shares owned by state shareholders in the sample is approximately 40 percent. Generally, the number 
of listed firms with state ownership each year gradually decreased between 2013 and 2016. However, 
the average percentage of shares owned by state shareholders in listed firms tended to increase 
between 2011 and 2016. This increasing percentage of state ownership in listed firms confirms that 
state ownership continues to maintain its important role in the Vietnamese economy, although the 




Table 2.4: Data about state ownership       
Panel A: Descriptive statistics partitioned by the presence of state ownership  
Variable Firms with RPT or RP balance disclosed and state ownership Firms with RPT or RP balance disclosed and no state ownership Mean difference 
 (t-statistics)   N mean sd Q1 median Q3 N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
Market capitalisation 
(billion VND) 2558 1,121.375 8,028.577 54.400 148.912 424.000 1363 1,385.550 6,487.485 64.096 176.400 569.812 1.046 
Total assets (billion 
VND) 2558 1,511.443 3,930.855 187.531 450.830 1,263.199 1363 2,354.475 8,936.729 219.404 515.527 1,613.646 4.087*** 
Total liabilities 
(billion VND) 2558 867.127 2,161.166 67.991 230.063 760.764 1363 1,427.337 6,403.675 68.052 237.967 874.234 4.016*** 
Net Sales (billion 
VND) 2558 1,427.428 4,270.884 167.116 438.106 1,182.237 1363 1,413.539 3,867.491 120.377 354.083 1,082.832 -0.100 
Net income (billion 
VND) 2558 108.003 618.653 5.306 19.867 57.726 1363 95.323 412.443 2.564 15.314 58.820 -0.680 
ROA 2558 0.082 0.093 0.024 0.063 0.118 1363 0.055 0.099 0.009 0.044 0.097 -8.431*** 
Leverage 2558 0.516 0.221 0.335 0.544 0.692 1363 0.474 0.217 0.309 0.493 0.638 -5.695*** 
Market-to-book 2558 1.054 0.958 0.510 0.800 1.260 1363 0.976 0.826 0.443 0.753 1.225 -2.544** 
Foreign ownership 2401 0.084 0.120 0.005 0.030 0.111 1265 0.113 0.169 0.005 0.039 0.140 6.085*** 
Board size 2558 5.407 1.002 5 5 5 1363 5.583 1.210 5 5 6 4.874*** 
Non-executive 
directors (%) 2558 0.567 0.201 0.400 0.600 0.750 1363 0.601 0.207 0.429 0.600 0.800 4.964*** 
Dual leadership 2558 0.299 0.458 0 0 1 1363 0.397 0.489 0 0 1 6.194*** 
Big 4 auditor 2558 0.218 0.413 0 0 0 1363 0.211 0.408 0 0 0 -0.468 





Panel  A: Descriptive statistics of firms with state ownership, breakdown at some levels of percentage of shares owned by state shareholders 
variable SO% < 0.05 0.05 ≤ SO% < 0.2 0.2 ≤ SO% < 0.5 0.5 ≤ SO%  
  N mean N mean N mean N mean 
Market capitalisation (billion VND) 100 478.476 443 682.615 870 1,174.290 1,145 1307.073 
Total assets (billion VND) 100 1,305.180 443 1,442.057 870 846.273 1,145 2061.715 
Total liabilities (billion VND) 100 716.469 443 877.539 870 422.552 1,145 1214.055 
Net Sales (billion VND) 100 663.594 443 1,347.904 870 977.297 1,145 1866.928 
Net income (billion VND) 100 41.384 443 80.009 870 88.631 1,145 139.372 
ROA 100 0.045 443 0.069 870 0.094 1,145 0.08 
Leverage 100 0.580 443 0.507 870 0.468 1,145 0.55 
Market-to-book 100 0.847 443 1.018 870 1.141 1,145 1.021 
State ownership 100 0.024 443 0.126 870 0.348 1,145 0.569 
Foreign ownership 94 0.092 420 0.113 801 0.096 1,086 0.063 
Board size 100 5.68 443 5.831 870 5.367 1,145 5.25 
Non-executive directors (%) 100 0.545 443 0.580 870 0.575 1,145 0.558 
Dual leadership 100 0.56 443 0.454 870 0.318 1,145 0.203 
Big 4 auditor 100 0.12 443 0.187 870 0.189 1,145 0.26 
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Panel  B: State ownership percentage breakdown by year 
Year N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
2010 327 0.386 0.189 0.215 0.428 0.510 
2011 363 0.384 0.187 0.217 0.434 0.510 
2012 381 0.389 0.190 0.229 0.442 0.512 
2013 383 0.395 0.195 0.233 0.442 0.515 
2014 378 0.391 0.197 0.230 0.442 0.513 
2015 373 0.405 0.206 0.244 0.466 0.525 
2016 353 0.422 0.205 0.269 0.490 0.536 
Total observations 2,558 0.396 0.196 0.237 0.448 0.513 
 
Table 2.5 decomposes disclosed information about related parties by listed firms according to: (1) 
the nature of the transaction, (2) the type of the balance, and (3) the relations – the parties involved 
in the RPT or the related balance.  
Vietnamese listed firms have been required to disclose RPTs since 2003, in accordance with VAS 
26. During the time under investigation, most firms reported in their notes to the financial statement 
the identity of their related parties, the relation with these related parties (e.g., parents, holding, major 
shareholder, entities under common control, associates, key management personnel (KMP) or KMP’s 
related entities), and the types and amounts of RPTs or related balances.  
Based on the notes to the consolidated financial statements, data about RPTs were hand-collected 
and classified by the nature of the transaction or balance and the related party involved. RPTs were 
classified into 16 types of transactions and six types of balances based on guidance from VAS 26 
(VAS 26.19, Ministry of Finance 2003). Other RPTs and other balances were types of transactions 
or balances that could not be grouped into the 16 specific categories of transactions or six groups of 
balances.  
Panel A of Table 2.5 reports that the most frequent transaction disclosed is sale of goods/services, 
followed by purchase of goods/services that respectively account for about 53 and 44 percent of total 
RPTs disclosed in the sample. Cash outflows to related parties and dividends received from related 
parties come next with a much lower proportion, being around 18 and 13 percent, respectively. Loans, 
borrowings, sales, or purchases of assets are not frequently disclosed transactions in my sample. 
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Guarantees to and from related parties are disclosed the least with only around 0.459 and 0.485 
percent of the sample, respectively. This feature distinguishes Vietnamese listed firms from Chinese 
listed firms where intercompany loans and related guarantees are found to be more prevalent and 
frequent (Habib et al. 2015).  
In addition, account receivables and payables represent the most frequent balances with related 
parties in the sample with around 53 and 45 percent, respectively. Compared with the balances of 
loans and borrowing, which account for about 9 and 12 percent, respectively, account receivables and 
payables have a much higher disclosure frequency, although their average values are much lower.  
I classify the identity of the related party and categorise these parties into groups. These groups 
are holding, parent, major shareholder, associate, joint venture, and KMP (including members of the 
director board, the management board and supervisory board, KMP related entities, KMP related 
individuals). A group entitled ‘other related entities’ includes invested entities, associate/joint venture 
of parent/major shareholders of firms or related entities whose relationships with the reporting firm 
are not disclosed clearly. A further inclusion is ‘other related individuals’, such as related individuals 
whose relationships with the reporting firm are not specified in the notes.  
Panel B of Table 2.5 shows that listed firms conduct RPTs and have balances mainly with their 
associates, parents, and entities under common control accounting for about 24 percent, 21 percent, 
and 20 percent respectively, of total firm-year RPT observations. RPTs or balances with ‘other related 
entities’ group account for 23 percent, but this category of the related party consists of a variety of 
parties that are not classified into particular groups. They can be entities that receive less than 20 
percent investment from listed firms, ex-related associates, joint ventures, or parents. However, the 
average value of the transaction with entities under common control and balances with the holding 
entity is the largest, while the average values of transactions or balances with associates are modest. 
Although I collected all information about related parties in the consolidated financial statements, I 
still observed some firms disclosing information about transactions or balances with their 
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subsidiaries. However, I excluded data about transactions or balances with subsidiaries from my 
analysis because almost all firms offset transactions or balances with subsidiaries in their consolidated 
financial statements.  
 
Table 2.5: Data about RPTs  




 mean   sd  Q1 median Q3 
Unit: billion VND  3921      
Transaction with RP        
Sales 2089 53.277 368.314 1,276.537 5.891 36.837 207.072 
Purchases 1755 44.759 330.845 1,381.475 3.359 25.752 165.073 
Loans 330 8.416 121.931 409.844 2.000 10.056 42.482 
Borrowing 432 11.018 118.105 398.040 3.284 15.050 75.986 
Asset sale 155 3.953 74.458 234.622 1.037 12.000 58.311 
Asset purchase 154 3.928 157.408 499.642 1.600 12.251 55.000 
Guarantee for RP 18 0.459 251.925 575.184 1.665 54.099 149.064 
Guarantee from RP 19 0.485 198.945 396.251 1.992 23.061 153.352 
Investment in RP 354 9.028 80.156 227.844 4.231 16.370 62.435 
Investment from RP 90 2.295 131.501 283.262 4.610 23.078 75.000 
Dividends received 407 10.380 24.445 167.013 0.564 2.832 11.488 
Dividends paid 530 13.517 59.154 275.397 3.300 10.093 25.960 
Interest revenue 415 10.584 23.297 84.732 0.414 1.636 10.798 
Interest expense 439 11.196 17.016 53.244 0.397 1.972 7.421 
Cash inflows 452 11.528 160.275 561.304 1.550 13.080 52.965 
Cash outflows 718 18.312 137.155 601.765 1.488 9.374 51.378 
Other RPTs 350 8.926 69.666 332.671 0.896 7.618 41.104 
Balance with RP        
Trade receivables 2102 53.609 91.540 258.500 2.548 13.927 69.806 
Other receivables 1130 28.819 73.715 280.507 0.637 4.308 30.660 
Loans receivables 372 9.487 190.546 712.038 4.000 12.733 73.730 
Trade payables 1777 45.320 84.745 323.365 1.421 8.445 43.791 
Other payables 1060 27.034 51.096 188.302 0.742 4.990 21.378 
Borrowings 496 12.650 247.232 915.983 5.086 28.139 112.088 
All receivables 2467 62.918 140.494 527.931 3.415 18.225 89.207 




Panel B: Descriptive data on RPTs and RP balances by transacting parties 
 Transacting party for RPTs Transacting party for RP balances 
Related party Obs frequency 
(%) 
 mean   sd  Q1 median Q3 Obs frequency 
(%) 
 sd  Q1 median Q3 
Unit: billion VND 3921           
Holding 58 1.479 125.573 243.810 0.432 6.604 119.233 45 1.148 1953.927 6.097 23.795 111.638 
Parent 819 20.888 398.903 1311.051 9.773 58.193 274.296 826 21.066 825.314 4.224 21.246 91.772 
Major shareholder 678 17.292 200.345 589.377 2.767 18.731 94.660 619 15.787 145.048 1.246 6.745 38.473 
Entities under common 
control 
787 20.071 715.423 1850.551 15.270 110.933 530.231 850 21.678 626.653 5.893 29.518 129.736 
Associate 958 24.433 158.459 571.903 5.581 24.930 98.640 898 22.902 262.057 2.561 11.093 45.556 
Joint venture 113 2.882 504.524 1728.799 2.007 11.408 153.526 101 2.576 430.454 0.519 7.686 104.548 
Other related entities 914 23.310 400.436 1601.073 5.638 35.173 206.960 901 22.979 700.333 2.765 18.463 103.348 
KMP and KMP related 
entities, individuals 
429 10.941 47.468 117.356 1.247 6.200 30.502 497 12.675 93.121 1.050 5.211 21.625 
Subsidiary 184 4.693 374.894 2026.388 3.821 24.124 100.569 171 4.361 355.736 1.950 9.695 36.087 
Other related individuals 84 2.142 231.954 880.356 2.707 15.492 75.619 109 2.780 92.334 0.740 6.675 28.666 
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Table 2.6 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in my regression model. The mean 
of RP_SALE is 0.270, showing that related sales account for 27 percent of net sales, on average. 
RP_CREDIT has a mean of 0.026, indicating that net credit to related parties by firms in the sample 
is approximately three percent of these firms’ total assets. The means (medians) of ABN_RP_SALE 
and ABN_RP_CREDIT are 0.010 (-0.094), and 0.002 (-0.016) respectively, estimated by the residual 
model. The negative (positive) values of ABN_RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT suggest that the 
firms have a lower (higher) level of RPTs than the normal level. The values of abnormal related sales 
and related net credit show that firms do not have a significantly different level of RPT from normal 
levels. For example, the level of abnormal related sales is just 0.010 or one percent higher than the 
normal level. However, both ABN_RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT are greater than zero, 
suggesting that both propping and tunnelling activities are likely to occur in listed Vietnamese firms 
(Habib et al. 2017).  
State shareholders are present in nearly 66 percent of total firm-year observations. The mean 
(median) of the percentage of shares owned by state owners is 0.395 (0.191) or approximately 40 (19) 
percent. This number is lower compared to state ownership in Chinese listed firms in the study by 
Shan (2019). Sample firms have high leverage (an average of 0.501 or about 50 percent). On average, 
the largest shareholder of a firm holds 0.354 or about 35 percent of shares in that firm. Foreign 
investors hold about nine percent of shares in a firm, on average. Finally, about 58 percent of members 









Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models 
variable N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
RP_SALE 2089 0.270 0.325 0.013 0.116 0.448 
ABN_RP_SALE 1900 0.010 0.324 -0.213 -0.094 0.200 
RP_CREDIT 2858 0.026 0.121 -0.022 0.004 0.056 
ABN_RP_CREDIT 2802 0.002 0.128 -0.060 -0.016 0.046 
SO_PRESENCE 3921 0.652 0.476 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SO_PERCENT 2558 0.395 0.191 0.237 0.448 0.513 
SIZE 3921 13.144 1.403 12.190 13.068 14.114 
LEV 3921 0.501 0.216 0.328 0.527 0.674 
MB 3921 0.978 0.665 0.486 0.786 1.252 
ADJ_ROA 3921 0.015 0.071 -0.031 0.000 0.050 
BLOCK 3884 0.354 0.186 0.192 0.346 0.510 
FOWN 3666 0.091 0.128 0.005 0.032 0.123 
DUAL 3921 0.333 0.471 0 0 1 
BOARD 3921 5.463 1.029 5 5 5 
NONEXE  3921 0.582 0.197 0.400 0.600 0.800 
BIG 4 3921 0.216 0.411 0 0 0 
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 3rd and 97th percentiles. Variables are defined in Table 2.1.  
 
2.5.2. Pearson correlation results 
Table 2.7 provides correlations among the variables. I find significantly positive correlations for 
RP_SALE and ABN_RP_SALE with SO_PERCENT (p<0.01). This suggests that firms with a higher 
proportion of state shareholders are more likely to have a higher extent of RPTs. I report negative 
correlations between RPTs and SIZE, MB, ADJ_ROA, FOWN, DUAL, BOARD, and BIG 4 
(p<0.01). However, the correlations between RPTs and LEV and BLOCK are mixed across different 
measures of RPTs (p<0.10 or better).  
Overall, the results of correlations reported in Table 2.7 show that the correlations between most 
of the explanatory variables are not high (apart from the correlation between state ownership 
percentage and block shareholders). Finally, I compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the 
explanatory variables. I find that the VIF values of the variables in the regression model are below 
the critical value of ten, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a major issue in my study (Kutner 
et al. 2005). 
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Table 2.7: Correlation results 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. RP_SALE  1.000        
2. ABN_RP_SALE  0.852*** 1.000       
3. RP_CREDIT  0.354*** 0.385*** 1.000      
4. ABN_RP_CREDIT  0.351*** 0.414*** 0.914*** 1.000     
5. SO_PERCENT  0.198*** 0.132*** 0.014 0.015 1.000    
6. SIZE -0.074*** -0.235*** -0.157*** -0.158*** 0.134*** 1.000   
7. LEV  0.042* -0.059** -0.112*** -0.035* 0.055*** 0.340*** 1.000  
8. MB  -0.102*** -0.032 -0.071*** -0.022 0.012 0.112*** -0.116*** 1.000 
9. ADJ_ROA  -0.078*** -0.018 0.009 -0.007 0.086*** -0.060*** -0.420*** 0.447*** 
10. BLOCK  0.170*** 0.101*** -0.033* -0.009 0.902*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.077*** 
11. FOWN  -0.148*** -0.153*** -0.065*** -0.073*** -0.175*** 0.298*** -0.202*** 0.230*** 
12. DUAL  -0.069*** -0.020 -0.013 -0.009 -0.239*** -0.084*** 0.009 -0.041** 
13. BOARD  -0.232*** -0.189*** -0.080*** -0.089*** -0.171*** 0.295*** -0.020 0.145*** 
14. NONEXE  0.038* 0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 0.076*** -0.132*** 0.093*** 
15. BIG 4  0.007 -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.087*** 0.119*** 0.470*** 0.048*** 0.154*** 
 
Table 2.7: Correlation results (continued)      
  9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
9. ADJ_ROA  1.000       
10. BLOCK  0.094*** 1.000      
11. FOWN  0.231*** -0.069*** 1.000     
12. DUAL  -0.016 -0.222*** -0.006 1.000    
13. BOARD  0.058*** -0.117*** 0.320*** -0.015 1.000   
14. NONEXE  -0.004 -0.019 0.029* -0.301*** 0.080*** 1.000  
15. BIG 4  0.040** 0.179*** 0.317*** -0.107*** 0.167*** 0.120*** 1.000 
 Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10%, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are 




2.5.3. Regression results 
Columns 1-4 of Table 2.8 present the regression results for the estimation of Eqn. (2) where state 
ownership is measured as a dummy variable. I find the coefficient on SO_PRESENCE, my main 
variable of interest, to be negative and significant to RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT (p<0.01). 
The negative coefficients suggest that the presence of state ownership is associated with a lower 
extent of related net credit (both normal and abnormal values) compared to their non-state ownership 
counterparts. Specifically, firms with state ownership deflate both normal and abnormal related net 
credit by approximately three percent of total assets compared to firms without state ownership. These 
results show that firms with state ownership are less likely to use RPTs (i.e., related net credit) than 
firms with no state shareholders. While related net credit is usually proxied for tunnelling activities 
(Habib et al. 2015) to exploit wealth from (minority) shareholders, this finding supports the argument 
concerning the positive role of state ownership on corporate efficiency in constraining firms’ 
tunnelling activities.  
Columns 5-8 of Table 2.8 presents the test results for the association between the extent of RPTs 
and the percentage of shares owned by state shareholders in the group of firms with state ownership 
only. The coefficient on SO_PERCENT is positive and significant for all proxies of RPTs (p<0.10 or 
better). This result shows that among firms reporting state ownership, firms with a higher state share 
percentage report a significantly higher extent of RPTs.  
The economic significance of this result can be explained as one standard deviation increase in the 
variable of SO_PERCENT inflates related sales by 26 percent of total sales relative to RP_SALE’s 
mean value. The economic significance value of  0.260 on RP_SALE is computed following Ball et 
al. (2012) by taking the coefficient on the variable SO_PERCENT of 0.368 which is multiplied by 
the standard deviation value of SO_PERCENT of 0.191, then dividing by RP_SALE mean value of 
0.270 (i.e., 0.368*0.191/0.270 = 0.260 or 26 percent). Similarly, one standard deviation increase in 
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SO_PERCENT is each associated respectively with 7.888, 0.478, and 6.876 in ABN_RP_SALE, 
RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT relative to their mean values.  
Regarding the control variables, the coefficients on SIZE and MB are negatively significant 
(p<0.10 or better) in the full sample and the sample of firms with state ownership only. These results 
are consistent with prior studies which indicate that RPTs are less prevalent in large firms (Cheung 
et al. 2009b) and in firms with high growth opportunities (Berkman et al. 2009; Kang et al. 2014).  I 
also find that RPTs are less prevalent in firms with dual leadership and firms with a larger board size 
(p<0.10 or better). However, these results are not in line with prior studies (Gordon et al. 2004a; 
Berkman et al. 2009; Yeh et al. 2012; Kang et al. 2014; Bennouri et al. 2015; Balsam et al. 2017). In 
addition, I find that NONEXE is positively associated with RPTs (p<0.10 or better). Thus, the higher 
the number of non-executive directors on the board, the more likely a firm is to have a higher extent 
of RPTs (measured by RP sales). 
There appears to be some inconsistency in the association between RPT and some of the control 
variables, such as LEV, ADJ_ROA, BLOCK and FOWN when I consider the whole sample and when 
I focus on firms with state ownership only. For example, in the whole sample, the coefficient on LEV 
is significantly negative (p<0.01) with RP_CREDIT. This result suggests that firms with higher 
leverage are less likely to provide credit to their related parties. However, among firms with state 
ownership, LEV is positively significant with RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT (p<0.01). 
Similarly, the coefficients on ADJ_ROA and FOWN are significantly negative when testing the full 
sample (p<0.05) but is significantly positive among firms with state ownership (p<0.10 or better). 
In contrast, BLOCK is positively significant with RPTs, measured by RP_SALE and 
ABN_RP_SALE, in the total sample (p<0.01), whereas among state ownership firms, there is a 
negative association between BLOCK and RPTs, measured by RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT 
(p<0.10). Finally, I do not find a significant association between BIG4 and the extent of RPTs.  
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RP_SALE ABN_RP_SALE RP_CREDIT ABN_RP_CREDIT RP_SALE ABN_RP_SALE RP_CREDIT ABN_RP_CREDIT 

















                
SO_PRESENCE ? 0.002 0.009 -0.029*** -0.026***     
  (0.129) (0.450) (-5.132) (-4.134)     
SO_PERCENT ?     0.368*** 0.413*** 0.065* 0.072* 
      (3.744) (3.732) (1.902) (1.960) 
SIZE ? -0.025*** -0.047*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.043*** -0.067*** -0.016*** -0.024*** 
  (-3.789) (-6.373) (-4.033) (-6.418) (-5.376) (-7.228) (-5.688) (-7.764) 
LEV ? 0.044 -0.067 -0.060*** 0.002 0.164*** 0.042 -0.008 0.052*** 
  (1.041) (-1.414) (-4.225) (0.106) (3.160) (0.704) (-0.418) (2.595) 
MB ? -0.043*** 0.013 -0.008* 0.007 -0.065*** 0.002 -0.013** 0.004 
  (-3.307) (0.893) (-1.778) (1.448) (-4.103) (0.115) (-2.220) (0.595) 
ADJ_ROA ? -0.197 -0.365** -0.024 -0.058 0.091 -0.164 0.112* 0.044 
  (-1.500) (-2.435) (-0.544) (-1.173) (0.548) (-0.848) (1.920) (0.691) 
BLOCK ? 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.014 0.014 -0.098 -0.119 -0.068* -0.074* 
  (4.399) (3.902) (0.953) (0.882) (-0.882) (-0.954) (-1.770) (-1.774) 
FOWN ? -0.062 -0.160** -0.027 -0.016 0.228** 0.094 0.057* 0.084** 
  (-0.983) (-2.184) (-1.264) (-0.698) (2.524) (0.855) (1.895) (2.505) 
DUAL ? 0.005 -0.005 -0.015*** -0.014** 0.029 0.019 -0.012* -0.012 
  (0.312) (-0.257) (-2.735) (-2.379) (1.396) (0.798) (-1.756) (-1.616) 
BOARD ? -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.006* -0.005 
  (-5.481) (-4.349) (-2.687) (-2.364) (-4.254) (-3.489) (-1.768) (-1.257) 
NONEXE ? 0.081** 0.065 -0.013 -0.005 0.132*** 0.117** -0.013 -0.001 
  (2.219) (1.567) (-1.049) (-0.342) (2.856) (2.208) (-0.853) (-0.051) 
BIG 4 ? 0.011 0.014 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.007 -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.619) (0.712) (-0.388) (-0.696) (0.266) (0.302) (-1.229) (-1.344) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.832*** 0.711*** 0.196*** 0.261*** 0.956*** 0.857*** 0.223*** 0.303*** 
  (9.413) (7.140) (6.372) (7.812) (9.116) (7.226) (5.974) (7.473) 
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Observations  1,954 1,780 2,657 2,606 1,390 1,249 1,791 1,745 
R-squared   0.232 0.088 0.074 0.042 0.268 0.113 0.104 0.067 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers in parentheses are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
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2.5.4 Robustness tests 
I perform some additional tests to verify the empirical findings reported in the previous section.  First, 
I use an alternative proxy for RPTs by replacing the components of RPTs with gross RPTs and re-ran 
my regression. More specifically, I use abnormal operating and abnormal total RPTs. Operating RPTs 
include sale and purchase of goods/services with related parties, while total RPTs are the gross dollar 
amount of all RPTs disclosed by a firm. These proxies have been used in the previous literature on 
RPTs to examine the association between RPTs and stock price crash (Habib et al. 2019). The results 
obtained from these regressions are consistent with those reported in Section 2.5.3. Hence, the 























ABN_RPT ABN_OPERRPT ABN_RPT ABN_OPERRPT 









      
SO_PRESENCE ? -0.280*** -0.105   
  (-2.971) (-0.842)   
SO_PERCENT ?   1.432*** 2.181*** 
  
  (2.722) (3.327) 
SIZE ? -0.004 -0.646*** -0.137*** -0.775*** 
  (-0.105) (-13.563) (-3.032) (-13.868) 
LEV ? -0.007 0.568* 0.783*** 0.781** 
  (-0.031) (1.846) (2.704) (2.146) 
MB ? -0.164** -0.371*** -0.199** -0.309*** 
  (-2.200) (-3.833) (-2.233) (-2.759) 
ADJ_ROA ? 3.090*** 5.068*** 4.154*** 5.376*** 
  (4.153) (5.224) (4.539) (4.681) 
BLOCK ? 3.013*** 2.186*** 2.182*** 0.995 
  (12.681) (7.118) (3.651) (1.345) 
FOWN ? -0.966*** -1.055** 0.117 -0.904 
  (-2.805) (-2.335) (0.247) (-1.491) 
DUAL ? -0.197** -0.224* -0.152 -0.184 
  (-2.184) (-1.887) (-1.363) (-1.300) 
BOARD ? -0.216*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.369*** 
  (-5.362) (-5.198) (-5.188) (-5.583) 
NONEXE  ? -0.024 -0.348 0.222 -0.213 
  (-0.113) (-1.288) (0.880) (-0.675) 
BIG 4 ? 0.174* 0.160 0.224* 0.387*** 
  (1.709) (1.244) (1.896) (2.680) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.236 9.633*** 1.269** 11.048*** 
  (0.457) (14.566) (2.115) (15.102) 
Observations  2,641 2,169 1,787 1,540 
R-squared   0.109 0.204 0.154 0.268 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers 
in parentheses are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Another robustness test conducted to alleviate any heterogeneity in the characteristics of firms is 
propensity score matching (see Tucker 2010; Lennox et al. 2012). Prior research indicates that factors 
such as size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, a firm’s performance (measured as return on assets), 
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ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and some corporate governance characteristics could 
influence the extent of RPTs engaged in by firms (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; 
Habib et al. 2017). I, therefore, employ the propensity score matching approach to confirm that 
changes in the extent of RPTs in firms are related to the presence or percentage of state ownership 
and not to the above factors (Blanco et al. 2020).  
I first estimate a logistic model for each year where the dependent variable is SO_PRESENCE, a 
dummy variable for firms with state ownership, and the independent variables are all the control 
variables in Eqn. (2). I use propensity scores generated from this logistic model to match observations 
with state ownership with those without state ownership.  
I next compute a dummy variable, HIGH_SO, which is coded 1 if the firm has SO_PERCENT 
greater than the sample’s yearly median among firms with state ownership, and 0 otherwise. I then 
estimate a logistic regression where HIGH_SO is the dependent variable and the covariates are all of 
the control variables in Eqn. (2). I match each observation from the high state ownership percentage 
subsample with an observation from the low state ownership percentage one based on the propensity 
scores.  
In both matching processes, I use a closest neighbour matching process with no replacement and 
with a calliper of one percent. These procedures result in a sample of matched pairs of treatment and 
control firms that are similar regarding size, leverage, and other characteristics. Table 2.10 - Panel A 
reports the descriptive statistics of the covariates used to match treatment and control firms in the 
regression for SO_PRESENCE and SO_PERCENT. The matching process was successful, with all 
variables being not statistically different across the two matched sample groups. These results suggest 
that I have a properly matched sample of treatment and control firms that differ only in the presence 
of state ownership or percentage of state ownership. 
I then estimate the regressions in Eqn. (2) using the propensity score-matched sample to verify my 
previous results. Panel B of Table 2.10 reports the results from the regression estimated using the 
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propensity score-matched samples. Although the number of observations reduces significantly, the 
coefficient on SO_PRESENCE remains negative and significant to RP_CREDIT and 
ABN_RP_CREDIT (p<0.01) as shown in columns 3 and 4. These results confirm that firms with state 
ownership have a lower extent of RPTs. Results from columns 5 to 8 of Panel B, Table 2.10, are 
consistent with my main results of a positive association between SO_PERCENT and extent of RPTs 
(p<0.01). These results confirm the robustness of my findings of the association between state 




Table 2.10: Propensity Score Matching     
Panel A: Propensity – matched variables 
 SO_PRESENCE =1  SO_PRESENCE =0  Difference Tests: 
p-value 
 HIGH_ SO =1  HIGH_ SO =1  Difference Tests: 
p-value Variable n mean  n mean   n mean  n mean  
SIZE 322 13.502  322 13.554  0.631  372 13.297  372 13.289  0.934 
LEV 322 0.499  322 0.509  0.570  372 0.491  372 0.507  0.327 
MB 322 0.012  322 0.012  0.666  372 0.018  372 0.021  0.379 
ADJ_ROA 322 0.039  322 0.032  0.917  372 0.049  372 0.095  0.555 
BLOCK 322 0.333  322 0.348  0.303  372 0.296  372 0.318  0.067 
FOWN 322 0.103  322 0.099  0.734  372 0.104  372 0.100  0.702 
DUAL 322 0.351  322 0.311  0.277  372 0.266  372 0.272  0.013 
BOARD 322 5.634  322 5.556  0.350  372 5.503  372 5.484  0.806 
NONEXE  322 0.628  322 0.606  0.150  372 0.617  372 0.615  0.884 

















RP_SALE ABN_RP_SALE RP_CREDIT ABN_RP_CREDIT RP_SALE ABN_RP_SALE RP_CREDIT ABN_RP_CREDIT 

















                
SO_PRESENCE ? -0.006 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.025***     
  (-0.310) (-0.093) (-3.352) (-2.623)     
SO_PERCENT ?     0.571*** 0.500*** 0.171*** 0.182*** 
      (0.122) (0.128) (0.049) (0.053) 
SIZE ? -0.025*** -0.045*** -0.009** -0.014*** -0.023* -0.057*** -0.014** -0.024*** 
  (-2.681) (-4.371) (-2.129) (-2.922) (-1.737) (-4.070) (-2.554) (-4.079) 
LEV ? 0.058 -0.014 -0.062** -0.018 -0.091 -0.138 -0.076** 0.005 
  (0.990) (-0.216) (-2.305) (-0.620) (-1.088) (-1.578) (-2.243) (0.132) 
MB ? -0.002 0.018 -0.000 0.015 0.011 0.073*** -0.001 0.012 
  (-0.088) (0.805) (-0.002) (1.468) (0.425) (2.758) (-0.125) (1.100) 
ADJ_ROA ? -0.319* -0.232 -0.057 -0.067 -0.689*** -0.688** -0.213** -0.254** 
  (-1.685) (-1.108) (-0.656) (-0.704) (-2.643) (-2.513) (-2.015) (-2.262) 
BLOCK ? 0.227*** 0.218*** 0.020 0.038 -0.104 -0.094 -0.145*** -0.147** 
  (3.999) (3.483) (0.766) (1.342) (-0.783) (-0.673) (-2.685) (-2.560) 
FOWN ? -0.182** -0.192** -0.091** -0.091** -0.036 -0.097 0.005 0.022 
  (-2.227) (-2.129) (-2.452) (-2.219) (-0.264) (-0.680) (0.084) (0.369) 
DUAL ? -0.017 -0.028 -0.016 -0.018 0.026 0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
  (-0.783) (-1.150) (-1.629) (-1.614) (0.785) (0.235) (-0.522) (-0.527) 
BOARD ? -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.028* -0.013 -0.003 -0.001 
  (-3.780) (-3.566) (-2.299) (-2.263) (-1.837) (-0.791) (-0.447) (-0.216) 
NONEXE  ? -0.020 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.048 -0.062 -0.055* -0.042 
  (-0.360) (-0.102) (-0.168) (-0.205) (-0.615) (-0.769) (-1.752) (-1.259) 
BIG 4 ? 0.040 0.039 0.016 0.010 0.037 0.035 -0.010 -0.014 
  (1.528) (1.367) (1.386) (0.787) (1.045) (0.941) (-0.682) (-0.935) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Constant  0.767*** 0.601*** 0.221*** 0.288*** 0.605*** 0.603*** 0.190** 0.279*** 
  (5.548) (3.934) (3.496) (4.141) (3.279) (3.112) (2.540) (3.512) 
Observations  644 644 644 644 499 499 499 499 
R-squared  0.254 0.132 0.109 0.089 0.310 0.173 0.168 0.133 





This paper provides a detailed description of RPTs in Vietnam, and firm-level characteristics of firms 
with RPTs, in comparison with their non-RPT counterparts. RPTs are found to be prevalent in the 
sample of listed firms in Vietnam, regardless of their ownership structure. I examined the association 
between RPTs and state ownership because of the dominance of state ownership in the Vietnamese 
economy and the important role of state ownership in corporate governance. Despite extant studies 
about RPTs since the early 2000s and the prevalence of state ownership in publicly traded firms 
around the world, the association between state ownership and RPTs remains under-researched. In 
this paper, I identify that the presence of state shareholders restrains the extent of RPTs engaged in 
by Vietnamese listed firms. However, among firms with state ownership, I find a positive association 
between the level of state ownership and the extent of RPTs. The positive association is consistent 
across RPT measures, ranging from normal and abnormal values of RPTs. These associations are also 
economically significant. The results support H1, which states that there is an association between 
state ownership and the extent of RPTs. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by describing RPTs in an emerging transitional 
economy with state concentrated ownership and characteristics associated with RPTs firms. I also 
provide comprehensive evidence of the association between state ownership and the extent of RPTs. 
I have tested this association using different proxies for state ownership and RPTs. Thus, my results 
are robust to alternative specifications. 
My findings have significant implications for investors and regulators in Vietnam and other 
countries where state ownership and RPTs prevail. Specifically, the findings suggest that investors 
considering investing in firms with state ownership are recommended to obtain information on RPTs 
and their related parties to make more informed investment choices. 
This paper is subject to some limitations. First, due to the limited information disclosed by firms, 
I do not have access to information about indirect state ownership. Such data would enable further 
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analysis of the role of state shareholders, direct and indirect, in the extent of RPTs engaged in by 
firms. Second, my paper is conducted during a period that has considerable variation in the application 
of corporate governance regulations. This leads to potential inconsistency in the way firms disclose 
information about RPTs. For example, listed firms have been subject to regulation by the Corporate 
Governance Code (revised 2012) since 2012 (Robinett et al. 2013).25 The regulation requires listed 
firms to prepare corporate governance reports every six months26. Information about the identities of 
all shareholders owning five percent or more of shares in a firm is required to be disclosed in this 
report.  
Given this is the first paper exploring RPTs in Vietnam, some potential topics might be further 
explored in the future to reveal implications of RPTs in the context of Vietnam. For example, the 
association between RPTs and stock liquidity, or the association between RPTs and the cost of equity 
for listed firms could be investigated to provide investors with knowledge of the possible economic 
consequences of RPTs.  
 
 
25 Before 2012, listed firms were regulated by the initial Corporate Governance Code (2007), which did not have the 
requirement of preparing corporate governance report.  
26 Corporate Governance Code (revised 2012), article 27 (2) (Ministry of Finance. 2012). 
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Chapter 3: Related party transactions, state ownership, and 
the cost of corporate debt: Evidence from Vietnam 
3.1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the potential association between the cost of corporate debt and RPTs reported 
by firms in Vietnam, a transition economy with concentrated state ownership (Robinett et al. 2013). 
I address the following questions. First, is there an association between the cost of debt and the 
presence and extent of RPTs reported by firms? Second, does the presence of state ownership 
moderate the association between the cost of debt and RPTs?  
A RPT is defined as a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related parties, 
regardless of whether a price is charged, where a related party is a person or entity related to the 
reporting entity (International Accounting Standard 24.9, International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) 2009). RPTs are various and frequently complicated transactions between a firm and its 
related parties, such as the firm’s managers, directors, shareholders and associates (Habib et al. 2015).  
RPTs can be initiated for genuine business purposes, such as lowering transaction costs or assuring 
product quality (Khanna and Palepu 2000). However, RPTs are also perceived to violate arm’s-length 
market transaction principles (Habib et al. 2015), which is associated with financial fraud and 
minority shareholder expropriations (Cheung et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2010). Firms are required to 
disclose information about transactions, balances, and relationships with related parties to allow users 
of financial reports to assess the entity’s operations, including the risks and opportunities facing the 
entity associated with RPTs (International Accounting Standard 24.8, International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) 2009).  
The literature on RPTs has mainly focused on the consequences of RPTs from different 
perspectives, such as firm performance, earnings quality, audit fees, CEO compensation or a price 
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crash perspective (e.g., Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Hwang et al. 2013; Habib et al. 2015; Balsam 
et al. 2017; Habib et al. 2019). However, there is limited evidence in the literature on whether lenders 
price the risks and benefits of the existence and extent of RPTs into the cost of debt. 
Prior studies apply efficient contracting theory and agency theory to explain the nature of RPTs 
(e.g., Gordon et al. 2004b; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004b). The efficient contracting theory 
documents that RPTs are part of normal business to fulfil economic needs. Therefore, RPTs enhance 
a firm’s value by lowering transaction costs, especially in the context of underdeveloped markets 
(Khanna and Palepu 2000). Hence, I expect a negative association between the cost of debt and RPTs. 
Alternatively, agency theory argues that RPTs could be used opportunistically by managers and 
controlling shareholders to exploit wealth from shareholders/minority shareholders (Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew 2010). Thus, the opportunistic use of RPTs is viewed as being detrimental to a firm’s value 
and increases the risk to firms (see Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Nekhili and Cherif 2011; Habib et 
al. 2015; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017; Habib et al. 2019). Lenders, therefore, are expected to assess 
firms reporting more RPTs as having a higher level of potential financial risk, which increases the 
cost of debt. This leads to an expected positive association between the cost of debt and RPTs.  
I test for these competing arguments regarding the cost of debt using data from Vietnam. Vietnam 
offers an interesting context to study the association between RPTs and the cost of debt because of 
its institutional features as a concentrated ownership economy and the prevalence of debt financing. 
First, ownership concentration facilitates RPTs, making RPTs substantial in Vietnam. Almost 80 
percent of listed firms in Vietnam report RPTs27. Second, debt financing (mainly bank lending) is an 
important source of capital for firms, as firms in Vietnam rely on loans rather than equity capital for 
their sources of finance (Nguyen et al. 2014; Sarath and Pham 2015; Phan 2018; Vuong 2019). In 
 
27 Data from my sample of listed firms is from 2010 to 2016. 
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2018, twice as much funding of capital for listed firms was from banks rather than equity funding.28 
This results from a long tradition of state and state-owned banks providing capital to firms. 
I conduct my main empirical analysis by regressing the cost of debt on the presence and magnitude 
of RPTs, controlling for a variety of cost of debt determinants. I also consider the moderating role of 
state ownership in the association between RPTs and the cost of debt. State ownership is a corporate 
governance mechanism that has been found to be associated with RPTs (e.g., Cheung et al. 2009a; 
Lo et al. 2010a; Habib et al. 2017) and the cost of debt (e.g., Borisova et al. 2015; Shailer and Wang 
2015). However, state ownership as a moderating role for the association between RPTs and the cost 
of debt has not been investigated. Given the dominance of state ownership in Vietnam with more than 
65 percent of listed firms having state shareholders29, Vietnam is a useful setting for exploring the 
role of state ownership in this association.  
Consistent with research on the cost of debt (e.g., Pittman and Fortin 2004; Bliss and Gul 2012; 
Shailer and Wang 2015; Liu et al. 2016; Fonseka et al. 2019), I use the effective interest rate as a 
proxy for the cost of debt. In addition, I use both a dummy variable to detect firms reporting RPTs 
and the relative dollar value of transactions to proxy for RPT activity. Following Habib et al. (2017), 
I use related sales and related net credit reported to measure the relative dollar value of RPTs.   
Based on panel data from 2010 to 2016, I find that the cost of debt is positively associated with 
the value of RPTs measured by related sales and related net credit, for both normal and abnormal 
values. This evidence suggests that lenders perceive RPTs as a potential default risk to firms. 
Therefore, the lenders charge a higher rate for firms with a higher amount of RPTs. This result 
supports agency theory in explaining the nature of RPTs reported by firms. I also find that state 
ownership has a moderating role in the association between RPTs and the cost of debt. This relation 
 
28 Data in 2018 is available at:  https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/talking-shop/425677/future-bright-for-viet-nams-
capital-market.html#FWcd58cWvDszuLyV.97). 
29 Data from my sample of listed firms is from 2010 to 2016. 
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is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, suggesting that the presence of state shareholders 
lessens potential risks from RPTs in lenders’ assessment.  
 This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it adds to the literature on 
RPT research in Vietnam and to the cost of debt research in general. Prior literature on RPTs generally 
focuses on RPTs consequences to equity shareholders or auditors (Gordon et al. 2007; Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; Habib et al. 2015; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017; Habib et al. 
2019). However, very little research has considered lenders’ response in terms of the cost of debt to 
the presence and extent of RPTs. I address this gap in the literature.  
Second, the paper contributes to the cost of debt literature by documenting a positive association 
between RPTs and the cost of debt in my sample of firms. Although a sizable volume of academic 
literature has investigated the determinants of the cost of debt, evidence on this from Vietnam is 
limited and, no prior studies have investigated the implication of RPTs on the cost of debt.  
Finally, this paper adds to the state ownership literature by documenting that the cost of debt-RPTs 
association varies between firms with and without state ownership. Specifically, state ownership 
moderates this relation by reducing the cost of debt and the magnitude of RPTs, and makes this 
relation less pronounced.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 considers the institutional 
background of RPTs, state ownership, and debt financing in Vietnam. Section 3.3 reviews the 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes my sample selection and research design. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2. Institutional background 
3.2.1. Debt financing in Vietnam 
The introduction of economic reforms in 1986 was the beginning of Vietnam’s remarkable 
development success story. During this period, Vietnam had one of the highest sustained GDP growth 
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rates in the world, second only to China. Per capita income increased from less than US$500 in 1986 
to US$2,590 in 201830, making it a lower-middle-income country after being one of the world’s 
poorest countries. The financial market was transformed following banking reforms in 1988-1989. 
Only the State Bank of Vietnam existed before the reforms with a two-tier banking system with a 
variety of banks under diverse ownership following the reforms (Sarath and Pham 2015; Vuong 
2019). The stock market was established in 2000 to provide an additional channel to organise capital 
for the economy. The banking system is still the main channel for finance in Vietnam despite the 
rapid development of the stock market. In 2017, domestic credit provided by the financial sector was 
nearly 142 percent of GDP31, compared to the stock market capitalisation of about 52 percent of the 
GDP32. Meanwhile, the corporate bond market remains modest (Phan 2018) with corporate bonds 
representing just about six percent of GDP33. The undeveloped corporate bond market results from 
many tight regulations in issuing bonds and a lack of a secondary market to increase the liquidity of 
corporate bonds.  
The banking system in Vietnam is dominated by four state-owned commercial banks (Vuong 
2019). They are the largest banks in terms of total equity and assets. In addition, there are 31 joint-
stock commercial banks and nine foreign commercial banks34. The banking system in Vietnam has 
joint ownership among banks, between banks and firms – being either private or state-owned 
enterprises (Vu-Thanh et al. 2013). This results in the frequently used practice of favourable credit to 
firms that own shares in banks (Vu-Thanh et al. 2013). A ceiling on lending35 and deposit rates 
 
30 Data retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=VN   on 3rd December 2019. 
31  Data retrieved from https://www.ceicdata.com/en/vietnam/bank-loans on 3rd December 2019. 
32 Data retrieved from https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/vietnam/market-capitalisation--nominal-gdp  on 3rd 
December 2019.  
33 Retrieved from https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/economy/vietnam-corporate-bonds-outstanding-tops-4-billion-
3898077.html on 3rd December 2019. 
34 As by the 30th of June 2019, data retrieved from the State Bank of Vietnam at https://www.sbv.gov.vn. 
35 SBV controls the ceiling on lending rates to firms operating in agriculture, exporting, supporting industries, or high 
technology industry, and small and medium enterprises (Article 13, Circular 39/2016/TT-NHNN issued on 30/12/2016, 
State Bank of Vietnam 2016). For example, the ceiling of short-term lending rate for capital (in Vietnam dong) used by 
firms in the above list since March 2020 is 5.500 percent (Decision 420/QD-NHNN dated 16/03/2020, State Bank of 
Vietnam 2020).   
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continues to be maintained and controlled by the State Bank of Vietnam. Access to credit is affected 
by the bank-by-bank credit growth ceiling established by the State Bank of Vietnam, government 
guidance on the sectoral priorities for bank lending, and capital shortfalls in state-owned commercial 
banks (Vu-Thanh et al. 2013). 
 
3.2.2. RPTs in Vietnam 
As a highly concentrated ownership economy, RPTs are perceived to be substantial in Vietnam, 
especially among firms with state ownership (Robinett et al. 2013). RPTs are frequently regarded as 
being related to circumstances open to a possible conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders, or between controlling and minority shareholders, and should be subject to thorough 
scrutiny (see Yeh et al. 2012; Bennouri et al. 2015; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017; Habib et al. 2019). 
This is the case with the involvement of fraud in Vietnam firms, such as Vinashin36, Asia Commercial 
Bank (ACB), and unlawful lending by Ocean Bank (OCB)37 (IFC 2015). International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, has released the Vietnam guidebook for 
banks about RPTs to raise bank awareness of RPTs. This guidebook aims to enable commercial banks 
to become more conscious of good corporate governance (IFC 2015). The guidebook also attempts 
to explain the complex RPTs and conflicts of interest present in banking, and their management 
 
36 Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group, or Vinashin, one of the largest state economic groups in Vietnam, almost went 
bankrupt in 2010 with US$4.4 billion in debts, much of which was provided by state-owned banks. Vinashin, a long-time 
ship builder, diversified into a variety of unrelated activities, including securities and tourism, and had been given 
privileged access to overseas borrowing. In addition to the related loans from state owned banks, there were a range of 
other suspicious transactions involving its holdings (Robinett et al. 2013, 16). Its executives were given harsh prison 
sentences for their role in the near-collapse of the group. Its former chairman was given the maximum sentence of 20 
years in jail for violation of state rules, including falsifying the group’s financial reports to disguise the group’s financial 
situation.  
37 ACB and OCB are two stock commercial banks, involved in unethical lending transactions between the bank and their 
related entities. Long prison sentences were imposed on the two top bank officials. ACB’s founder – Nguyen Duc Kien 
– was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a series of financial frauds worth US$1.1 billion that has become one 
of the highest-profile banking scandals in Vietnam (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vietnam-tycoon-nguyen-duc-
kien-jailed-30-years-over-fraud-n126001). OCB’s ex-chairman – Ha Van Tham – was given a life sentence for breaching 
lending rules. OCB’s former general director, Nguyen Xuan Son, was sentenced to death for his involvement in millions 




through lending practices (IFC 2015). This is more important in Vietnamese banks – being a crucial 
industry in the economy, because bank ownership structures are complex with many cross-
shareholdings between private entities, state-owned enterprises, and economic groups. This 
guidebook is use by banks for approving loans with their related parties. It does not necessarily 
provide a guideline for banks to assess the risk of borrowers with RPTs when they apply for debt 
financing from banks. 
 
3.2.3. State ownership in Vietnam 
SOE restructuring is a critical part of the economic reforms launched in 1986 in Vietnam with the 
promotion of private sector development. Only profitable small or medium-size SOEs are the goal of 
the equitisation process in the first stage (Ngo et al. 2014). However, SOEs still account for a large 
share of employment, bank credit, and fixed assets (Robinett et al. 2013). The government continues 
to hold a large proportion of ownership in large formerly state-owned economic enterprise/state 
corporations and firms in strategic sectors, namely mining, quarrying, electricity, oil and gas (Vu-
Thanh 2017).  
In Vietnam, the presence of state ownership in listed firms is in the form of investments by state-
owned corporations or state-owned groups,38 provincial people’s committees, and the State Capital 
Investment Corporation (SCIC)39 (Robinett et al. 2013).  
 
 
38 Since the 1st of July 2015, an SOE is defined in the Law on Enterprise (2014) as an enterprise where the state retains 
100 percent of its equity. This definition differs from the one in Law on Enterprise (2005) which defined an SOE as a 
firm where the state owns from 50 percent or more of its equity (Phan 2018).  
39 SCIC was established in 2005 with a goal to manage and invest State capital in enterprises, regardless of their ownership 
structure. SCIC represents the State’s investments in firms and oversees large SOEs to enhance accountability and 
efficiency while leaving management and regulation with line ministries and regulators (Robinett et al. 2013). 
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3.3. Literature review and hypotheses development  
3.3.1. Determinants of the cost of debt 
Previous studies have examined the determinants of debt pricing. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and 
Valta (2012) state that the cost of debt depends primarily on lenders’ estimate of the risk of default 
by borrowers. There is a variety of factors associated with the default risk of a firm. Fisher (1959) 
lists three factors that could influence the estimate of default risk. They are variability of earnings, 
reliability in meeting obligations, and the capital structure of firms. Jiang (2008) finds that firms 
beating earnings benchmarks have a lower cost of debt, suggesting that firms’ profitability has a 
significant influence on debt pricing. Meanwhile, firms with low earnings quality, for example 
through earnings management, are charged a higher cost of debt due to the low reliability of earnings 
(see Prevost et al. 2008; Shen and Huang 2013; Ge and Kim 2014).  
Increased quality of information disclosure is another factor influencing the cost of debt as it 
reduces information asymmetry, associated with reduced agency costs. Sengupta (1998) finds a 
negative association between disclosure quality and the cost of debt for US firms. Francis et al. (2005) 
provide evidence that firms with higher voluntary disclosure levels have a lower cost of debt. For 
example, energy firms in China that disclose environmental information incur a lower cost of debt 
(Fonseka et al. 2019). The higher creditability of financial statements audited by Big 4 in Finland or 
Big 6 in the U.S is also associated with decreased cost of debt capital (Pittman and Fortin 2004; 
Karjalainen 2011). Kent and Bu (2020) find that firms reporting the indirect method of cash flow 
statement incur a higher cost of equity but not a higher cost of debt relative to firms reporting the 
direct method, suggesting that there are differences in the information provided in the choice of cash 
flow statements associated with the cost of capital. 
Prior studies also indicate that lenders rely on the firm’s corporate governance structure to price 
the cost of a loan. For instance, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Byun et al. (2013) find that lenders 
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charge a higher cost of debt to firms with anticipated potential wealth expropriation by controlling 
shareholders or managers.  
 
3.3.2. Cost of debt and RPTs 
RPTs are defined as “a transfer of resources, services or obligations between related parties, 
regardless of whether a price is charged” (VAS 26.5, Ministry of Finance 2003). The literature 
identifies two alternative views about the nature of RPTs (e.g., Gordon et al. 2004b). RPTs can be 
viewed as either a conflict of interest or efficient transactions. Under the conflicts of interest view, 
which is supported by agency theory, RPTs are potentially harmful to shareholders because they 
“compromise management’s agency responsibility to shareholders or a board of directors’ monitoring 
function” (Gordon et al. 2004b, 4). RPTs can be opportunistically used by managers or controlling 
shareholders in expropriating wealth from shareholders or minority shareholders. In contrast, RPTs 
are viewed as efficient transactions because these transactions can lower transaction costs and 
enhance firms’ performance, especially in economies where the capital, technology, and labour 
markets are underdeveloped (e.g., Khanna and Palepu 2000; Ryngaert and Thomas 2012; Habib et 
al. 2015; Fang et al. 2018). 
The two contrasting views offer different implications regarding the potential costs and benefits 
of transacting with related parties. For example, evidence supporting the agency theory of RPTs finds 
that firms with RPTs have lower performance, lower market valuation, and higher audit fees due to 
high risk to auditors (e.g., Chen et al. 2009; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Nekhili and Cherif 2011; 
Ryngaert and Thomas 2012; Habib et al. 2015). RPTs can be seen as a potential risk of restatement, 
as indicated in a U.S. sample (see Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017). Bennouri et al. (2015) find a negative 
relationship between auditor reputation and the number of RPTs reported, implying that RPTs result 
in accounting reporting uncertainty. Further, Habib et al. (2019) provide evidence of a positive 
association between RPTs and the risk of a stock price crash in China. Such evidence suggests that 
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opportunistic RPTs can be potentially detrimental to (minority) shareholders and lenders because 
these RPTs result in negative economic consequences for a firm, including higher potential default 
risk. Therefore, lenders take precautionary measures to reduce the risks associated with RPTs. One 
of these measures is raising interest rates for firms with RPTs. This leads to a higher cost of debt to 
firms with RPTs.   
Although there has been less evidence supporting the efficient contracting theory of RPTs, RPTs 
(for example, related sales) are found to enhance the performance of firms in China as these 
transactions could be used to inflate firms’ income before their IPO or when they are in financial 
distress (Jian and Wong 2010; Wong et al. 2015). Peng et al. (2011) show that related loans can be 
used by controlling shareholders to support earnings when a firm is in financial distress. Although 
these earnings are temporary and do not add value to a firm in the long term, this action usually 
receives favourable reactions from the market. With evidence of a positive association between RPTs 
and firms’ efficiency, the conflict between lenders and shareholders could be minimised. 
Consequently, lenders are likely to charge firms engaged in RPTs a lower cost on debt. 
Given the above discussion, I develop the following non-directional hypothesis:  
H1: The cost of debt is associated with RPTs.  
 
3.3.3. State ownership and the association between the cost of debt and RPTs 
In assessing the determinants of the cost of debt, previous studies have provided evidence about 
ownership structure as an influencing factor (e.g., Boubakri and Ghouma 2010; Lin et al. 2011; 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca 2011). For example, state ownership has been identified as an 
important determinant of the cost of debt (see Borisova and Megginson 2011; Sánchez-Ballesta and 
García-Meca 2011; Borisova et al. 2015; Shailer and Wang 2015; Liu et al. 2016). However, the 
literature on the cost of debt provides mixed evidence about the association between state ownership 
and the cost of debt. In a study investigating the relation between state ownership and the cost of debt 
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in privatised European firms, Borisova and Megginson (2011) find privatised firms that retained state 
ownership are charged a lower cost of debt as bondholders are more secure about debt recovery from 
these firms due to the implicit government guarantee. The negative relation between the cost of debt 
and state ownership is also found in a Spanish sample by Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2011) 
with the argument being that state ownership lowers the cost of debt through state financial agency.40 
Using a sample of Chinese firms, Shailer and Wang (2015) and Liu et al. (2016) provide evidence 
that the presence of controlling state shareholders is related to a lower cost of debt, measured by the 
average interest rate. Shailer and Wang (2015) argue that in China, financial institutions tend to prefer 
firms with state ownership in a system where state-owned banks are still dominated. Liu et al. (2016) 
document that many firms with state ownership are in industries that are crucial to the country’s 
security. Therefore, it is likely that the state wants to ensure these firms are financially sustainable. 
In contrast, Borisova et al. (2015) find that higher state ownership is associated with a higher cost of 
debt, measured by bond credit spreads from a sample of 43 countries. However, this association is 
negative during financial crises and for firms more likely to be distressed (Borisova et al. 2015).  
In the context of Vietnam, most listed firms have converted from state-owned enterprises,41 and 
the state retains significant ownership in these firms. While state-owned commercial banks still 
dominate the economy, firms with state ownership are perceived to access bank credits on preferential 
terms (Phan 2018). In addition, there is some evidence of the positive association between RPTs and 
state ownership (Cheung et al. 2009a). Therefore, I expect the relation between RPTs and the cost of 
debt to be moderated by state ownership, leading to the following hypothesis:  
H2: The association between the cost of debt and RPTs is less pronounced for firms with state 
ownership than for firms without state ownership.  
 
 
40 The state financial agency is attached to the Spanish Ministry of Economy (Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca 2011, 
394). 
41 Data from my sample shows that about 68% of listed firms are SOE-converted (2,250 observations). 
66 
 
3.4. Research design 
3.4.1. Data and sample selection 
My sample consists of all firms listed in 2016 in the two stock exchanges in Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh 
City Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX)42. I begin with 4,209 firm-year 
observations from 2010 to 2016. The sample period starts in 2010 because the number of listed firms 
in the two stock exchanges was limited and the disclosure practices by listed firms were very poor 
before 2010. I exclude 271 firm-year observations for financial firms as these firms are subject to 
different regulatory constraints. Missing interest expense and debt data yield a reduced sample of 635 
observations. Because of unavailable information for control variables, 17 firm-year observations are 
further deleted. My final sample consists of 3,286 firm-year observations that meet all the selection 
criteria.  
I use the OSIRIS database to obtain financial data, including data of debt and interest expense, and 
market data. Data about RPTs, including the amounts, types, parties involved, are collected manually 
from the notes to audited financial statements of listed firms (consolidated financial statements for 
firms which have subsidiaries) during the period under investigation. Similarly, data concerning state 
ownership, percentage of the largest shareholders, dual leadership, board size, identity of audit firms, 
and firm age are also hand-collected from the annual reports and corporate governance reports.  
  
3.4.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the cost of debt (COD). Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Pittman and 
Fortin 2004; Francis et al. 2005; Karjalainen 2011; Bliss and Gul 2012; Shailer and Wang 2015; Liu 
et al. 2016; Fonseka et al. 2019), I use the interest rate on a firm’s debts43 to proxy for the cost of 
 
42 HOSE is the first stock market in Vietnam, being established in 2000. On average, firms listed on this stock exchange 
are larger and tend to have more foreign ownership, but less state ownership than firms listed on HNX, which was formed 
in 2005 (Robinett et al. 2013). 
43 Credit spread over corporate bonds are used in some studies of cost of debt (e.g., Byun et al. 2013; Houston et al. 2014; 
Borisova et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2016). However, I could not use this measure in this paper because corporate bonds were 
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debt. The interest rate is measured as the interest expense for the year divided by the average short-
term and long-term debt, with the average based on the beginning- and end-of-year total debt. I 
convert this ratio to a percentage for ease of coefficient interpretation.  
 
3.4.3. Independent variables 
3.4.3.1. Test variables 
My first variable of interest is the existence and the extent of related party transactions (RPT). Due 
to competing arguments regarding the implications of RPTs, I make no sign prediction for this 
variable.  
I first use an indicator variable – RPT_DUMMY, which is coded 1 if the firm discloses at least 
one transaction or one balance with related parties, and 0 otherwise. This is used to compare the cost 
of debt between firms with and without RPTs.  
I then examine the relation between the cost of debt and the value of RPTs. Following research by 
Habib et al. (2017), I proxy RPT according to the following categories of RPTs: (i) RP sales 
(RP_SALE), measured by the amount of sales with related parties scaled by net sales, and (ii) RP net 
credit (RP_CREDIT), measured by total receivables minus total payables, scaled by total assets. RP 
sales are widely used as a proxy for propping activities (Jian and Wong 2010; Habib et al. 2017; 
Aharony et al. 2010). Meanwhile, RP net credit is used as a proxy for tunnelling activities (see Habib 
et al. 2017; Chan et al. 2016).  
I use the normal and abnormal values of these measures to test the robustness of my results. 
However, I am interested in the abnormal level of RPT in testing the relationship between the cost of 
debt and RPT, as RPT may be part of normal business activities or used to exploit wealth from 
 




shareholders and debtholders. I separate those transactions that are a normal part of the business by 
adopting Jian and Wong’s (2010) approach to calculate the abnormal RPTs as in the equation (1) 
RPTi.t = β0 + β1SIZEi.t + β2LEVi.t + β3GROWTHi.t + β4MBi.t + YEARt + INDUSTRYt + εi.t (1) 
where SIZE = the natural log of total assets, LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets, 
GROWTH = sales growth, MB (measured as the ratio of market value to the book value of equity) = 
the market-to-book ratio, and YEARt and INDUSTRYt represent year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. 
I estimate the regression in Eqn. (1) separately for the two RPT proxies above. The residuals from 
these regressions represent the abnormal amount of RPTs.  
Another variable of interest is the interaction term between RPT and the presence of state 
ownership (SO_PRESENCE) computed as RPT*SO_PRESENCE. SO_PRESENCE is a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state shareholders, and 0 otherwise. I predict the coefficient sign of 
this variable to be negative.  
 
3.4.3.2. Control variables 
I include several control variables in my regression models to control for the influence of other factors 
on a firm’s cost of debt. I control for the presence of state ownership (SO_PRESENCE) as this form 
of ownership is found to be associated with the cost of debt (e.g., Borisova and Megginson 2011; 
Shailer and Wang 2015; Liu et al. 2016). Consistent with prior studies, such as Pittman and Fortin 
(2004), Shailer and Wang (2015), Liu et al. (2016), and Fonseka et al. (2019), I control for the 
following variables in the regression model: firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), return on asset (ROA), 
cash flow from operations (CFO), sales growth (GROWTH), the market-to-book ratio (MB), tangible 
asset intensity (CAPINT), agency costs (AGENCY), ownership concentration (BLOCK), leadership 
duality (DUAL), board size (BOARD), auditor (BIG4), and firm age (AGE).  
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Recall that SO_PRESENCE is defined as the presence of state shareholders in a firm. I expect the 
coefficient on the state ownership variable to be negative, as found in studies by Shailer and Wang 
(2015) and Liu et al. (2016), indicating that state-owned firms have a lower cost of debt.  
Pittman and Fortin 2004 argue that large firms have less default risk thanks to their economies of 
scale. Thus, I expect that SIZE is negatively associated with COD. Firms with different financial 
structures may be exposed to different levels of risk.  Firms have a higher risk to lenders when they 
have higher leverage (Bliss and Gul 2012; Fonseka et al. 2019). Therefore, LEV, measured as total 
liabilities scaled by total assets, is expected to be positively associated with COD.  
More profitable firms and those with higher sales growth are more likely to meet their debt 
obligations and have lower default risk (Bliss and Gul 2012; Fonseka et al. 2019). Thus, ROA 
(earnings scaled by total assets) and GROWTH (changes in sales relative to last year divided by last 
year sales) are expected to be negatively associated with COD. Similarly, MB (measured as the ratio 
between market value to the book value of a firm’s equity) proxies for growth opportunities. It is 
expected to be negatively associated with COD as firms with higher growth opportunities have a 
greater likelihood to repay their debt (Shailer and Wang 2015; Fonseka et al. 2019).  
I do not make a direction prediction for CFO (operating cash flows divided by total assets). Firms 
with higher cash flows may have a lower cost of debt because they are more likely to repay their debt. 
Alternatively, lenders may assess firms with higher cash flows with potentially lower earnings and 
charge these firms a higher cost of debt (Shailer and Wang 2015).  
CAPINT, measured as total tangible assets scaled by total assets, is predicted to be negatively 
associated with COD as it may be easier for tangible assets to be used as collateral (Shailer and Wang 
2015; Liu et al. 2016).  
The following variables relate to firms’ corporate governance mechanisms as there is evidence 
showing that the cost of debt is influenced by the quality of corporate governance (e.g., Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Boubakri and Ghouma 2010; Byun et al. 2013; Shailer and Wang 2015). AGENCY 
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(measured as administrative expenses over net sales) shows firms’ operation efficiency. Firms with 
higher agency costs are assumed to have lower operation efficiency, leading to higher default risk 
(Shailer and Wang 2015). Therefore, I predict AGENCY to be positively associated with the COD.  
Large shareholders can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance as an external corporate 
governance mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), and thus reduce the cost of debt. Alternatively, 
large shareholders may also facilitate wealth expropriation from minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders, including lenders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Given the competing arguments, I do not 
predict the sign of BLOCK (measured as the percentage of shares held by the largest single 
shareholder).  
DUAL (a dummy variable,  coded as 1 if the chief executive officer is also the chair of the board, 
and 0 otherwise) proxies for poor corporate governance practice (Bliss and Gul 2012; Shailer and 
Wang 2015). I expect to find a negative association between DUAL and COD.  
The board size of a firm could be related to the quality of the firm’s corporate governance. Fonseka 
et al. (2019) suggest that a larger board size indicates better corporate governance practice as a higher 
number of directors in a firm provides more expertise to the board. Conversely, larger board size is 
argued to be less effective in monitoring (e.g., Gordon et al. 2004a; Bennouri et al. 2015). Thus, I 
make no sign prediction for BOARD.  
I also control for auditor size as large auditors could lower the cost of debt by improving the 
reliability of information disclosed in financial statements (Pittman and Fortin 2004). I use BIG4 (a 
dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise) to control 
for auditor size. Further, I expect AGE to be negatively associated with COD because older firms can 
have good credit records over time that lower the risks to lenders (Fonseka et al. 2019).  
YEAR dummy variables are included to control for possible differences in the borrowing interest 
rates in Vietnam during the 2010to 2016 financial years. The YEAR dummies are coded as 1 if the 
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year is within a particular year category, and 0 otherwise. I make no sign predictions for the YEAR 
dummies. 
I include INDUSTRY dummy variables because firms in different industries could access debt at 
different rates. Ten INDUSTRY dummies based on the General Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) are included in the regression model. The INDUSTRY dummies are coded as 1 if the firm is 
in a specific GICS category, and 0 otherwise. No sign predictions are made for the INDUSTRY 
dummies.  
Finally, definitions for all variables used in the paper are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Variable definitions 
Abbreviation Description  Measurement 
COD Cost of debt Interest expense during the year scaled by the average total debt multiplied by 100 
RPT_DUMMY RPT dummy variable 
Dummy variable, coded as 1 if firms disclose at least one transaction or one balance with related parties, 0 
otherwise 
RP_SALE Related sales Related sales to net sales 
ABN_RP_SALE Abnormal related sales Abnormal value of related sales ratio  
RP_CREDIT Related net credit Total receivables minus total payables, scales by total assets 
ABN_RP_CREDIT Abnormal related net credit Abnormal value of related net credit ratio 
SO_PRESENCE State ownership dummy variable Dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state shareholder and 0 otherwise in the end-of-year t 
RPT*SO_PRESENCE Interaction variable RPT multiplied by SO_PRESENCE 
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets in the end-of-year t 
LEV Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets in the end-of-year t 
ROA Return on asset Net income scaled by total assets in the end-of-year t 
CFO Operating cash flows Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets in the end-of-year t  
GROWTH Sales growth Change in sales relative to last year divided by last year sales 
MB Market-to-book ratio Ratio between market value to the book value of a firm’s equity 
CAPINT Tangible assets intensity Total tangible assets divided by total assets 
AGENCY Agency cost Ratio of administrative expenses to net sales  
BLOCK Ownership concentration Percentage of share held by the largest single shareholder 
DUAL Leadership duality Dummy variable, coded as 1 if the chief executive officer is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise 
BOARD Board size Number of directors in a firm 
BIG4 Auditor size Dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise in the end-of-year t 
AGE Firm age Number of years since its inception year 
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3.4.4. Model specification  
To examine the association between RPTs and COD (H1), I estimate the following baseline 
regression model:  
COD i.t = β0 +β1RPT i.t + β2SO_PRESENCEi.t + β3SIZEi.t + β4LEVi.t + β5ROAi.t + β6CFOi.t + 
β7GROWTHi.t + β8MBi.t +β9CAPINTi.t + β10AGENCYi.t + β11BLOCKi.t + β12DUALi.t + 
β13BOARDi.t + β14BIG4i.t  + β15AGEi.t + YEARt  + INDUSTRYt + ε                                           (2) 
where COD = interest expense scaled by average total debt then multiplied by 100; RPT = a proxy 
for related party transactions including normal and abnormal values (RP_SALE, ABN_RP_SALE, 
RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT) and RPT_DUMMY, coded as 1 if the firm discloses at least 
one transaction or one balance with related parties, and 0 otherwise; SO_PRESENCE = a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state ownership, and 0 otherwise; SIZE= the natural logarithm of 
total assets; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; ROA = pre-tax income scaled by total assets; 
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; GROWTH = change in sales relative to last 
year scaled by the last year sales; MB = the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity; 
CAPINT = total tangible assets scaled by total assets; AGENCY = administrative expenses scaled by 
net sales; BLOCK = percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; DUAL = a dummy 
variable, coded 1 if a firm has dual leadership, and 0 otherwise; BOARD = number of members on 
the board; BIG4 = a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 
otherwise; AGE= the number of years since the firm was first listed on the stock exchange; YEAR = 
a year dummy variable, coded as 1 if the year falls within a specific year category, and 0 otherwise; 
and INDUSTRY = industry dummy variables, coded as 1 if the firm is represented in a particular 
GICS category, and 0 otherwise.  
To test H2 regarding whether the interaction effect of RPT and state ownership is negatively 
associated with the COD, I add the interaction variables of RPT*SO_PRESENCE to estimate the 
following regression model:  
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COD i.t = β0 + β1RPT i.t + β2SO_PRESENCEi.t + β3RPT i.t*SO_PRESENCEi.t  + β4SIZEi.t + β5LEVi.t + 
β6ROAi.t + β7CFOi.t + β8GROWTHi.t + β9MBi.t +β10CAPINTi.t + β11AGENCYi.t + β12BLOCKi.t + 
β13DUALi.t + β14BOARDi.t + β15BIG4i.t  + β16AGEi.t + YEARt  + INDUSTRYt + ε               (3) 
where RPT*SO_PRESENCE = an interaction variable computed by multiplying RPT by 
SO_PRESENCE. 
Finally, I winsorise all the continuous variables at the top and bottom three percent of their 
distribution to reduce the influence of outliers. 
 
3.5. Results and discussion 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in my models. The mean (median) interest 
rate on a firm’s debt is 8.521 percent (7.754 percent). The mean of RP_SALE is 0.270, showing that 
RP sales account for 27 percent of net sales, on average. RP_CREDIT has a mean of 0.026, indicating 
that net credit to related parties by firms in the sample is nearly three of the firms’ total assets. The 
means (medians) of ABN_RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT are 0.010 (-0.094), and 0.002 (-0.016), 
estimated by the model in equation (1). The positive (negative) values of the ABN_RP_SALE and 
ABN_RP_CREDIT imply that the underlying firms have a higher (lower) level of related party 
transactions than the normal level. As the means of ABN_RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT are 
low, the amount of abnormal related sales and the related net credit of firms in the sample is not high. 
Nearly 66 percent of firm-year observations have state shareholders. On average, the state owns 
approximately 40 percent of shares in a firm. Meanwhile, on average the largest shareholder owns 
about 35 percent of shares in a firm. Sample firms are highly leveraged (an average of 0.501). Big 4 
audit firms audit about 22 percent of firm-year observations. Dual leadership is not frequent in the 




Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variable N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
COD 3,286 8.521 5.024 4.879 7.754 11.355 
RPT_DUMMY 3,921 0.796 0.403 1 1 1 
RP_SALE 2,089 0.270 0.325 0.013 0.116 0.448 
ABN_RP_SALE 1,900 0.010 0.324 -0.213 -0.094 0.200 
RP_CREDIT 2,858 0.026 0.121 -0.022 0.004 0.056 
ABN_RP_CREDIT 2,802 0.002 0.128 -0.060 -0.016 0.046 
SO_PRESENCE 3,921 0.652 0.476 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 3,921 13.144 1.403 12.190 13.068 14.114 
LEV 3,921 0.501 0.216 0.328 0.527 0.674 
ROA 3,921 0.073 0.074 0.018 0.055 0.111 
CFO 3,910 0.050 0.119 -0.026 0.041 0.123 
GROWTH 3,921 0.155 0.440 -0.076 0.087 0.267 
MB 3,921 0.978 0.665 0.486 0.786 1.252 
CAPINT 3,921 0.248 0.207 0.082 0.189 0.360 
AGENCY 3,536 0.067 0.060 0.028 0.049 0.081 
BLOCK  3,884 0.354 0.186 0.192 0.346 0.510 
DUAL 3,921 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BOARD 3,921 5.463 1.029 5.000 5.000 5.000 
BIG 4 3,921 0.216 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AGE 3,921 4.659 2.994 2.000 4.000 7.000 
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 3rd and 97th percentiles. Variables are defined in 
Table 3.1 
 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics of the cost of debt by industry (Panel A) and year (Panel 
B). Whereas firms in Communication Services have the highest average debt costs of 11.406 percent, 
firms in Utilities have the lowest cost of debt of just 6.496 percent. The cost of debt in the year 2011 
is the highest at 11.909 compared to other years. This is explained by high inflation in Vietnam in 
2011, which was up to about 18 percent in that year (Vuong 2019). The cost of debt in 2015 and 2016 
is low at 6.304 and 6.420 percent, which is nearly half of the highest interest rate during the sample 







Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the cost of debt by industry and by year 
Panel  A: Descriptive statistics of the cost of debt by industry 
Industry description N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
Communication Services 70 11.406 5.967 6.730 10.837 15.408 
Consumer Discretionary 279 7.943 4.678 4.387 6.780 10.529 
Consumer Staples 324 8.305 5.064 4.995 6.975 10.711 
Energy 188 8.762 4.863 5.287 8.076 11.811 
Health Care 100 9.666 4.628 5.962 8.902 13.017 
Industrials 1,213 8.985 4.949 5.292 8.236 12.087 
Information Technology 99 9.043 5.039 5.537 7.599 12.599 
Materials 629 8.519 4.771 5.368 7.886 10.916 
Real Estate 266 6.621 5.565 1.857 5.610 9.940 
Utilities 118 6.496 4.439 2.929 5.756 9.408 
Total 3,286 8.521 5.024 4.879 7.754 11.355 
 
Panel  B: Descriptive statistics of the cost of debt by year 
Year N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
2010 422 8.956 4.822 5.406 8.801 12.206 
2011 423 11.909 6.078 6.823 11.675 17.341 
2012 462 11.098 5.539 6.609 11.132 15.390 
2013 475 8.615 4.557 5.254 8.547 11.583 
2014 487 7.167 3.811 4.450 6.955 9.425 
2015 486 6.304 3.517 3.937 6.172 8.300 
2016 531 6.420 3.596 4.066 6.225 8.113 




3.5.2. Pearson correlation results 
Table 3.4 provides the correlations among the variables. I find a significantly positive correlation 
between COD and four measures of RPTs (p<0.05 or better), suggesting that firms with a higher 
extent of related sales and related net credit are more likely to have a higher cost of debt. The 
correlation between COD and the SO_PRESENCE is negative but not significant. There are also 
negative and significant correlations of the cost of debt with firm size (p<0.01), ROA (p<0.01), MB 
(p<0.01), BLOCK (p<0.05), BOARD (p<0.01), BIG 4 (p<0.01) and AGE (p<0.01), as I predicted. In 
contrast, COD is positively associated with AGENCY and DUAL (p<0.01). Overall, the correlation 
results reported in Table 3.4 show that the correlations between the explanatory variables are not 
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high. Moreover, when variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the explanatory variables are calculated, 
the VIF values of the variables in the regressions are found to be less than the critical value of ten, 
which indicates that multi-collinearity is not threatening the computational accuracy of the results 
(Kutner et al. 2005). 
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  Table 3.4: Correlation results 
 Variable 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. COD  1.000          
2. RP_SALE  0.056** 1.000         
3. ABN_RP_SALE 0.113*** 0.852*** 1.000        
4. RP_CREDIT 0.116*** 0.354*** 0.385*** 1.000       
5. ABN_RP_CREDIT 0.118*** 0.351*** 0.414*** 0.914*** 1.000      
6. SO_PRESENCE -0.002 0.131*** 0.071*** -0.084*** -0.046** 1.000     
7. SIZE  -0.281*** -0.074*** -0.235*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.063*** 1.000    
8. LEV -0.002 0.042* -0.059** -0.112*** -0.035* 0.089*** 0.340*** 1.000   
9. ROA  -0.046*** -0.069*** -0.018 -0.001 -0.006 0.130*** -0.086*** -0.462*** 1.000  
10. CFO  0.012 0.008 0.017 -0.091*** -0.073*** 0.129*** -0.062*** -0.216*** 0.411*** 1.000 
11. GROWTH 0.011 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.134*** 0.076*** 0.012 0.138*** -0.027* 
12. MB  -0.175*** -0.102*** -0.032 -0.071*** -0.022 0.038** 0.112*** -0.116*** 0.506*** 0.237*** 
13. CAPINT -0.062*** 0.091*** 0.006 -0.118*** -0.098*** 0.108*** 0.097*** 0.000 -0.018 0.198*** 
14. AGENCY 0.035* 0.091*** 0.124*** 0.136*** 0.121*** -0.064*** -0.213*** -0.186*** -0.156*** -0.087*** 
15. BLOCK -0.041** 0.170*** 0.101*** -0.033* -0.009 0.408*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.097*** 0.137*** 
16. DUAL 0.050*** -0.069*** -0.020 -0.013 -0.009 -0.098*** -0.084*** 0.009 -0.015 -0.052*** 
17. BOARD  -0.096*** -0.232*** -0.189*** -0.080*** -0.089*** -0.081*** 0.295*** -0.020 0.062*** 0.019 
18. BIG 4  -0.167*** 0.007 -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.087*** 0.007 0.470*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.024 








Table 3.4: Correlation results (continued) 
  11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
11. GROWTH 1.000         
12. MB  0.101*** 1.000        
13. CAPINT -0.047*** 0.031* 1.000       
14. AGENCY -0.186*** -0.062*** -0.039** 1.000      
15. BLOCK -0.069*** 0.077*** 0.153*** -0.083*** 1.000     
16. DUAL -0.002 -0.041** -0.084*** -0.038** -0.222*** 1.000    
17. BOARD  0.023 0.145*** 0.084*** -0.017 -0.117*** -0.015 1.000   
18. BIG 4  0.019 0.154*** -0.001 0.000 0.179*** -0.107*** 0.167*** 1.000  
19. AGE  -0.120*** 0.014 0.016 -0.023 -0.007 -0.115*** 0.082*** 0.100*** 1.000 





3.5.3. Regression results 
Table 3.5 presents the cost of debt regression estimates across five measures of RPTs. The coefficients 
on the four measures of RPTs, except for the dummy variable detecting RPTs reported by firms, are 
positive and significant (p<0.05 or better). These results show that a relatively high cost of debt is 
associated with RPTs, either normal or abnormal values. This result supports the conjecture that RPTs 
are evaluated as a potential risk to firms’ performance and ability to repay debt. Therefore, lenders 
charge a higher cost of debt for firms with a higher value of RPTs. This result supports agency theory 
in explaining the implications of RPTs. 
There is a limited difference in testing between normal and abnormal values of RPTs with COD. 
For instance, the coefficients on RP_SALE and ABN_RP_SALE are 0.825 and 0.889 (p<0.05) 
respectively, with corresponding standard error values being 0.375 and 0.360. This may result from 
the fact that the levels of abnormal value of related sales and related net credit are not high (see mean 
values in Table 3.2). The level of abnormal related sales to total sales is just 0.010 (1 percent) higher 
than the normal proportion of related sales over total sales.  
In terms of economic significance, results from Table 3.5 reflect the influence of change in the 
extent of RPTs on COD. For example, the coefficient of 3.408 and corresponding standard deviation 
of 0.121 on RP_CREDIT implies that a one standard deviation increase in RP_CREDIT is associated 
with a 0.048 percent increase in COD relative to the mean, which is 8.521 percent. According to Ball 
et al. (2012), the economic significance value on COD of 0.048 percent is calculated by taking the 
coefficient on the variable (RP_CREDIT) multiplied by the standard deviation then dividing by the 
mean of COD (i.e., 3.408*0.121/8.521).  
The coefficient on SO_PRESENCE is negative and significant across all models (p<0.01) for the 
cost of debt and state ownership association. The coefficient on SO_PRESENCE in column (1) of 
Table 3.5 is -0.734 indicating that the COD for firms with state shareholders is about 0.734 percent 
less than that of firms without state shareholders. This result is economically significant, in that a firm 
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with a state shareholder with a mean level of debt (VND641 billion, equivalent to about US$ 27.869 
million) has interest costs that are VND 4.704 billion or about US$ 204.563 thousand (i.e. VND 641 
billion*0.734 percent) less than a firm without a state shareholder with the same level of debt. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of the negative association between the cost of debt and state 
ownership by Shailer and Wang (2015) and Liu et al. (2016) using samples from China. The result 
suggests that firms with state ownership have a lower cost of debt due to the implicit guarantee of the 





































              
RPT_DUMMY ? 0.092     
  (0.445)     
RP_SALE ?  0.825**    
   (2.201)    
ABN_RP_SALE ?   0.889**   
    (2.469)   
RP_CREDIT ?    3.408***  
     (4.178)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT ?     2.718*** 
      (3.564) 
SO_PRESENCE - -0.734*** -0.782*** -0.828*** -0.688*** -0.746*** 
  (-3.653) (-2.704) (-2.776) (-2.877) (-3.111) 
SIZE - -0.813*** -0.971*** -0.975*** -0.846*** -0.855*** 
  (-10.242) (-9.050) (-8.763) (-9.255) (-9.255) 
LEV + 0.959* 2.199*** 2.433*** 0.798 0.649 
  (1.850) (3.071) (3.300) (1.337) (1.084) 
ROA - -2.239 -0.462 -0.796 -2.961 -3.137 
  (-1.289) (-0.190) (-0.318) (-1.438) (-1.514) 
CFO ? 2.266*** 2.356** 2.421** 2.356** 2.313** 
  (2.888) (2.199) (2.171) (2.567) (2.507) 
GROWTH - 0.678*** 0.293 0.236 0.589*** 0.587*** 
  (3.411) (1.075) (0.842) (2.619) (2.601) 
MB - -0.519*** -0.635*** -0.659*** -0.429** -0.487** 
  (-3.289) (-2.936) (-2.976) (-2.286) (-2.576) 
CAPINT - -1.276*** -1.305** -1.312** -1.153** -1.067** 
  (-2.945) (-2.244) (-2.213) (-2.332) (-2.145) 
AGENCY + 2.447 1.072 0.515 1.207 1.292 
  (1.464) (0.453) (0.209) (0.632) (0.674) 
BLOCK  ? 0.278 0.562 0.528 0.408 0.466 
  (0.549) (0.792) (0.723) (0.701) (0.796) 
DUAL - -0.062 -0.087 -0.108 -0.096 -0.105 
  (-0.348) (-0.343) (-0.409) (-0.460) (-0.494) 
BOARD  + -0.016 0.069 0.108 -0.073 -0.070 
  (-0.197) (0.572) (0.874) (-0.746) (-0.708) 
BIG 4 ? -0.270 -0.092 -0.067 -0.236 -0.192 
  (-1.195) (-0.325) (-0.230) (-0.938) (-0.758) 
AGE - -0.012 -0.035 -0.039 -0.052 -0.049 
  (-0.325) (-0.672) (-0.727) (-1.195) (-1.123) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  21.212*** 21.397*** 21.548*** 22.110*** 22.170*** 
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  (19.067) (13.940) (13.791) (16.943) (16.771) 
Observations  2,994 1,591 1,476 2,188 2,149 
R-squared  0.267 0.315 0.312 0.301 0.295 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers in 
parentheses are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
In assessing the moderating role of state ownership on the relation between the cost of debt and 
RPTs, the model in Eqn. (3) is employed. Table 3.6 reports the result of this model. Strong results are 
provided about the negative association between the cost of debt and state ownership (p<0.05 or 
better). However, the positive association between COD and RPTs holds for three measures of RPTs 
that are ABN_RP_SALE (p<0.10), RP_CREDIT, and ABN_RP_CREDIT (p<0.01). The interaction 
terms between RPT and SO_PRESENCE are significantly negative for only RP_CREDIT and 
ABN_RP_CREDIT (p<0.10). This result suggests that among firms with RPTs, if there is a presence 
of state ownership, COD is lower. In other words, the association between RPTs and the cost of debt 
is less pronounced.  
Regarding the control variables, COD is positively associated with LEV and negatively related to 
SIZE (p<0.01), MB (p<0.05 or better), and CAPINT (p<0.05 or better), as predicted. However, the 
positive association between the cost of debt and GROWTH is not in the predicted direction (p<0.01). 
I find that CFO is positively related to the cost of debt (p<0.05), suggesting that lenders judge firms 
with higher operating cash flows as firms likely to make lower returns, and thus charge these firms a 
higher cost of debt.  
I do not find a significant association between other control variables, such as ROA, AGENCY, 
BLOCK, DUAL, BIG 4, or AGE with COD. This could be explained by the fact that firms in Vietnam 
usually obtain loans from the bank based on political connections between managers and banks, the 






















              
RPT_DUMMY ? 0.059     
  (0.175)     
RPT_DUMMY*SO_PRESENCE - 0.052     
  (0.124)     
RP_SALE ?  0.216    
   (0.282)    
RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE -  0.794    
   (0.916)    
ABN_RP_SALE ?   1.202*   
    (1.655)   
ABN_RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE -   -0.415   
    (-0.496)   
RP_CREDIT ?    5.674***  
     (3.752)  
RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE -    -3.192*  
     (-1.779)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT ?     4.681*** 
      (3.457) 
ABN_RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE -     -2.868* 
      (-1.754) 
SO_PRESENCE - -0.774** -0.937*** -0.848*** -0.585** -0.730*** 
  (-2.046) (-2.797) (-2.817) (-2.380) (-3.044) 
SIZE - -0.812*** -0.967*** -0.980*** -0.864*** -0.873*** 
  (-10.217) (-8.994) (-8.771) (-9.401) (-9.398) 
LEV + 0.956* 2.120*** 2.484*** 0.903 0.731 
  (1.844) (2.940) (3.336) (1.505) (1.217) 
ROA - -2.239 -0.710 -0.654 -2.708 -2.951 
  (-1.289) (-0.290) (-0.259) (-1.313) (-1.423) 
CFO ? 2.267*** 2.344** 2.427** 2.311** 2.279** 
  (2.889) (2.188) (2.175) (2.519) (2.471) 
GROWTH - 0.679*** 0.291 0.238 0.587*** 0.594*** 
  (3.412) (1.067) (0.849) (2.607) (2.633) 
MB - -0.520*** -0.627*** -0.662*** -0.423** -0.484** 
  (-3.291) (-2.899) (-2.986) (-2.257) (-2.562) 
CAPINT - -1.275*** -1.350** -1.283** -1.184** -1.095** 
  (-2.940) (-2.314) (-2.154) (-2.394) (-2.200) 
AGENCY + 2.451 0.908 0.593 1.136 1.253 
  (1.466) (0.382) (0.241) (0.595) (0.654) 
BLOCK  ? 0.276 0.567 0.530 0.415 0.449 
  (0.544) (0.799) (0.726) (0.713) (0.767) 
DUAL - -0.062 -0.105 -0.097 -0.079 -0.093 
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  (-0.347) (-0.413) (-0.365) (-0.379) (-0.440) 
BOARD  + -0.016 0.065 0.110 -0.065 -0.061 
  (-0.197) (0.538) (0.891) (-0.666) (-0.620) 
BIG 4 ? -0.271 -0.097 -0.068 -0.223 -0.179 
  (-1.199) (-0.342) (-0.233) (-0.885) (-0.705) 
AGE - -0.012 -0.038 -0.037 -0.049 -0.047 
  (-0.325) (-0.733) (-0.687) (-1.120) (-1.064) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  21.233*** 21.537*** 21.562*** 22.069*** 22.266*** 
  (18.870) (13.961) (13.794) (16.917) (16.837) 
Observations  2,994 1,591 1,476 2,188 2,149 
R-squared  0.267 0.315 0.312 0.302 0.296 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers in parentheses 
are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
3.5.4. Robustness test 
I employ propensity score matching to verify that the findings from Section 3.5.3 are robust. I first 
compute a dummy variable, HIGH_RPT, which is coded as 1 if the firm’s abnormal value of total 
RPTs scaled by total sales is greater than the yearly median of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. The 
abnormal value of the RPT ratio is estimated using the Jian and Wong (2010) model by predicting 
the total value of RPTs against SIZE, LEV, GROWTH and MB. I then match observations in the high 
extent of abnormal RPTs sample with those in the low-RPTs sample, based on propensity scores 
derived from estimating a logistic regression where HIGH_RPT is the dependent variable and the 
covariates are the control variables as in Eqn. (2). Specifically, I use the nearest neighbour matching 
process (with no replacement) and a calliper of one percent. My matched sample thus includes firms 
that are similar in terms of all control variables in Eqn. (2). Panel A of Table 3.7 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the covariates used to match treatment and control firms in the regression for 
HIGH_RPT. None of the differences in the mean of treatment and control firms are statistically 
significant.  
I next re-estimate my regression in Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (3) with the matched sample. Panel B of 
Table 3.7 shows the results from running the regression to test hypothesis 1 using the propensity 
score-matched sample. The coefficients on the four measures of RPTs are positive and significant 
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(p<0.05 or better), suggesting that a higher cost of debt is associated with the extent of RPTs, either 
normal or abnormal values. The results from testing the hypothesis 2 with the matched sample are 
shown in Panel C of Table 3.7. The positive association between COD and RPTs holds across three 
measures of RPTs (p<0.10 or better). The coefficients on the interaction terms between RPT and 
SO_PRESENCE are negative and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that among firms with RPTs, if 
firms have state shareholders, their COD are lower. The results from rerunning models in Eqn. (2) 
and Eqn. (3) with the match sample are consistent with those reported in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, 
supporting my previous findings.  
 
Table 3.7: Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of propensity-matched variables    
 HIGH_RPT=1  HIGH_RPT=0  Difference Tests: 
p-value Variable n mean  n mean  
SO_PRESENCE 1092 0.659  1092 0.660  0.964 
SIZE 1092 13.585  1092 13.523  0.281 
LEV 1092 0.526  1092 0.526  0.999 
ROA 1092 0.067  1092 0.067  0.995 
CFO 1092 0.049  1092 0.050  0.866 
GROWTH 1092 0.141  1092 0.138  0.864 
MB 1092 0.925  1092 0.925  0.984 
CAPINT 1092 0.268  1092 0.269  0.969 
AGENCY 1092 0.059  1092 0.061  0.536 
BLOCK  1092 0.344  1092 0.349  0.496 
DUAL 1092 0.327  1092 0.320  0.715 
BOARD 1092 5.620  1092 5.571  0.303 
BIG 4 1092 0.248  1092 0.254  0.767 


























              
RPT_DUMMY ? -0.015     
  (-0.058)     
RP_SALE ?  0.945**    
   (2.142)    
ABN_RP_SALE ?   1.101***   
    (2.660)   
RP_CREDIT ?    2.542**  
     (2.556)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT ?     1.823** 
      (1.977) 
SO_PRESENCE - -1.015*** -1.039*** -1.058*** -0.884*** -0.939*** 
  (-4.442) (-3.266) (-3.296) (-3.311) (-3.516) 
SIZE - -0.951*** -1.208*** -1.178*** -1.002*** -0.996*** 
  (-10.247) (-9.859) (-9.429) (-9.585) (-9.451) 
LEV + 1.388** 2.747*** 2.733*** 1.190* 1.003 
  (2.342) (3.435) (3.375) (1.771) (1.493) 
ROA - -0.842 0.771 0.339 -0.407 -0.641 
  (-0.422) (0.281) (0.121) (-0.173) (-0.271) 
CFO ? 2.250** 2.224* 2.037 2.211** 2.192** 
  (2.450) (1.820) (1.620) (2.092) (2.066) 
GROWTH - 0.325 0.226 0.106 0.419 0.362 
  (1.419) (0.725) (0.338) (1.621) (1.400) 
MB - -0.713*** -0.835*** -0.770*** -0.748*** -0.773*** 
  (-3.706) (-3.217) (-2.923) (-3.244) (-3.340) 
CAPINT - -0.958* -0.909 -0.963 -0.687 -0.640 
  (-1.948) (-1.406) (-1.480) (-1.244) (-1.154) 
AGENCY + 2.083 6.587** 5.943** 1.374 1.118 
  (1.044) (2.290) (2.046) (0.609) (0.495) 
BLOCK  ? -0.186 0.205 0.114 0.134 0.226 
  (-0.322) (0.264) (0.145) (0.207) (0.349) 
DUAL - -0.223 -0.117 -0.132 -0.109 -0.146 
  (-1.098) (-0.414) (-0.453) (-0.462) (-0.612) 
BOARD  + -0.004 0.050 0.053 -0.085 -0.094 
  (-0.040) (0.396) (0.413) (-0.824) (-0.904) 
BIG 4 ? 0.116 0.242 0.206 0.126 0.132 
  (0.460) (0.780) (0.659) (0.449) (0.468) 
AGE - -0.035 -0.049 -0.044 -0.040 -0.033 
  (-0.836) (-0.848) (-0.759) (-0.811) (-0.679) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  23.066*** 24.317*** 24.335*** 23.977*** 23.931*** 
  (17.488) (13.851) (13.706) (15.929) (15.762) 
Observations  2,184 1,186 1,119 1,654 1,634 
R-squared  0.267 0.341 0.338 0.299 0.290 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers in parentheses 
are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
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RPT_DUMMY ? -0.516     
  (-1.253)     
RPT_DUMMY*SO_PRESENCE - 0.786     
  (1.544)     
RP_SALE ?  0.162    
   (0.169)    
RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE -  0.987    
   (0.921)    
ABN_RP_SALE ?   1.475*   
    (1.724)   
ABN_RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE -   -0.492   
    (-0.500)   
RP_CREDIT ?    5.880***  
     (3.108)  
RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE -    -4.592**  
     (-2.073)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT ?     4.719*** 
      (2.819) 
ABN_RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE -     -4.146** 
      (-2.072) 
SO_PRESENCE - -1.655*** -1.188*** -1.104*** -0.762*** -0.945*** 
  (-3.498) (-3.328) (-3.305) (-2.793) (-3.541) 
SIZE - -0.941*** -1.203*** -1.183*** -1.022*** -1.014*** 
  (-10.120) (-9.806) (-9.434) (-9.743) (-9.598) 
LEV + 1.359** 2.685*** 2.780*** 1.331** 1.110* 
  (2.292) (3.346) (3.409) (1.972) (1.650) 
ROA - -0.850 0.487 0.503 -0.079 -0.376 
  (-0.427) (0.176) (0.177) (-0.033) (-0.159) 
CFO ? 2.277** 2.201* 2.041 2.122** 2.130** 
  (2.480) (1.800) (1.623) (2.008) (2.008) 
GROWTH - 0.327 0.227 0.103 0.422 0.382 
  (1.433) (0.729) (0.325) (1.634) (1.477) 
MB - -0.722*** -0.830*** -0.771*** -0.731*** -0.765*** 
  (-3.751) (-3.198) (-2.926) (-3.175) (-3.311) 
CAPINT - -0.934* -0.969 -0.926 -0.682 -0.634 
  (-1.899) (-1.492) (-1.414) (-1.237) (-1.146) 
AGENCY + 2.151 6.500** 5.954** 1.271 1.008 
  (1.078) (2.258) (2.049) (0.564) (0.447) 
BLOCK  ? -0.223 0.190 0.130 0.166 0.220 
  (-0.386) (0.245) (0.165) (0.258) (0.340) 
DUAL - -0.220 -0.135 -0.120 -0.083 -0.128 
  (-1.081) (-0.475) (-0.413) (-0.352) (-0.536) 
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BOARD  + -0.007 0.046 0.055 -0.079 -0.087 
  (-0.077) (0.369) (0.431) (-0.769) (-0.841) 
BIG 4 ? 0.097 0.244 0.203 0.130 0.136 
  (0.384) (0.788) (0.648) (0.464) (0.485) 
AGE - -0.034 -0.054 -0.041 -0.035 -0.030 
  (-0.817) (-0.932) (-0.709) (-0.717) (-0.610) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  23.403*** 24.451*** 24.369*** 23.869*** 24.013*** 
  (17.511) (13.879) (13.710) (15.865) (15.827) 
Observations  2,184 1,186 1,119 1,654 1,634 
R-squared  0.267 0.342 0.338 0.301 0.292 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed test). The numbers in parentheses 
are t-values. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of the association between RPTs and the cost of debt, and the 
moderating role of state ownership in this association. I attempt to clarify the two opposing views of 
RPTs from lenders’ perspectives: conflicts of interest and efficient transactions. 
Over my sample period, I find that firms with the existence of RPTs have a higher cost of debt 
compared to firms without RPTs. In addition, a higher extent of RPTs is associated with a higher cost 
of debt for firms. This suggests that lenders likely assess RPTs as a potential default risk to firms, and 
thus charge these firms at higher interest rates to compensate for potential risks. This result supports 
the conflicts of interest view of RPTs and confirms the association between the cost of debt and RPTs, 
as stated in H1. I also find evidence about the moderating role of state ownership in the relation 
between RPTs and the cost of debt. The association between RPTs and the cost of debt is less 
pronounced for firms with the presence of state shareholders, supporting H2.  
 The results extend previous studies of RPTs, which have generally focused on stakeholders such 
as equity investors or auditors. I explore the implications of RPTs from lenders’ perspectives by 
investigating the association between RPTs and the cost of debt. RPTs are viewed as potential 
conflicts of interest and lenders should be aware of the possibility of using RPTs to distort information 
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in firms’ financial statements. Whilst RPTs-firms are more likely to have a higher cost of debt, those 
firms can benefit from the presence of state ownership in accessing debts with lower costs compared 
to their non-state ownership counterparts.  
The results suggest that further reforms should be made to improve competition between firms in 
accessing credit from the formal banking system, regardless of their ownership structure, especially 
in the context of prevalent state ownership such as in Vietnam. In addition, findings from this study 
provide investors with knowledge of how firms’ cost of debt might be influenced by the extent of 
RPTs engaged in by firms.  
One potential criticism of this paper is that I rely on information about RPTs to estimate the extent 
of RPTs engaged in by firms. However, firms in Vietnam have poor practices in disclosing non-
financial information in their financial statements. Listed firms disclose incomplete information about 
the nature and amount of RPTs, and their relationship with related parties. Therefore, the results might 
be biased due to incomplete information disclosure. In addition, my results regarding the moderating 
role of state ownership on the association between RPTs and the cost of debt are subject to a caveat. 
I do not have access to information about indirect ownership by representatives of the state because 
there is no requirement for firms to report this information (Robinett et al. 2013). Such data would 
capture a more comprehensive role of state ownership in RPT and the cost of debt association.   
Given the prevalence of RPTs and their impact in many countries, further research on the 
association between RPTs and the cost of debt in other developing markets could be conducted to 
extend the findings reported in this paper. Finally, future studies on this association could also 
potentially consider using credit spreads as an alternative proxy for the COD to investigate the validity 




Chapter 4: Related party transactions, state ownership, and 
corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from Vietnam 
4.1. Introduction 
This paper explores the potential association between RPTs and corporate tax avoidance, and the 
moderating role of state ownership in this association in Vietnam, which is a fast-growing developing 
economy with weak minority shareholder protection (Robinett et al. 2013). Tax avoidance is defined 
as any transaction or event (passive or aggressive) that leads to a reduction in the amount of corporate 
taxes paid by a firm (Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). It includes tax planning 
activities that are legal, or which may fall into a gray area, and activities that are clearly illegal (e.g., 
tax evasion) (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Tax avoidance is traditionally viewed as being a value-
enhancing activity to shareholders as it leads to increases in after-tax cash flows and earnings (Rego 
2003; Sikka 2010; Khurana and Moser 2013). An alternative view of tax avoidance argues that tax 
avoidance may be harmful to shareholders as managers or controlling shareholders can use 
complicated transactions to avoid corporate tax and at the same time, exploit wealth transfers from 
minority shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2006).  
 This paper is motivated by the lack of empirical research on RPTs and corporate tax avoidance in 
Vietnam. However, there are conflicting arguments about the general nature of RPTs in the literature. 
For instance, the literature shows that RPTs can be related to either efficient contracting or conflicts 
of interest (Gordon et al. 2004b). The efficient contracting theory argues that RPTs are part of normal 
business operations of a firm to fulfil economic needs (Gordon et al. 2004b), so they enhance firm 
value by lowering transaction costs, particularly in underdeveloped markets (Khanna and Palepu 
2000). In contrast, agency theory argues that RPTs can be used opportunistically by managers or 




(Gordon et al. 2007). These alternative views of RPTs could lead to an ambiguous association 
between RPTs and tax avoidance. However, I argue that RPTs are likely to be positively associated 
with firms’ tax avoidance activities as RPTs are tools for managers and controlling shareholders to 
significantly avoid tax for their personal benefit. Alternatively, RPTs may be viewed as efficient 
transactions that enhance firms’ performance. Overall, this paper explores the potential association 
between RPTs and corporate tax avoidance in a developing country, Vietnam, for the first time. 
I use a hand-collected sample of publicly listed Vietnamese firms to explore the potential 
association between RPTs and tax avoidance and the role of state ownership on this association. The 
Vietnamese setting is well suited to this paper because RPTs are common due to highly concentrated 
ownership, weak corporate governance and little protection for minority shareholders (Robinett et al. 
2013; Nguyen et al. 2017). State ownership is dominant in Vietnam, although the government has 
undertaken a reform in SOEs as part of the economic reforms introduced in 1986 (Nguyen and 
Richard 2011; Nguyen 2019). Further, corporate income tax has only been introduced in Vietnam 
since the early 1990s under the name of “tax on profit” (Yui 2006). Since this time, continuous 
reforms have been carried out in Vietnam to ensure that the regulations on corporate income tax are 
close to international standards (Shukla et al. 2011). However, the complexity and generosity of tax 
incentives, along with the lack of efficiency in the tax administration process, offer an opportunity 
for firms to get involved in tax avoidance activities in Vietnam.   
Based on the 2016 register of all firms publicly listed on the Vietnamese Stock Exchange, I hand- 
collect data over the 2010 to 2016 period to examine the potential association between RPTs and 
corporate tax avoidance. First, I test whether firms with RPTs engage in more tax avoidance activities 
than firms without RPTs. I then focus on different types of RPTs that could be employed to avoid 
corporate tax. Finally, I examine the potential moderating role of state ownership on this association. 
Following prior research by Habib et al. (2017), I employ related sales and related net credit to 




and Wong 2010), while net related credit could be seen as a channel for tunnelling if net related credit 
is greater than zero (Habib et al. 2017). In terms of corporate tax avoidance, I use two proxy measures 
of tax avoidance drawn from prior literature (e.g., Taylor and Richardson 2014; Khan et al. 2017) to 
improve the robustness of the empirical results, including the accounting effective tax rate (ETR, 
hereafter) and the cash ETR.  
I provide novel evidence showing that firms with RPTs exhibit more tax avoidance than their non-
RPT counterparts. I also find that firms with a higher amount of related net credit and related sales 
exhibit even higher levels of tax avoidance. Specifically, the coefficients on the ETRs are negative 
across some measures of RPTs, suggesting that firms with RPTs are more likely to engage in tax 
avoidance activities. Further, among firms with RPTs, the higher the level of RPTs the higher the 
likelihood firms will engage in more tax avoidance activities. Overall, the evidence is consistent with 
agency theory in explaining the nature underlying RPTs. Further, in terms of the moderating role of 
state ownership, I find that the presence of state shareholders plays an important role in reducing 
corporate tax avoidance by increasing ETRs. Thus, the presence of state shareholders in firms with 
RPTs helps to restrain those firms from engaging in aggressive tax avoidance activities.   
This paper makes the following contributions. First, it extends the literature on the determinants 
of corporate tax avoidance to a developing economy denoted by Vietnam, which is characterised by 
a weak corporate governance environment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that 
empirically examines RPTs, state ownership and corporate tax avoidance in Vietnam. My findings 
suggest that firms use RPTs as a mechanism to significantly avoid corporate taxes. My results show 
that firms use sales to related parties (which are normally used for inflating earnings) to avoid 
corporate taxes. My results also confirm that tax avoidance correlates to firms’ tunneling activities, 
and firms’ propping activities, however, the presence of state shareholders appears to restrain the 




Second, by exploring the association between RPTs and corporate tax avoidance, this paper 
provides a better understanding of the implications of RPTs on other stakeholders in Vietnamese 
firms. Consequently, this raises awareness of the potential abuse of RPTs in firms in avoiding taxes, 
even when those firms do not have foreign operations which can be potentially used to avoid taxes 
through transfer pricing activities. Therefore, the empirical results of this paper could possibly be 
applied to other developing economies around the world.  
Finally, the results of this paper are likely to provide important insights to policymakers and 
regulators in other developing economies concerning the abusive use of RPTs to significantly avoid 
corporate taxes, which has a direct impact on the provision of public goods (e.g., education, 
healthcare, law enforcement and national defense) in such economies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 considers the institutional 
background and develops my hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the sample selection and research 
design. Section 4.4 reports empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2. Institutional background and hypotheses development 
4.2.1. Corporate income tax in Vietnam 
Originally, there was no tax on corporate income in Vietnam, where SOEs were the main taxpayers 
before economic reforms in the late 1980s (Yui 2006). Rather than paying income tax, SOEs 
transferred a proportion of their profits to the government under a regulation named profit-sharing. 
The proportion of profits transferred to the government varied depending on the SOE’s industry. For 
example, the lowest rate of 40 percent was applied to SOEs in the heavy industry category,44 while 
the highest rate of 60 percent was applied to the commercial industry category (Yui 2006).  
 
44 Heavy industry involves the manufacture of large and heavy products or facilities and equipment. Some examples of 




Following the introduction of economic reforms, Vietnam began to restructure its tax system in 
the early 1990s. The first phase of tax reform was the formalisation of tax laws. Until 1989, all taxes 
were based on administrative decrees rather than enacted laws (Tran-Nam 2012). Subsequently, an 
inclusive regulatory framework was established for reforming the outdated tax system in the centrally 
planned economy (Shukla et al. 2011). For example, the state, non-state and agricultural sectors were 
imposed profit tax based on the integrated regulations in the Law on Profit Tax (Shukla et al. 2011). 
However, discrimination in the corporate tax rates of firms based on their industries remained in place 
in the Law on Profit Tax until 1 January 1999 (Tran-Nam 2012).  
The Law on Corporate Income Tax was announced in 1998, as part of the second phase of the tax 
reform (effective from 1 January 1999) to replace the Law on Profit Tax. This new law removed the 
discrimination of corporate tax rates among industries with the enactment of a unified tax rate of 32% 
applied to all domestic firms (Tran-Nam 2012; Nguyen 2015). However, discrimination between 
domestic and foreign firms still existed, where foreign firms paid a tax rate of 25 percent (Tran-Nam 
2012). This discrimination existed until the Law on Corporate Income Tax was amended in 2003 
whereby the standard income tax rate of 28 percent was imposed at the national level for all businesses 
established under the laws of Vietnam, irrespective of whether services were performed inside or 
outside Vietnam (Tran-Nam 2012). Intensive tax incentives in the form of preferential tax rates45 or 
tax exemptions46 are provided under the Law on Corporate Income Tax for investments made in 
particular industries, and areas, and where certain social criteria are met to promote the development 
of different regions or industries in Vietnam (Shukla et al. 2011, 54).  
 
45 Currently, preferential tax rates of 10, 15 and 17 percent are available to firms in Vietnam which meet certain criteria 
to encourage investment in specific projects or sectors (Tran-Nam 2012).  
46 Tax exemption (or tax holidays) take the form of a complete exemption from corporate income tax for a certain period 
of time beginning immediately after the entity first makes profits, followed by a further period where tax is charged at 50 
percent of the standard rate. This form of tax incentive is granted for new investment projects in the socialised sectors 
and difficult socio-economic areas. Further details about the tax incentives in Vietnam can be obtained from Law on 




The standard corporate income tax rate has been reduced in Vietnam since 2003 in an effort to 
attract investment from both domestic and foreign investors (Tran-Nam 2012). It was 28 percent from 
2004 to 2008, 25 percent from 2009 to 2013, 22 percent from 2014 to 2015, and 20 percent from 2016 
until now. However, a higher rate between 32 and 50 percent applies to firms operating in the oil and 
gas and natural resources sectors, depending on the nature of the projects (Nguyen 2015). Under the 
Law on Corporate Income Tax, tax losses of businesses may be carried forward fully and 
consecutively and offset against the profits of later years for a maximum of five years (KPMG 2018). 
Firms in Vietnam are not allowed to consolidate their income tax filing with other firms within a 
group (KPMG 2018).  
Vietnam was previously one of the countries that used a tax-based accounting system (Chan et al. 
2010; Nguyen and Richard 2011). However, the introduction of Vietnamese accounting standards47 
in the early 2000s as part of the reform in accounting to adjust to the transition economy has changed 
the accounting system to be more in line with international accounting standards (Nguyen and 
Richard 2011). Vietnam switched from a tax-based focus to an accrual-based accounting system. The 
Vietnamese Accounting Standard (VAS) No 17 – Income Tax issued in 2005 (Ministry of Finance 
2005) changed the way firms accounted for corporate income tax, from an amount distributed from 
earnings into an expense.  
The existence of multiple tax rates with a standard rate of 20 percent, a higher rate between 32 and 
50 percent applicable to oil, gas, and rare natural resources, and the reduced tax rates of 10, 15 and 
17 percent48 makes tax administration complex for firms in Vietnam (Shukla et al. 2011). Further, 
there are different types of tax incentives in the form of tax exemptions or tax reductions granted to 
firms that meet specific criteria (Shukla et al. 2011). Overall, the complexity and generosity in tax 
incentives, as well as the somewhat ineffective tax administration process may provide opportunities 
for firms to engage in tax avoidance in Vietnam.  
 
47 These standards are aligned almost entirely with the IAS (Version 2003) (Nguyen and Tran 2012). 





4.2.2. Corporate tax avoidance 
Corporate income taxes represent a significant expense of firms and shareholders, so they have 
incentives to reduce taxes through tax avoidance activities to increase their wealth. Tax avoidance is 
a global phenomenon that has attracted increased interest from a variety of stakeholders 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2016; Khan et al. 2017). It is traditionally viewed as a value-enhancing activity 
because tax savings can be reinvested and returned to shareholders (Chan et al. 2016). However, the 
emerging perspective on tax avoidance that relies on the agency theory view, put forward by Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006), proposes that tax avoidance activities generate a shield for rent diversion, 
which facilitates the diversion of resources from shareholders to managers, or from minority 
shareholders to controlling shareholders.  
The literature on tax avoidance has focused a great deal of attention on identifying the determinants 
of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Some firm characteristics are found to be related to 
tax avoidance, including firm size, profitability, leverage, capital intensity and foreign operations 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2016). Prior research also shows that corporate governance mechanisms have 
an impact on the tax avoidance activities of firms. For example, Lanis and Richardson (2011) find 
that firms with a higher proportion of outside members on the board reduce the likelihood of tax 
avoidance. Meanwhile, dual leadership results in inadequate board monitoring and hinders its 
supervision and governance role (Chan et al. 2013). Thus, firms with dual leadership are more tax 
aggressive (Chan et al. 2013). Ownership structure also has an impact on corporate tax avoidance. 
Chen et al. (2010) find that firms with family ownership engage in fewer tax avoidance activities to 
avoid the non-tax cost resulted from a potential price discount to the stock price of the firm. These 
authors show that government-controlled firms pursue a less aggressive tax strategy compared with 
non-government-controlled firms. More recently, Khan et al. (2017) examine the association between 




firms are associated with more concentrated ownership or that an increase in ownership concentration 
increases tax avoidance. Finally, there is also research showing a negative association between auditor 
quality and tax avoidance (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al. 2016).  
Political connections are also found to be related to tax avoidance (e.g., Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu 
et al. 2012b).49 Adhikari et al. (2006) find that firms in Malaysia with political connections (proxied 
by the percentage of government ownership in a firm) pay tax at lower ETRs than other firms, 
implying that these firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms. Wu et al. (2012b) find 
that private firms with politically connected managers obtain more tax benefits (measured as the ETR) 
compared to firms without politically connected managers. Similar evidence is also found by Kim 
and Zhang (2016) using a sample of U.S. firms. They find that politically connected firms are more 
tax aggressive as these firms can have lower detection risk, have better information about future 
changes in tax regulation or enforcement, lower capital market pressure for transparency, lower 
political costs associated with aggressive tax planning and higher risk-taking tendencies.  
 
4.2.3. RPTs 
The literature on RPTs provides two alternative theories that seek to explain their underlying nature. 
The predominant agency theory views all RPTs as potential conflicts of interests (Gordon et al. 2007) 
and therefore RPTs are seen as detrimental to the economic interests of shareholders.50 RPTs may be 
indicative of weaknesses in corporate governance (Balsam et al. 2017) that could be used as a means 
for insider self-dealing by managers or controlling shareholders (Ryngaert and Thomas 2012), 
thereby facilitating the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, an alternative view of RPTs 
is the efficient contracting theory, which argues that RPTs are a means to enhance firms’ performance 
 
49 Kim and Zhang (2016) define politically connected firms as firms with at least one board of director member with one 
of their former positions being connected with political positions, such as president, presidential candidate and being a 
member of the U.S House of Representatives. 
50 This view is referred to as conflict of interest theory, weak governance hypothesis and/or shareholder expropriation 




in imperfect market conditions. RPTs can be used within corporate groups to optimise internal 
resource allocation, reduce transaction costs, and improve return on assets (Khanna and Palepu 2000). 
Hence, RPTs are consistent with shareholders’ interests.  
Prior studies report empirical evidence supporting both views of RPTs. However, evidence 
supporting the agency theory view of RPTs appears to be stronger (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017). 
For example, RPTs have been found to be used to manipulate earnings (Thomas et al. 2004; Chen et 
al. 2011), and to tunnel or prop up earnings between listed firms and their controlling shareholders 
(Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Peng et al. 2011; 
Yeh et al. 2012; Habib et al. 2017). There is also evidence about the association between RPTs and 
the higher possibility of restatements (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017) or stock price crash risk (Habib 
et al. 2019). Finally, there is extant evidence concerning the negative association between RPTs and 
both firms’ valuation and firms’ performance (Chen et al. 2009; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010).  
 
4.2.4. Corporate tax avoidance and RPTs 
Given the strong evidence suggesting the negative consequences of RPTs to equity investors and 
auditors (e.g., Chen et al. 2009; Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; Habib et al. 2015), 
RPTs have raised concerns about being used as a means to significantly avoid corporate taxes by 
managers and/or controlling shareholders. RPTs are considered among rent extraction activities that 
managers pursue at the expense of shareholders (Chen et al. 2010). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
suggest that rent extraction activities can be enabled and masked by tax avoidance activities. Prior 
studies provide evidence regarding the association between RPTs used for tunnelling purposes 
(proxied by related party lending) and tax avoidance, which indicates a positive association between 
these two variables (e.g., Chan et al. 2016). However, the literature on RPTs states that not all RPTs 
are the same (e.g., Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010; Ryngaert and Thomas 2012). Therefore, this paper 




Tax avoidance is viewed as a form of agency conflict between managers and shareholders or 
between insiders and outsider shareholders (see Desai and Dharmapala 2006). If RPTs are seen as a 
conflict of interest according to agency theory, RPTs can be used as a mechanism to manipulate 
earnings to reduce corporate tax liabilities. For instance, related party sales or purchases could be 
conducted by firms at non-arm’s length prices (i.e., buy high and sell low), related party loans could 
be interest-free, and related party borrowing could be charged at a higher rate to increase interest 
expense leading to reduced tax liabilities for firms due to decreased earnings.  
Further, past studies consistently show that RPTs occur in firms with weak corporate governance 
and monitoring mechanisms, providing the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (e.g., Gordon et al. 
2007). In such firms, tax avoidance has been found to be more pronounced (e.g., Balsam et al. 2017), 
so I expect that Vietnamese firms with RPTs are more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities. 
Based on the above discussion, I develop the following directional hypothesis:  
H1: Firms with a higher level of RPTs have a higher level of tax avoidance. 
 
4.2.5. State ownership and the association between corporate tax avoidance and RPTs  
In examining the determinants of tax avoidance, prior studies have shown that ownership structure is 
a factor that influences firms’ tax avoidance activities (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). State ownership has 
been identified as an important determinant of tax avoidance in the literature (e.g., Adhikari et al. 
2006; Wu et al. 2012a; Chan et al. 2013). However, the evidence about the association between state 
ownership and tax avoidance is mixed because of the different views on the role of state ownership. 
Although tax is treated as an expense of the firm and its shareholders, it could also be implied 
dividends to state shareholders (see Bradshaw et al. 2016). Thus, firms with state controlling 
shareholders could engage in fewer tax avoidance activities.  
In addition, firms with state ownership are expected to be less tax aggressive, because institutional 




and Moser, 2009). Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, Chan et al. (2013) find that government-
controlled firms pursue a less aggressive tax strategy compared with non-government-controlled 
firms. They also argue that managers of government-controlled firms are less likely to have incentives 
to avoid tax because of their connection with government authorities and their expectation to be 
promoted in the future. In contrast, there is an alternative view that firms with state ownership engage 
in more tax avoidance because these firms receive less scrutiny concerning their tax strategies because 
of their close connection with the state (see Adhikari et al. 2006). For example, using a sample of 
Malaysian firms, Adhikari et al. (2006) find that firms with political connections have significantly 
lower ETRs, so firms with a higher percentage of government ownership are more likely to engage 
in tax avoidance activities.  
Given the conflicting evidence from prior research as outlined above, I develop the following non-
directional hypothesis:  
H2: The association between tax avoidance and RPTs is less or more pronounced for firms with 
state ownership than firms without state ownership.  
 
4.3. Research design 
4.3.1. Data collection and sample selection 
The sample consists of firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi 
Stock Exchange (HNX)51 during the 2010-2016 period. Consistent with prior studies, I exclude 
financial firms from the sample as these firms are subject to different regulatory constraints (Khurana 
and Moser 2013; Fang et al. 2018). I collect financial data, including data of pre-tax accounting 
income, corporate income tax expense, corporate income tax paid and market data from the OSIRIS 
database. For firms with missing data from this database, I hand-collect data directly from firms’ 
 
51 HOSE is the first stock market in Vietnam, established in 2000. On average, firms listed on this stock exchange have a 
larger size and tend to have more foreign ownership, but less state ownership, than firms listed on HNX, which was 




audited annual financial statements. Data for RPTs (including the amounts, types and parties 
involved) are also collected manually from the notes of audited financial statements of listed firms 
(i.e., consolidated financial statements for firms which have subsidiaries) during the period under 
investigation. Data concerning state ownership are also hand-collected from listed firms’ annual 
reports. Further, I winsorise all continuous variables at the top and bottom three percent of their 
distribution to mitigate the potential effect of outliers on my empirical results. Finally, depending on 
data availability for specific tests, the final sample size used in the main regression analysis is 3,919 
firm-year observations. 
 
4.3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is corporate tax avoidance (TA). Following prior studies, I use ETRs as proxy 
measures of TA (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Huseynov and Klamm 2012; Taylor and 
Richardson 2014; Khan et al. 2017). I use both ACCETR and CETR in my empirical analysis to 
improve the robustness of my empirical results, where ACCETR (CETR) is calculated as the total tax 
expense, including both current and deferred income tax expenses, (cash taxes paid) scaled by pre-
tax accounting income. Both measures represent a firm’s average rate of tax per dollar of pre-tax 
accounting income, and therefore reflect a firm’s ability to reduce its income tax expense (cash taxes 
paid) compared with its pre-tax accounting income. Further, while ACCETR is not affected by a tax 
strategy that defers taxes since the numerator includes all income tax expenses, CETR is affected by 
tax deferral strategies (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). However, CETR is not impacted by changes in 
the tax accounting accruals and does not affect accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
Finally, consistent with prior research (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008), a lower ETR is associated with more 





4.3.3. Independent variables 
4.3.3.1. Test variables 
The main independent variable of interest is related-party transactions (RPT). Recall that H1 suggests 
that the coefficient of the RPT variable is negative. To compare the level of tax avoidance between 
firms with and without RPTs, I first use a dummy variable, RPT_DUMMY, which is coded as 1 if 
firms disclose at least one transaction or one balance with related parties, and 0 otherwise.  
To examine further the potential association between tax avoidance and RPTs, I look at the extent 
of firms’ use of RPTs. I follow prior research by Habib et al. (2017) and proxy for RPT based on the 
following categories: (i) RP sales (RP_SALE), measured as the amount of sales with related parties 
scaled by net sales, and (ii) related net credit (RP_CREDIT), measured by total receivables minus 
total payables, scaled by total assets. In the literature, RP sales are widely used as a proxy for propping 
activities (e.g., Aharony et al. 2010; Jian and Wong 2010; Habib et al. 2017). Finally, related net 
credit is used as a proxy for firms’ tunnelling activities as per prior research (Chan et al. 2016; Habib 
et al. 2017). 
I use both raw and abnormal amounts of these categories to improve the robustness of my empirical 
results. RPTs might be used to fulfil the economic need of firms in a large business group or to exploit 
wealth from shareholders. Any abnormal amounts of RPTs should also reveal exploiting activities by 
firms. To calculate abnormal RPTs, I adopt the approach used by Jian and Wong (2010), and estimate 
the following regression model:  
RPTi,t = β0 + β1SIZEi,t + β2LEVi,t + β3GROWTHi,t + β4MBi,t + YEARt + INDUSTRYt+ εi,t      (1) 
where the regression model in Eqn. (1) is estimated separately for the two RPT proxies outlined 
above. Finally, the residuals from these regressions denote the abnormal amounts of RPTs.  
My final independent variable of interest is the interaction term between RPT and the presence of 




(RPT*SO_PRESENCE). I construct a dummy variable for SO_PRESENCE, coded as 1 if a firm has 
a state shareholder, and 0 otherwise. 
  
4.3.3.2. Control variables 
Drawing on prior literature, I include in my baseline regression model the following control variables 
that are shown to be associated with tax avoidance (e.g., Stickney and McGee 1982; Gupta and 
Newberry 1997; Chan et al. 2013; Khurana and Moser 2013; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016; Richardson 
et al. 2016), state ownership presence (SO_PRESENCE), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), the 
market-to-book ratio (MB), return on assets (ROA), sales growth (GROWTH), capital intensity 
(CAPINT), and inventory intensity (INVINT). Finally, I also include in my regression model controls 
for year (YEAR) and industry (INDUSTRY) effects.  
SO_PRESENCE is measured as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm has a state shareholder, 
and 0 otherwise. I expect the coefficient of SO_PRESENCE to be positive because Chan et al. (2013) 
show that state ownership firms engage in fewer tax avoidance activities.  
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities 
scaled by total assets. MB is measured as the ratio of the market value to the book value of its equity. 
Past studies provide inconsistent results about the association between SIZE, LEV and MB with 
different measures of ETRs (e.g., Chan et al. 2013; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016), so I do not predict the 
signs for these variables.  
ROA is measured as pre-tax income scaled by the total assets, which is a proxy for a firm’s 
profitability. Due to conflicting evidence about the association between ROA and ETR in prior 
research (e.g., Richardson et al. 2016), I make no sign prediction for this variable.  
GROWTH is measured as the change in sales relative to last year scaled by last year’s sales. It is 
argued to be positively related to tax avoidance as firms with higher sales growth receive greater 




CAPINT and INVINT are used to control for firms’ asset mix (see Stickney and McGee 1982; 
Gupta and Newberry 1997). CAPINT is measured as tangible assets scaled by total assets, while 
INVINT is measured as the year-end total inventory scaled by total assets. Prior research provides 
evidence that CAPINT is positively associated with tax avoidance (e.g., Stickney and McGee 1982; 
Richardson et al. 2016). In contrast, INVINT is found in prior research to be negatively associated 
with tax avoidance (e.g, Richardson et al. 2016). Therefore, I predict a positive (negative) sign for 
CAPINT (INVINT) in my regression model.  
I include YEAR dummy variables to control for possible differences in corporate tax avoidance 
activities in Vietnamese listed firms during the 2010-2016 financial years. The YEAR dummies are 
coded as 1 if the year falls within a particular year category, and 0 otherwise. No sign predictions are 
made for the YEAR dummies. 
INDUSTRY dummy variables are also included in the regression models since tax avoidance 
could be different across different industries. Ten INDUSTRY dummies based on the General 
Industry Classification Standards (GICS) are constructed. The INDUSTRY dummies are coded as 1 
if the firm is represented in a specific GICS category, and 0 otherwise. No sign prediction is made 
for the INDUSTRY dummies. 




Table 4.1: Variable definitions 
Abbreviation Description Measurement 
ACCETR Accounting ETR Total income tax expenses scaled by pre-tax accounting profit 
CETR Cash ETR Cash income taxes paid scaled by pre-tax accounting profit 
RPT_DUMMY RPT dummy variable  
Dummy variable, coded as 1 if firms disclose at least one transaction or 
one balance with related parties, 0 otherwise 
RP_SALE Related sales Related sales to net sales 
ABN_RP_SALE Abnormal related sales Abnormal value of related sales ratio  
RP_CREDIT Related net credit Total receivables minus total payables, scales by total assets 
ABN_RP_CREDIT 
Abnormal related net 
credit 
Abnormal value of related net credit ratio 
SO_PRESENCE 
State ownership dummy 
variable 
Dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state shareholder and 0 otherwise 
in the end-of-year t 
RPT*SO_PRESENCE Interaction variable RPT multiplied by SO_PRESENCE 
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets in the end-of-year t 
LEV Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets in the end-of-year t 
MB Market-to-book ratio Ratio between market value to the book value of a firm’s equity 
ROA Return on asset Pre-tax accounting income scaled by total assets in the end-of-year t 
GROWTH Sales growth Change in sales relative to last year scaled by last year sales 
CAPINT Tangible assets intensity Total tangible assets scaled by total assets 
INVINT Inventory intensity Total inventory scaled by total assets 
 
 
4.3.4. Model specification 
To examine the potential association between RPTs and tax avoidance (H1), I estimate the following 
baseline regression model:  
TAi,t = β0 +β1RPTi,t + β2SO_PRESENCEi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5MBi,t + β6ROAi,t + 
β7GROWTHi,t + β8CAPINTi,t +β9INVINTi,t + YEARt  + INDUSTRYt + εi,t                       (2) 
where TA = a proxy for tax avoidance (ACCETR and CETR); RPT = a proxy for related party 
transactions including normal and abnormal values (RP_SALE, ABN_RP_SALE, RP_CREDIT and 
ABN_RP_CREDIT) and RPT_DUMMY, a dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm discloses at least 
one transaction or one balance with related parties, and 0 otherwise; SO_PRESENCE = a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if a firm has state ownership, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = the natural logarithm of 
total assets; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; MB = the market value of equity scaled by 
the book value of equity; ROA = pre-tax income scaled by total assets; GROWTH = change in sales 
relative to last year scaled by the last year sales; CAPINT = total tangible assets scaled by total assets; 




year falls within a specific year category, and 0 otherwise; and INDUSTRY = industry dummy 
variables, coded as 1 if firm is represented in a particular GICS category, and 0 otherwise.  
To test H2 whether the interaction effect of RPT and state ownership is negatively associated with 
tax avoidance, I compute an interaction variable (RPT*SO_PRESENCE) and estimate the following 
extended regression model:  
TAi,t = β0 +β1RPT i,t + β2SO_PRESENCEi,t + β3RPT i,t *SO_PRESENCEi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5LEVi,t 
+ β6MBi,t + β7ROAi,t + β8 GROWTHi,t + β9CAPINTi,t +β10INVINTi,t + YEARt  + INDUSTRYt + 
εi,t                                                                                                                                                 (3) 
where RPT*SO_PRESENCE = an interaction variable computed by multiplying RPT by 
SO_PRESENCE. 
 
4.4. Results and discussion 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in my models. The mean (median) ACCETR 
and CETR are respectively 0.189 (0.208) or nearly 19 percent (nearly 21 percent) and 0.203 (0.164) 
or about 20 percent (about 16 percent). The mean (median) of related sales (RP_SALE) is 0.270 
(0.116), showing that related sales account for 27 (about 11) percent of net sales, on average. Related 
net credit (RP_CREDIT) has a mean (median) of 0.026 (0.004), which indicates that net credit to 
related parties for firms in the sample is nearly three (about one) percent of their total assets. The 
means (median) of abnormal related sales (ABN_RP_SALE) and related net credit 
(ABN_RP_CREDIT) are 0.01 (-0.094), and 0.002 (-0.016) respectively, as estimated by the residual 
model. The negative (positive) values of the ABN_RP_SALE and ABN_RP_CREDIT suggest that 
the underlying firms have a lower (higher) level of related party transactions than the normal level. 




reasonably high leverage (an average of about 50 percent). Finally, the average pre-tax return on 
assets of firms in the sample is about seven percent.  
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variable N mean sd Q1 median Q3 
ACCETR 3,919 0.189 0.108 0.125 0.208 0.249 
CETR 3,919 0.203 0.236 0.031 0.164 0.257 
RPT_DUMMY 3,921 0.796 0.403 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RP_SALE 2,089 0.270 0.325 0.013 0.116 0.448 
ABN_RP_SALE 1,900 0.010 0.324 -0.213 -0.094 0.200 
RP_CREDIT 2,858 0.026 0.121 -0.022 0.004 0.056 
ABN_RP_CREDIT 2,802 0.002 0.128 -0.060 -0.016 0.046 
SO_PRESENCE 3,921 0.652 0.476 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 3,921 13.144 1.403 12.190 13.068 14.114 
MB 3,921 0.978 0.665 0.486 0.786 1.252 
LEV 3,921 0.501 0.216 0.328 0.527 0.674 
ROA 3,921 0.073 0.074 0.018 0.055 0.111 
GROWTH 3,921 0.155 0.440 -0.076 0.087 0.267 
CAPINT 3,921 0.248 0.207 0.082 0.189 0.360 
INVINT 3,921 0.223 0.178 0.071 0.192 0.334 
Note: All continuous variables are winsorised at the 3rd and 97th percentiles. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
 
 
4.4.2. Pearson correlation results 
Table 4.3 reports the Pearson correlations between the variables. I find significantly negative 
correlations between ACCETR and three measures of RPT (RP_SALE, RP_CREDIT and 
ABN_RP_CREDIT) (p<0.05 or better). This shows that higher levels of RPTs are associated with the 
likelihood of tax avoidance. The correlations between ACCETR and SO_PRESENCE is significantly 
positive (p<0.01), so firms with state shareholders are less likely to engage in tax avoidance. I also 
report a significant correlation between ACCETR, CETR and several of the control variables, such 
as SO_PRESENCE, LEV, ROA, GROWTH, MB, CAPINT and INVINT (p<0.10 or better). Overall, 
the correlation results in Table 4.3 show that the correlations between the explanatory variables are 
not high. I calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the explanatory variables. I find that the VIF 
values of the variables used in the regressions are less than the critical value of ten, which shows that 




Table 4.3: Correlation results 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. ACCETR 1.000       
2. CETR  0.402*** 1.000      
3. RP_SALE  -0.049** 0.024 1.000     
4. ABN_RP_SALE -0.030 0.033 0.852*** 1.000    
5. RP_CREDIT -0.048** -0.028 0.354*** 0.385*** 1.000   
6. ABN_R_CREDIT -0.037** -0.022 0.351*** 0.414*** 0.914*** 1.000  
7. SO_PRESENCE 0.113*** 0.048*** 0.131*** 0.071*** -0.084*** -0.046** 1.000 
8. SIZE 0.018 -0.012 -0.074*** -0.235*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.063*** 
9. LEV 0.102*** 0.055*** 0.042* -0.059** -0.112*** -0.035* 0.089*** 
10. MB  -0.023 -0.069*** -0.102*** -0.032 -0.071*** -0.022 0.038** 
11. ROA 0.027* -0.110*** -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.134*** 
12. GROWTH 0.073*** -0.101*** -0.069*** -0.018 -0.001 -0.006 0.130*** 
13. CAPINT -0.138*** -0.063*** 0.091*** 0.006 -0.118*** -0.098*** 0.108*** 
14. INVINT 0.111*** 0.085*** -0.127*** -0.060*** -0.118*** -0.089*** 0.010 
 
Table 4.3: Correlation results (continued) 
  8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
8. SIZE 1.000       
9. LEV 0.340*** 1.000      
10. MB  0.112*** -0.116*** 1.000     
11. ROA 0.076*** 0.012 0.101*** 1.000    
12. GROWTH -0.086*** -0.462*** 0.506*** 0.138*** 1.000   
13. CAPINT 0.097*** 0.000 0.031* -0.018 -0.047*** 1.000  
14. INVINT 0.094*** 0.321*** -0.054*** -0.141*** -0.045*** -0.410*** 1.000 
 Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively (two-tailed). Variables are defined in 
Table 4.1. 
 
4.4.3. Regression results 
Table 4.4 presents the regression results for the estimation of Eqn. (2) using my two measures of tax 
avoidance, ACCETR, and CETR. Columns from (1) to (5) of Table 4.4 report the results for 
ACCETR, whereas Columns from (6) to (10) report those for CETR. To test H1, five regressions are 
estimated using a dummy variable and two measures for RPT values with both raw and abnormal 
values as independent variables.  
As shown in Columns (1) to (5) of Table 4.4, the coefficients on four out of five measures of RPT 
are negative and statistically significant (p<0.10 or better). These results are economically significant. 
For instance, the RP_SALE coefficient of -0.014 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 




of its mean value.52 Similarly, an increase by one standard deviation of RP_CREDIT 
(ABN_RP_CREDIT) reduces ACCETR by about three percent of its means.53 
Regarding the CETR, the coefficients on RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT are negatively 
significant (p<0.10). In terms of economic significance, I find that a one standard deviation increase 
in RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) is associated with a nearly four percent decrease in CETR.54  
Overall, the above results support H1, indicating that firms with the presence of RPT and higher 
extent of RPTs have lower ACCETR and CETR, implying higher levels of tax avoidance. I conclude 
that the empirical results support the agency theory argument of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) as an 
explanation of the implications of RPTs for firms in Vietnam.  
 
52 The result for RP_SALE of 0.024 is computed following Ball et al. (2012) by taking the coefficient on RP_SALE of -
0.014 and multiplying it by the standard deviation of RP_SALE of 0.325, and then scaling it by mean of ACCETR of 
0.189 (i.e., -0.014*0.325/0.189 = -0.024). 
53 The result for RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) of 0.028 (0.025) is calculated following Ball et al. (2012) by taking 
the coefficient on RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) of -0.044 (-0.037) and multiplying it by the standard deviation of 
RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) of 0.121 (0.128), and then scaling it by mean of ACCETR of 0.189 (i.e., -
0.044*0.121/0.189 = -0.028).  
54 The economic magnitude of RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) on CETR is computed as follows: taking the coefficient 
on RP_CREDIT (ABN_RP_CREDIT) of -0.065 (-0.059) and multiplying it by the standard deviation of RP_CREDIT 






























             
RPT_DUMMY - -0.008*     0.003     
  (-1.919)     (0.344)     
RP_SALE -  -0.014*      0.011    
   (-1.844)      (0.658)    
ABN_RP_SALE -   -0.011      0.016   
    (-1.545)      (0.926)   
RP_CREDIT -    -0.044***      -0.065*  
     (-2.629)      (-1.703)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT -     -0.037**      -0.059* 
      (-2.342)      (-1.652) 
SO_PRESENCE + 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021** 0.016 0.015 0.020* 0.020* 
  (4.805) (4.260) (4.012) (4.213) (4.161) (2.417) (1.296) (1.175) (1.910) (1.855) 
SIZE ? 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.007* -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
  (1.331) (-0.530) (-0.964) (0.644) (0.622) (-0.757) (-1.685) (-1.574) (-1.070) (-1.131) 
LEV ? 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.072*** -0.017 -0.007 0.010 -0.013 -0.006 
  (6.576) (4.594) (4.216) (5.671) (5.793) (-0.724) (-0.227) (0.298) (-0.476) (-0.198) 
MB ? 0.264*** 0.224*** 0.214*** 0.289*** 0.289*** -0.271*** -0.406*** -0.455*** -0.315*** -0.321*** 
  (8.473) (5.160) (4.628) (7.641) (7.500) (-3.870) (-4.087) (-4.275) (-3.670) (-3.678) 
ROA + 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008* 0.007 -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
  (1.168) (1.058) (1.269) (1.660) (1.574) (-5.207) (-4.085) (-3.398) (-4.698) (-4.600) 
GROWTH - -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
  (-4.516) (-3.595) (-3.482) (-5.142) (-4.957) (-0.020) (0.356) (0.427) (-0.318) (-0.188) 
CAPINT - -0.061*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.053** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.085*** 
  (-6.453) (-5.806) (-5.453) (-7.320) (-7.319) (-2.486) (-3.019) (-2.996) (-3.211) (-3.331) 




  (1.438) (0.457) (0.192) (0.019) (0.032) (2.635) (1.285) (0.800) (0.829) (0.788) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.143*** 0.185*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.287*** 0.383*** 0.370*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 
  (7.337) (6.819) (6.740) (6.696) (6.466) (6.551) (6.162) (5.699) (6.370) (6.237) 
Observations  3,919 2,088 1,899 2,857 2,801 3,919 2,088 1,899 2,857 2,801 
R-squared   0.093 0.110 0.101 0.107 0.106 0.042 0.057 0.058 0.044 0.044 




In exploring the potential moderating role of state ownership, the regression model in Eqn. (3) is 
used. Table 4.5 reports the results of this model. Columns from (1) to (5) present the results where 
ACCETR is used as a dependent variable, while Columns (6) to (10) report the results of using CETR 
in this analysis. Significant results are provided where ACCETR is used as a dependent variable. I 
find negative coefficients between ACCETR and four measures of the value of RPTs (p<0.10 or 
better). The interaction terms between RPT and SO are significantly positive for three measures of 
RPTs (p<0.05 or better). This result suggests that among firms with RPTs, if state ownership exists, 
ACCETR is higher. In other words, the presence of state ownership makes the association between 
tax avoidance and RPT less pronounced. Finally, although the results for CETR are not as strong as 






























                        
RPT_DUMMY - -0.010     0.018     
  (-1.449)     (1.195)     
RPT_DUMMY*SO_PRESENCE ? 0.003     -0.024     
  (0.329)     (-1.252)     
RP_SALE -  -0.065***      -0.067*    
   (-4.327)      (-1.937)    
RP_SALE* SO_PRESENCE ?  0.067***      0.103***    
   (3.927)      (2.615)    
ABN_RP_SALE -   -0.043***      -0.008   
    (-2.929)      (-0.237)   
ABN_RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE ?   0.042**      0.032   
    (2.488)      (0.812)   
RP_CREDIT -    -0.100***      -0.082  
     (-3.213)      (-1.168)  
RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE ?    0.078**      0.024  
     (2.122)      (0.286)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT -     -0.054*      -0.056 
      (-1.916)      (-0.869) 
ABN_RP_CREDIT* SO_PRESENCE ?     0.025      -0.005 
      (0.727)      (-0.071) 
SO_PRESENCE + 0.016** 0.010 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.039** -0.005 0.017 0.019* 0.020* 
  (2.105) (1.487) (4.252) (3.579) (4.137) (2.289) (-0.315) (1.252) (1.784) (1.856) 
SIZE ? 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
  (1.346) (-0.385) (-0.763) (0.824) (0.681) (-0.821) (-1.588) (-1.503) (-1.042) (-1.133) 




  (6.573) (4.311) (4.000) (5.533) (5.765) (-0.715) (-0.418) (0.230) (-0.493) (-0.195) 
MB ? 0.264*** 0.208*** 0.203*** 0.285*** 0.288*** -0.271*** -0.431*** -0.463*** -0.316*** -0.321*** 
  (8.473) (4.780) (4.395) (7.509) (7.468) (-3.873) (-4.324) (-4.330) (-3.679) (-3.673) 
ROA + 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008* 0.007 -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
  (1.171) (1.224) (1.368) (1.672) (1.563) (-5.217) (-3.979) (-3.363) (-4.696) (-4.597) 
GROWTH - -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
  (-4.524) (-3.512) (-3.473) (-5.186) (-4.964) (0.026) (0.420) (0.431) (-0.323) (-0.187) 
CAPINT - -0.061*** -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.053** -0.097*** -0.093*** -0.081*** -0.085*** 
  (-6.453) (-6.280) (-5.690) (-7.392) (-7.332) (-2.484) (-3.333) (-3.064) (-3.218) (-3.328) 
INVINT + 0.016 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.070*** 0.043 0.031 0.026 0.026 
  (1.422) (0.216) (0.090) (-0.127) (-0.010) (2.687) (1.123) (0.766) (0.807) (0.790) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.144*** 0.195*** 0.186*** 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.278*** 0.399*** 0.367*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 
  (7.285) (7.184) (6.639) (6.773) (6.441) (6.241) (6.391) (5.659) (6.375) (6.236) 
Observations  3,919 2,088 1,899 2,857 2,801 3,919 2,088 1,899 2,857 2,801 
R-squared   0.093 0.117 0.104 0.109 0.106 0.042 0.060 0.058 0.044 0.044 







The results for control variables are consistent across the two regression models reported in Tables 
4.4 and 4.5, respectively. The coefficients on SO_PRESENCE when ACCETR is a dependent 
variable are significantly positive across the five measures of RPT (p<0.05 or better), whereas those 
for CETR are only significantly positive for RPT_DUMMY and RP_CREDIT (normal and abnormal 
values) (p<0.10 or better). SO_PRESENCE has a positive coefficient with ACCETR and CETR, 
indicating that firms with state ownership have higher ETRs. These results suggest that these firms 
avoid less tax compared with firms without state ownership. For example, the coefficient on 
SO_PRESENCE in Column (1) of Table 4.4 is 0.018, indicating that ACCETR for firms with state 
shareholders is nearly two percent higher than that of firms without state shareholders. The result is 
in line with prior research by Chan et al. (2013). 
In terms of the other control variables, the coefficient on SIZE is negatively significant only where 
the normal value of related sales is used as a proxy for RPTs in model 1 (p<0.10). This result shows 
that larger firms are likely to have fewer cash tax payments than smaller firms. The result is consistent 
with the study by Adhikari et al. (2006). Similar to the findings of Gupta and Newberry (1997), I find 
that firms with higher leverage engage in less tax avoidance. LEV is positively associated with 
ACCETR (p<0.01), indicating that firms with higher leverage pay higher ACCETR. The coefficients 
on MB and CAPINT are significantly negative across the five measures of RPTs (p<0.05 or better). 
This suggests that firms with higher MB and CAPINT have lower ACCETR and CETR, and thus 
higher levels of tax avoidance. The CAPINT result is consistent with the prediction and findings of 
prior studies (e.g., Stickney and McGee 1982; Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2012b). 
Finally, the results show that the coefficients of ROA and GROWTH are conflicting between 
ACCETR and CETR. For example, ROA has a positive association with ACCETR (p<0.01), while 
it has a negative association with CETR (p<0.01). This suggests that firms with higher profitability 
have higher income tax expense, but lower cash tax payments. Likewise, the coefficients on 





significantly positive for RP_CREDIT only (p<0.10). Finally, consistent with past studies, I find that 
the coefficients on INVINT are positively significant (p<0.01) (e.g., Chan et al. 2010; Taylor and 
Richardson 2014). However, they are not uniformly significant across all measures of RPTs.  
 
4.4.4. Robustness test 
It is possible that firms may not randomly engage in RPTs. Prior research suggests that factors such 
as size, leverage, the market–to–book ratio, firms’ performance (measured as return on assets), 
ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and some corporate governance characteristics could 
influence the extent of RPTs engaged in by firms (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010; Bennouri et al. 2015; 
Habib et al. 2017). However, some of these factors potentially affect the ETR proxies for tax 
avoidance activities. For example, firm size is found to be associated with RPTs, although the 
evidence is mixed (e.g., Cheung et al. 2009b; Jian and Wong 2010; Kang et al. 2014; Balsam et al. 
2017). Similarly, past studies provide mixed evidence about the association between firm size and 
ETRs (e.g., Chan et al. 2013; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016). Therefore, the regression model adjusts for 
common factors which affect both RPTs and ETRs to ensure that the coefficients on ETRs in Eqn. 
(2) and Eqn. (3) are not biased.  
Following Tucker (2010) and Lennox et al. (2012), I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach to address this issue. I first compute a dummy variable, HIGH_RPT, which is coded as 1 if 
the abnormal value of total RPTs scaled by total sales is greater than the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. The abnormal value of the RPT ratio is calculated as the residuals from estimating Eqn. 
(1) where the dependent variable is total RPTs scaled by total sales. I then estimate a logistic model 
where HIGH_RPT is the dependent variable and the covariates are the control variables as in Eqn. 
(2). Based on the propensity scores derived from this model, I then match observations of the sample 
of high abnormal RPTs with those in the low-RPTs sample. In particular, I use the nearest neighbour 





the descriptive statistics of the covariates used in the regression for HIGH_RPT to match treatment 
and control firms. I find that there is no significant difference in the mean of covariates between 
treatment and control firms, suggesting that my matching process was carried out properly (Tucker 
2010; Lennox et al. 2012).   
I next re-estimate my regressions in Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (3) using the propensity score-matched 
sample. The results from estimating the regression models to test H1 with the matched sample are 
presented in Panel B of Table 6. Coefficients on several measures of RPTs (e.g., RPT_DUMMY, 
RP_CREDIT and ABN_RP_CREDIT) are negative and significant for ACCETR (p<0.05), 
suggesting that firms with the presence of RPTs and higher extent of RPTs have lower ACCETR, 
which translates into higher levels of tax avoidance. Panel C of Table 6 reports results for testing 
hypothesis 2 with the matched sample. The negative coefficients between ACCETR and RPTs still 
hold (p<0.05 or better). The coefficients on the interaction terms between RPT and SO_PRESENCE 
are positive and significant (p<0.10 or better), suggesting that among firms with RPTs, firms with 
state ownership have higher ETRs, which suggests these firms avoid less tax compared to those firms 
with no state ownership. Overall, the results shown in Panels B and C of Table 6 are consistent with 
those reported in Tables 4 and 5 of the paper, suggesting that my main empirical findings are validated 
based on PSM analysis.  
 
Table 4.6: Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of propensity-matched variables   
 HIGH_RPT=1  HIGH_RPT=0  Difference Tests: p-
value Variable n mean  n mean  
SO_PRESENCE 1,238 0.666  1,238 0.668  0.898 
SIZE 1,238 13.467  1,238 13.407  0.272 
LEV 1,238 0.504  1,238 0.500  0.696 
MB 1,238 0.957  1,238 0.977  0.439 
ROA 1,238 0.076  1,238 0.076  0.834 
GROWTH 1,238 0.137  1,238 0.134  0.854 
CAPINT 1,238 0.254  1,238 0.258  0.684 































             
RPT_DUMMY - -0.013**     -0.014     
  (-2.204)     (-1.163)     
RP_SALE -  -0.007      0.023    
   (-0.715)      (1.022)    
ABN_RP_SALE -   -0.008      0.027   
    (-0.788)      (1.234)   
RP_CREDIT -    -0.049**      -0.047  
     (-2.111)      (-0.919)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT -     -0.048**      -0.060 
      (-2.164)      (-1.263) 
SO_PRESENCE + 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021** 0.011 0.010 0.020 0.019 
  (4.157) (2.894) (2.674) (3.339) (3.291) (2.046) (0.739) (0.648) (1.574) (1.512) 
SIZE ? 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.540) (-0.135) (-0.541) (0.040) (-0.102) (-0.608) (-1.238) (-0.974) (-0.826) (-0.856) 
LEV ? 0.080*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.022 0.035 0.037 0.021 0.029 
  (5.850) (3.524) (3.333) (4.763) (5.003) (0.744) (0.860) (0.855) (0.620) (0.837) 
MB ? 0.208*** 0.192*** 0.166*** 0.241*** 0.237*** -0.318*** -0.382*** -0.466*** -0.349*** -0.357*** 
  (4.993) (3.348) (2.734) (4.816) (4.692) (-3.511) (-3.036) (-3.451) (-3.208) (-3.250) 
ROA + 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011* 0.011* -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
  (1.638) (1.294) (1.432) (1.792) (1.792) (-3.126) (-3.174) (-2.857) (-3.085) (-3.057) 
GROWTH - -0.011** -0.015*** -0.012** -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.009 
  (-2.555) (-2.590) (-2.045) (-3.342) (-3.127) (1.089) (0.468) (0.650) (0.677) (0.769) 





  (-5.578) (-4.411) (-4.211) (-5.336) (-5.382) (-2.328) (-2.545) (-2.533) (-2.459) (-2.640) 
INVINT + 0.005 0.026 0.023 0.004 0.003 0.061* 0.039 0.020 0.031 0.029 
  (0.332) (1.225) (1.033) (0.214) (0.180) (1.902) (0.838) (0.403) (0.806) (0.736) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.161*** 0.168*** 0.179*** 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.299*** 0.361*** 0.357*** 0.319*** 0.321*** 
  (5.953) (4.647) (4.768) (5.143) (5.186) (5.069) (4.532) (4.283) (4.592) (4.559) 
Observations  2,476 1,352 1,254 1,870 1,852 2,476 1,352 1,254 1,870 1,852 
R-squared   0.093 0.107 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.046 0.068 0.068 0.048 0.050 










































                        
RPT_DUMMY - -0.012     0.008     
  (-1.252)     (0.366)     
RPT_DUMMY*SO_PRESENCE ? -0.001     -0.034     
  (-0.063)     (-1.307)     
RP_SALE -  -0.074***      -0.054    
   (-3.522)      (-1.159)    
RP_SALE* SO_PRESENCE ?  0.086***      0.098*    
   (3.615)      (1.869)    
ABN_RP_SALE -   -0.054***      0.026   
    (-2.603)      (0.556)   
ABN_RP_SALE*SO_PRESENCE ?   0.060**      0.001   
    (2.530)      (0.028)   
RP_CREDIT -    -0.138***      -0.065  
     (-3.221)      (-0.695)  
RP_CREDIT*SO_PRESENCE ?    0.125**      0.026  
     (2.468)      (0.231)  
ABN_RP_CREDIT -     -0.082**      -0.014 
      (-2.093)      (-0.169) 
ABN_RP_CREDIT* 
SO_PRESENCE 
?     0.050      -0.067 
      (1.062)      (-0.653) 
SO_PRESENCE + 0.021* 0.006 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.049** -0.005 0.010 0.019 0.019 
  (1.895) (0.746) (3.298) (2.721) (3.326) (2.077) (-0.278) (0.628) (1.484) (1.488) 





  (0.538) (-0.226) (-0.456) (0.127) (-0.064) (-0.649) (-1.286) (-0.972) (-0.817) (-0.878) 
LEV ? 0.080*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.022 0.032 0.037 0.021 0.030 
  (5.849) (3.400) (3.173) (4.567) (4.931) (0.758) (0.789) (0.851) (0.600) (0.875) 
MB ? 0.208*** 0.173*** 0.149** 0.229*** 0.233*** -0.317*** -0.404*** -0.466*** -0.352*** -0.351*** 
  (4.992) (3.024) (2.435) (4.553) (4.587) (-3.502) (-3.194) (-3.431) (-3.214) (-3.183) 
ROA + 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011* 0.011* -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
  (1.637) (1.510) (1.465) (1.845) (1.775) (-3.145) (-3.062) (-2.856) (-3.078) (-3.045) 
GROWTH - -0.011** -0.014** -0.012* -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.009 
  (-2.552) (-2.510) (-1.939) (-3.342) (-3.115) (1.123) (0.515) (0.650) (0.677) (0.762) 
CAPINT - -0.067*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.061** -0.099*** -0.094** -0.076** -0.081*** 
  (-5.577) (-4.870) (-4.505) (-5.443) (-5.416) (-2.340) (-2.773) (-2.515) (-2.466) (-2.615) 
INVINT + 0.005 0.023 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.064** 0.035 0.020 0.031 0.031 
  (0.335) (1.080) (0.938) (0.025) (0.114) (1.974) (0.761) (0.402) (0.786) (0.775) 
YEAR ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.161*** 0.184*** 0.176*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.282*** 0.379*** 0.357*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
  (5.806) (5.069) (4.699) (5.341) (5.203) (4.683) (4.729) (4.278) (4.593) (4.547) 
Observations  2,476 1,352 1,254 1,870 1,852 2,476 1,352 1,254 1,870 1,852 
R-squared   0.093 0.116 0.106 0.105 0.102 0.047 0.070 0.068 0.048 0.050 








This paper has explored the potential association between RPTs and corporate tax avoidance in 
Vietnam, providing important insights on how RPTs relate to tax avoidance activities, and how state 
ownership moderates this association. Using data for all non-financial firms listed on two stock 
exchanges in Vietnam from 2010 to 2016, I find that firms with RPTs are more likely to engage in 
tax avoidance activities than non-RPTs firms. Among firms with RPTs, the higher the extent of RPTs, 
the more likely firms are to avoid corporate taxes. This result supports the agency theory view of 
RPTs (e.g., Gordon et al. 2007), which suggests that RPTs may be used for opportunistic purposes 
by managers and/or controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. 
However, the positive association between RPTs and tax avoidance may be restrained by the presence 
of state ownership. I also find that in firms with state shareholders, the association between RPTs and 
tax avoidance is less pronounced than in firms without state shareholders. The results both support 
H1 and H2, which state that firms with a higher level of RPTs have a higher level of tax avoidance 
and that the association between tax avoidance and RPTs is moderated by the presence of state 
ownership.   
Overall, the findings from this paper extend the literature on RPTs, corporate tax avoidance and 
the role of state ownership in Vietnam, which is a developing economy where state ownership is 
prevalent, and corporate governance regulations to protect minority shareholders are weak. 
This paper is subject to a few limitations. First, it only uses ETRs to proxy for tax avoidance in 
Vietnam due to the unavailability of data. Although both accounting ETR and cash ETR can capture 
some level of tax avoidance activities, these measures may not reflect conforming tax avoidance 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Second, some firms in Vietnam may be entitled to several forms of tax 
incentives (e.g., preferential tax rates or tax exemptions) for investments made in specific regions in 





my analysis because of data unavailability. Therefore, the findings should be interpreted with some 
caution.  
Future research on the association between RPTs and tax avoidance in Vietnam might consider 
using other proxies of tax avoidance to examine the validation of this paper’s findings. Finally, future 
research on the association between RPTs and tax avoidance could be carried out in other developing 







Chapter 5: Conclusion  
This chapter presents a summary of the main findings and contributions of each paper in this thesis, 
in addition to potential limitations and some directions for future research. 
 
5.1. Summary of the main findings and contributions 
The first paper, which is presented as Chapter 2, comprehensively describes RPTs and the 
characteristics of firms associated with RPTs in Vietnam. This is the first paper to provide extensive 
data on RPTs reported by listed firms in Vietnam. RPTs are found to be prevalent in the sample of 
650 listed firms in Vietnam irrespective of their ownership structure. I explore the association 
between RPTs and state ownership given its dominance in the Vietnamese economy and the 
significant role of state ownership in corporate governance. Despite extant studies on RPTs since the 
early 2000s and the prevalence of state ownership in publicly traded firms worldwide, the association 
between state ownership and RPTs remains understudied. The results indicate that the existence of 
state ownership limits RPTs engaged in by listed firms in Vietnam although there is a positive 
correlation between the percentage of shares owned by state shareholders and the magnitude of RPTs 
among state-owned firms. I add to the current literature by identifying RPTs in an emerging transition 
economy with concentrated state ownership. I also provide comprehensive evidence of the association 
between state ownership and the extent of RPTs. The findings suggest that state ownership plays a 
major role in firms’ operations. 
In Chapter 3, the second paper investigates the association between RPTs and the cost of debt, and 
the moderating role of state ownership in this association. This paper provides evidence of the positive 
association between RPTs and the cost of debt, suggesting that lenders are likely to assess RPTs as a 





of state ownership in firms is reported to moderate the association between RPTs and the cost of debt. 
Findings from this paper extend prior studies regarding the implication of RPTs, which have generally 
focused on specific stakeholders, such as equity investors or auditors. I investigate the consequences 
of RPTs from the viewpoint of lenders by examining the association between RPTs and the cost of 
debt. RPTs are considered potential conflicts of interest and lenders should be informed of the risk of 
using RPTs to manipulate information in firms’ financial statements. Although firms engaging in 
RPTs are more likely to have a higher cost of debt than non-RPTs firms, those firms still can benefit 
from the involvement of state ownership in obtaining lower debt costs compared to their non-state 
ownership counterparts.  
The third paper, presented in Chapter 4, explores the association between RPTs and corporate tax 
avoidance, and the moderating role of state ownership in this association. This paper reports that firms 
with RPTs are more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities than non-RPTs firms. Among firms 
with RPTs, the higher the extent of RPTs, the more likely firms are to avoid corporate taxes. This 
result supports the view of RPTs according to agency theory (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006), 
which suggests that RPTs may be used for opportunistic purposes by managers and/or controlling 
shareholders to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. However, the positive association 
between RPTs and tax avoidance may be restrained by the presence of state ownership. I find that the 
association between RPTs and tax avoidance in firms with state shareholders is less pronounced than 
in their non-state ownership counterparts. Findings from this paper expand the literature on the 
implication of RPTs, determinants of corporate income tax and the role of state ownership as a 
corporate governance mechanism. 
 
5.2. Limitations 
This thesis is subject to several potential limitations. The first limitation is related to the measurement 





engaged in by firms, I rely on the information on RPTs reported by listed firms. Vietnamese firms, 
however, have poor experience of providing non-financial information in their financial statements. 
Listed firms report insufficient details on the existence and quantity of RPTs and their relationship 
with related parties. Therefore, the results of this thesis might be biased due to incomplete information 
disclosure.  
Second, I only use ETRs as tax avoidance proxies because of data unavailability. Although both 
accounting ETR and cash ETR are able to detect some forms of tax avoidance activities, neither of 
these measures reflects tax avoidance conformity (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Additionally, some 
firms might be entitled to types of tax incentives (either in the form of preferential tax rates or tax 
exemptions) for investments made in specific regions, i.e., remote, or underdeveloped areas. 
However, , I could not incorporate the effect of firms’ region effects in my analysis due to the 
unavailability of data. Therefore, the findings regarding the third paper should be interpreted with 
some caution. 
Third, listed firms in Vietnam are not required to provide information about indirect ownership 
(Robinett et al. 2013), consequently, I do not have access to information on indirect state ownership 
in firms. These data would allow me to further analyse the role of state shareholders, direct and 
indirect, regarding the extent of RPTs employed by firms. Furthermore, given the limitations of data 
on indirect state ownership, the results concerning the moderating role of state ownership in the 
association between RPTs and the cost of debt and the association between RPTs and tax avoidance 
should be cautiously interpreted.  
Finally, the three papers in this thesis are conducted using data during a period that has 
considerable variation in the application of corporate governance regulations in Vietnam. For 
example, the revised Corporate Governance Code was issued in 2012 and enacted in September 2012, 
replacing the initial Corporate Governance Code 2007 (Ministry of Finance 2012). Moreover, the 





information in public firms’ corporate governance reports. Another example of changing corporate 
governance regulation is the issuance of the revised Law on Enterprise in 2014, effective on 1 July 
2015 (National Assembly of Vietnam 2014). One of the changes in the revised Law on Enterprise 
(2014) is the SOE definition. The Law on Enterprise (2014) defines an SOE as an enterprise in which 
the state holds 100 percent of its equity, compared to the definition stated in Law on Enterprise (2015) 
that requires the state holds 50 percent or more of its equity (Phan 2018). These changes lead to 
potential inconsistency in the way firms disclose information, including information on RPTs and 
state ownership.  
 
5.3. Directions for future research 
Given that this represents the first attempt to examine RPTs in Vietnam, it raises some potential topics 
that might be further explored in the future to reveal determinants and implications of RPTs in the 
context of Vietnam. For example, is family, foreign ownership and management ownership a factor 
in determining the extent of RPTs? In addition, how are RPTs associated with the liquidity of stocks, 
and/or the cost of equity capital of listed firms? Such studies should provide potential investors, 
policymakers and regulators with further knowledge of the possible economic consequences of RPTs.  
Building on my thesis, further research could use alternative proxies for the cost of debt and tax 
avoidance to validate findings from this thesis. For example, the association between RPTs and the 
cost of debt in other developing markets could be examined where credit spreads are used to estimate 
the cost of debt, so that the implications of RPTs to bond investors could be potentially revealed. 
Finally, future research on the association between RPTs and tax avoidance could also possibly 
consider using other proxies of tax avoidance, such as long term ETR or book-tax differences, to 
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